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Abstract	
	Human	 Factors	 (HF)	 has	 long	 been	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 causes	 of	incidents	 and	 accidents	 in	 the	 transportation	 industry,	 and	more	 recently	 has	become	 increasingly	 important	 in	 air	 accident	 investigation	 and	 safety	improvement.	As	a	result,	many	National	Investigation	Agencies	(NIAs)	are	now	explicitly	 acknowledging	 HF	 in	 their	 final	 investigation	 reports.	 Whereas	engineering-and	operations-led	 investigation	 can	highlight	what	 happened	 and	
how	 it	occurred,	 it	 is	 increasingly	recognised	 that	 the	 integration	of	HF	 into	an	investigation	can	help	understand	why	a	sequence	of	events	led	to	an	incident	or	accident.			However,	there	are	considerable	challenges	to	more	thorough	integration	of	HF	into	 air	 accident	 investigations.	 Most	 notably,	 there	 remains	 a	 reluctance	amongst	 some	NIAs	 to	 fully	 embrace	HF	and	address	potentially	 important	HF	issues	 in	 detail	 in	 their	 investigations.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 some	investigations	are	consistently	overlooking	potentially	critical	HF	issues,	and	as	a	result	fail	to	fully	address	why	an	incident	or	accident	occurred.	There	is	a	need	for	 research	 that	 examines	 these	 challenges,	 including	 the	 possible	 gap	 that	exists	 between	 research	 and	 industry	 regarding	 the	 development	 and	applicability	 of	 accident	 analysis	 tools,	 and	 that	 provides	practical	 solutions	 to	enable	a	better	integration	of	HF	in	air	accident	investigations.		
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The	 thesis	 aims	 to	 address	 this	 gap	 in	 knowledge	 by	 examining	 the	 training	needs	 of	 air	 accident	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	 develop	more	 thorough	 human	factors	 integration	 in	 accident	 investigations.	 Following	 the	 methodological	process	 of	 a	 Training	 Needs	 Analysis	 (TNA),	 it	 provides	 recommendations	 on	what	 NIAs	 could	 do	 to	 ensure	 more	 thorough	 and	 credible	 HF	 investigations.	These	 recommendations	 focus	 on	 the	 training	 provision	 for	 investigators	 and	managers,	 the	 involvement	 (or	 not)	 of	 HF	 specialists,	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 an	approved	 approach	or	methodology.	They	 are	based	on	 the	 findings	 from	 four	separate	 studies	 conducted	 as	 part	 of	 the	Training	Needs	Analysis;	 namely,	 an	analysis	 of	 accident	 investigation	 reports	 from	 five	 major	 NIAs,	 an	 online	questionnaire	survey	of	current	air	accident	investigators,	a	series	of	qualitative	semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 HF	 specialists	 involved	 in	 air	 accident	investigations	and	an	associated	follow-up	questionnaire	survey.			It	 was	 found	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 HF	 integration	 in	 accident	 reports	 varied	between	NIAs,	with	 those	who	 systematically	 involved	HF	 specialists	 generally	producing	 more	 detailed	 and	 thorough	 HF	 investigations.	 Other	 key	 findings	include	 the	 lack	of	 standardised	 and	adapted	HF	 training	 for	 investigators,	 the	lack	 of	 HF	 refresher	 training,	 and	 the	 need	 for	 investigators	 to	 understand	specialist	input.	Recommendations	from	the	TNA	include	the	need	to	involve	HF	specialists	 throughout	the	 investigation	process	 in	order	to	provide	a	 thorough	and	credible	HF	element	to	accident	investigation	report,	as	well	as	the	necessity	to	develop	adapted	and	standardised	HF	training	for	investigators	and	managers.		 	
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Chapter	I	–	Introduction	
	
I-	1	Context	
	
I-	1-	1	Aviation	Safety	and	Human	Factors		In	 the	 past	 decade,	 the	 aviation	 industry	 has	 continued	 to	 become	 ever-safer,	illustrated	by	a	slow	but	nonetheless	significant	reduction	of	accident	rate	from	3.46	accidents	per	million	sectors	in	2005	to	1.92	accidents	per	million	sectors	in	2014	for	both	jet	and	turboprop	aircraft	(International	Air	Transport	Association	(IATA),	 2015).	 Figures	 are	 also	 improving	 in	 terms	of	 fatal	 accidents:	 between	2005	and	2014	the	 industry	went	 from	a	fatal	accident	rate	of	0.82	to	0.32	per	million	 sectors	 (also	 for	 both	 jet	 and	 turboprop	 aircraft)	 (IATA,	 2015).	 As	 a	result,	 aviation	 and	 the	 air	 transport	 sector	 is	 widely-regarded	 as	 one	 of	 the	safest	industries	in	the	world.				Much	of	this	improvement	can	be	attributed	to	the	increasing	performance	and	reliability	of	aircraft	technologies,	which	has	seen	a	reduction	in	the	number	of	accidents	 caused	by	purely	 technical	 failures.	As	a	 result,	 in	 recent	years	 there	has	been	a	renewed	focus	on	the	role	of	human	error	 in	air	accidents,	as	 it	has	been	widely	demonstrated	that	the	majority	of	accidents	involve	human	error	in	one	way	or	another	(Dismukes,	2010;	Shappell	and	Wiegmann,	2009;	Shappell	at	al,	2007).		
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	Most	accidents	and	serious	 incidents	are	 investigated	by	National	 Investigation	Agencies	 (NIAs),	 who	 need	 to	 conduct	 blame-free	 and	 independent	investigations	 of	 the	 incidents	 in	 question.	 Standard	 practices	 and	recommendations	 on	 how	 to	 conduct	 such	 investigations	 are	 detailed	 in	 the	International	 Civil	 Aviation	 Organisation	 (ICAO)	 Annex	 13	 to	 the	 Chicago	Convention	on	International	Civil	Aviation	“Accident	and	Incident	Investigation”	(ICAO,	2010).	Commercial	organisations	such	as	airlines	and	manufacturers	also	conduct	 their	 own	 organisations,	 particularly	when	NIAs	 are	 not	 involved	 (for	smaller	incidents,	for	example).			Dismukes	 (2010),	 emphasizes	 that	 human	 error,	 and	more	 particularly	 errors	made	 by	 highly-skilled	 experts	 (such	 as	 pilots	 or	 air	 traffic	 controllers)	 are	symptoms,	 rather	 than	 causes,	 of	 the	 system	 in	 which	 they	 work,	 and	 that	therefore,	 apportioning	 blame	 and	 punishment	 would	 not	 improve	 safety.	Instead,	the	entire	system	should	be	considered	in	the	investigation.			Given	 the	 growing	 importance	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 accidents,	 it	 is	 increasingly	being	 recognised	 that	 human	 error	 should	 form	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 an	investigation,	and	that	in	order	to	thoroughly	investigate	an	error,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	“why	the	operator	did	what	they	did	and	why	it	made	sense	at	the	time”	(Dekker,	2006).	For	this	to	happen,	it	requires	investigators	to	remove	any	hindsight	bias	that	they	may	have,	and	embrace	the	role	of	human	factors	in	the	accident	 investigation	 process	 (Dekker,	 2006).	 The	 system	 that	 should	 be	investigated	 includes	 both	 the	 human	 and	 his/her	 physical	 environment	
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(cockpit,	 weather),	 it	 also	 involves	 organisational	 factors	 such	 as	 procedures,	structure	 or	 policies	 as	 well	 as	 training	 and	 interactions	 within	 this	 system.	Investigating	human	 factors	 therefore	means	 considering	 the	human	within	 its	context,	 and	 both	 investigating	 human	 error	 and	 organisational	 factors.	 This	change	 in	 approach	 potentially	 poses	 challenges	 for	 investigations	 that	 have	traditionally	focussed	only	on	technical	aspects	of	accidents.		
I-	1-	2	Preliminary	research		In	 this	 context	 where	 thoroughly	 investigating	 human	 factors	 is	 essential	 to	conducting	 a	 credible	 air	 accident	 investigation,	 the	 researcher	 undertook	 a	qualitative	 study	 regarding	 the	 consideration	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 a	 National	Investigation	Agency	(NIA).	Unlike	some	NIAs,	the	one	used	in	the	study	did	not	have	an	‘in-house’	human	factors	specialist.	The	research	was	undertaken	as	part	of	 the	 author’s	 MSc	 research	 in	 2012,	 and	 aimed	 to	 identify	 how	 such	 an	organisation	 integrate	HF	 into	 their	 investigations	 and	 reports.	While	 this	was	conducted	 separately	 from	 the	 PhD,	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 project	 represented	important	influences	on	the	focus	and	design	of	the	current	research,	and	as	such	are	reported	here.			The	 research	 consisted	 of	 conducting	 15	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	investigators	 with	 different	 levels	 of	 experience.	 This	 organisation’s	investigation	 team	 is	 formed	 of	 inspectors	 specialised	 in	 either	 Flight	 Data	Recorders	 (FDRs),	 Operations	 (Ops.)	 or	 Engineering	 (Eng.).	 The	 operations	
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investigators	focus	on	all	the	aspects	of	flying	and	circumstances	of	the	flight,	the	engineering	 inspectors	 focus	 on	 the	 more	 technical	 part	 of	 the	 investigation	including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 maintenance	 process,	 the	 structure	 of	 the	aircraft,	the	examination	of	ground	marks	and	the	FDRs	inspectors	are	in	charge	of	 the	 recovery	 and	 interpretation	 of	 recording	 devices	 such	 as	 Digital	 Flight	Data	Recorders	(DFDRs),	Cockpit	Voice	Recorders	(CVRs)	and	Global	Positioning	System	(GPS).			The	interviews	focused	on	what	the	investigators	thought	of	human	factors	and	how	 they	 considered	 it	 in	 their	 task	 of	 investigating	 an	 accident.	 Their	 HF	training	 was	 also	 approached.	 Findings	 from	 this	 study	 are	 presented	 in	 an	adaptation	of	the	original	interview	coding	on	Figure	1.	
	
Figure	1:	Coding	from	preliminary	research	interviews	(adapted	from	Burban,	2012)	
	
HF	CONSIDERATION	IN	THE	
ORGANISATION	
DEPTH	of	the	investigation	limited	by	lack	of	resources	 BALANCE:	-More	structured	HF	investigation	needed	-Not	over	complicating	it	
LIMITED	KNOWLEDGE:	good	awareness	but	limitations	when	complex	issues	
Lack	of	EXPERTISE:	-Expert	needed	from	the	start	-Need	someone	available	quickly	and	who	understands	the	needs		-	No	budget	for	an	in-house	expert	-Would	bring	credibility			
Lack	of	TRAINING:		-Desire	to	stay	up-to-date	-Need	for	more	practical,	adapted	training	-Availability	constraint	
CREDIBILITY:		-Evidence-based	culture,	HF	can	be	hard	to	prove	-Credibility	essential	in	report	and	inquest	
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After	 analysing	 the	 transcripts	 of	 the	 interviews	 using	 grounded	 theory,	 key	themes	arose	from	the	interviews.	Those	key	themes	were	all	related	to	human	factors	 and	 were	 presented	 as	 key	 challenges	 for	 the	 investigators	 and	 the	organisation.	The	 ‘depth’	 of	 the	HF	 investigation	being	 limited	due	 to	 a	 lack	of	resources	and	 the	 search	 for	 ‘balance’	 in	 terms	of	HF	versus	 technical	 element	within	an	investigation	were	two	of	the	main	challenges	that	were	emphasized.		The	resources	limiting	the	thoroughness	of	HF	investigation	were	believed	to	be	their	 ‘limited	knowledge’,	 the	 ‘lack	of	HF	training’	and	the	 ‘lack	of	expertise’,	or	specialist	to	refer	to.			The	 limitations	 of	 the	 interviewees’	 knowledge	was	 expressed	 by	 the	 fact	 that	they	believed	they	had	a	good	awareness	of	the	different	HF	topics	but	reached	their	 limitations	 when	 faced	 with	 more	 complex	 issues	 and	 therefore	 did	 not	integrate	them	into	the	report	due	to	 lack	of	evidence.	The	lack	of	training	was	also	one	essential	 factor	as	to	why	HF	was	not	always	investigated	in	sufficient	depth.	 It	was	 found	 that	 the	 investigators	 from	 that	 specific	 organisation	were	only	given	a	very	short	 introduction	to	HF	and	no	refresher	training.	They	also	specified	 that	 more	 adapted	 and	 practical	 training	 would	 be	 more	 useful	 and	effective.	The	 investigators	 found	 it	difficult	 to	apply	HF	 theory	 to	 the	accident	investigation	process.	The	fact	they	that	their	schedule	is	already	busy	with	other	training	and	investigations	was	also	a	limitation	to	receiving	more	HF	training.		This	has	however	evolved.	Since	2014-2015,	the	investigators	and	managers	are	now	undertaking	a	course	focused	on	investigating	human	performance	as	part	of	their	training.	The	impact	is	yet	to	be	observed.	
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As	 well	 as	 their	 limited	 knowledge	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 HF	 training,	 the	 other	 key	theme	 was	 the	 lack	 of	 HF	 expertise	 to	 involve	 in	 investigation.	 Most	 of	 the	participants	 expressed	 concerns	 regarding	who	 to	 contact.	 Their	 requirements	involved	 the	 necessity	 for	 someone	 who	 understands	 the	 needs	 for	 the	organisation	and	who	would	be	available	quickly,	and	preferably	from	the	start	of	the	investigation.	However,	 it	was	believed	that	the	budget	did	not	allow	the	recruitment	of	 a	 full	 time	 in-house	HF	 specialist,	 even	 though	 it	 is	proven	 that	most	 of	 the	 accidents	 involve	 human	 error	 (Shappell	 and	 Wiegmann,	 1997).	Some	 inspectors	 also	 strongly	 believed	 that	 the	 workload	 (i.e.	 a	 rather	 low	amount	 of	 investigations	 that	 would	 require	 the	 specialist’s	 input)	 would	 not	justify	such	an	investment.	Finally,	the	key	theme	that	appeared	from	the	interviews	was	‘credibility’.	Being	credible	 is	 essential	 for	 the	 accident	 investigation	 organisation,	 particularly	when	 involved	 in	 an	 inquest	 and	 considering	 the	 high	 public	 interest	 that	commercial	 aircraft	 accidents	 create.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	 investigators	interviewed	 believed	 that	 HF	 was	 difficult	 to	 prove	 and	 therefore	 the	 HF	elements	 in	 the	 reports	 were	 limited	 due	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 remaining	‘evidence	based’.		It	appears	therefore	that	HF	training,	HF	expertise	and	credibility	were	the	three	main	challenges	identified	by	this	organisation’s	investigators	when	considering	human	factors.	With	this	in	mind,	it	would	seem	relevant	to	further	examine	the	role	of	human	factors	in	accident	investigation	in	order	to	understand	how	these	challenges	could	be	overcome.	The	public	trust	is	based	on	the	independence	of	
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the	organisation	and	the	credibility	of	its	investigations	and	thus	the	quality	of	its	investigators	(Smart,	2004).			
I-	2	Aim	and	objectives		Considering	 the	 importance	 of	 investigating	 human	 factors	 in	 aircraft	 accident	and	incidents	 in	today’s	aviation	industry,	and	the	fact	that	 it	 is	not	made	clear	how	this	should	be	done,	nor	to	what	extent,	looking	at	how	human	factors	could	be	more	 integrated	within	air	accident	 investigation	would	be	a	step	 further	 in	improving	 aviation	 safety.	 Moreover,	 HF	 training	 and	 expertise	 have	 been	identified	as	key	challenges	for	accident	investigators.			Thus,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is:	“To	examine	the	training	needs	of	air	accident	investigators	in	order	to	develop	more	thorough	integration	of	human	factors	in	accident	investigations.”		Five	objectives	were	developed	in	order	to	reach	that	aim:	1. To	identify	the	current	role	of,	and	key	human	factors	challenges	for,	air	accident	investigators.	2. To	analyse	human	factors	integration	in	accident	investigation	reports.	3. To	 evaluate	 the	 relevance	 and	 efficiency	 of	 human	 factors	 training	provision	for	air	accident	investigators.	4. To	assess	the	training	needs	of	air	accident	investigators.	5. To	provide	recommendations	for	developing	human	factors	integration	in	accident	investigations.	
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I-	3	Structure	of	the	thesis		This	 thesis	 is	 formed	 of	 seven	 other	 chapters.	 Although	 reporting	 distinct	studies,	they	are	related	to	each	other.		
Chapter	II:	Literature	review	A	review	of	the	literature	is	undertaken	to	identify	the	role	of	human	factors	in	accident	investigation	and	safety	as	well	as	the	key	HF	challenges	for	air	accident	investigators.	 This	 chapter	 also	 highlights	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 this	research	fills.			
Chapter	III:	Research	design	Chapter	 III	 presents	 the	 paradigm	 in	 which	 this	 research	 is	 taking	 place,	 the	research	strategy	and	provides	a	description	of	the	main	methodology	employed	to	build	this	thesis,	Training	Needs	Analysis	(TNA).	It	also	details	the	objectives	guiding	this	thesis	and	how	each	chapter	fulfils	the	relevant	objective.		
Chapter	IV:	Accident	investigation	reports	analysis	A	content	analysis	of	15	official	accident	reports	was	conducted	as	the	first	stage	of	 the	TNA.	 Its	purpose	was	 to	 examine	 in	 existing	 reports	what	 the	 literature	had	identified:	the	lack	of	thorough	HF	investigation.	The	analysis	section	of	each	report	was	therefore	analysed	looking	for	how	the	HF	issues	were	dealt	with	and	integrated.			
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Chapter	V:	Accident	investigators	training	An	online	 questionnaire	was	 sent	 to	 air	 accident	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	 find	out	more	about	 the	 type	of	HF	 training	 they	had	received	and	how	useful	 they	thought	 it	was.	89	investigators	from	different	regions,	with	different	roles	and	working	 for	 different	 types	 of	 organisations	 took	 the	 survey.	 Descriptive	statistics	were	employed	to	analyse	the	three	parts	of	the	questionnaire.	The	first	one	 focused	 on	 the	 initial	 training	 they	 received,	 the	 second	 one	 on	 specialist	training	and	the	final	part	focused	on	human	factors.			
Chapter	VI:	Human	factors	experts	interviews	Thematic	analysis	was	used	to	analyse	interviews	conducted	with	human	factors	experts	who	are	involved	in	accident	investigation.	The	questions	were	focused	on	 their	opinion	of	 the	 training	 for	accident	 investigators,	 their	 involvement	 in	an	 investigation,	 the	 way	 HF	 should	 be	 integrated	 and	 who	 the	 ideal	 HF	investigator	should	be.	This	study	is	the	first	part	of	a	triangulation	methodology	aiming	at	increasing	the	validity	of	the	findings.		
Chapter	VII:	Human	factors	experts	consensus	As	the	second	part	of	the	triangulation	process,	a	questionnaire	was	sent	to	the	specialists	who	were	 interviewed	 in	 the	previous	study.	The	questions	 focused	on	 the	 content	 and	 format	 of	 HF	 training	 for	 investigators	 and	 the	 skills	 and	attributes	 of	 the	 ideal	 HF	 specialists	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 accident	 investigation.	Descriptive	statistics	were	employed	 to	 identify	 the	elements	 that	 received	 the	majority	of	responses	from	the	participants.			
	 10	
Chapter	VIII:	Discussion	and	conclusion	The	final	chapter	of	the	thesis	discusses	the	findings	from	all	the	different	studies	and	 the	use	 of	TNA.	 It	 provides	 recommendations	 regarding	 the	 integration	of	HF	within	accident	investigation.	It	also	discusses	the	limitations	of	the	research	and	 describes	 further	 research	 that	 could	 be	 carried	 out	 based	 on	 the	conclusions.			
I-	4	Ethics	considerations	
	Each	individual	study	presented	in	this	thesis	was	carefully	designed	neither	to	put	the	participants’	career	at	risk,	nor	to	have	an	impact	on	the	organisations’	reputation.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 interviews	 participants	 and	 the	 questionnaires	respondents	will	 remain	 anonymous.	 Each	 study	 involving	human	participants	received	approval	from	the	Cranfield	University	Ethics	System	(CURES).		 	
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Chapter	II	–	Literature	review	
	
II-1	Introduction		The	 objective	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 current	 role	 of	 and	 key	 human	factors	challenges	 for	air	accident	 investigators	by	providing	an	analysis	of	 the	literature.	 Peer-reviewed	 journals,	 books,	 and	 also	 regulations	 and	 standard	operating	procedures	documentation	were	reviewed	in	order	to	identify	the	gap	in	research	that	led	to	the	aim	of	this	study:	examining	the	training	needs	of	air	accident	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	 develop	more	 through	 integration	 of	 human	factors	 in	 accident	 investigations.	 	 It	 is	 presented	 in	 three	 complementary	sections	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 providing	 a	 relevant	 and	 solid	 context	 for	 this	research	project.		First	 of	 all,	 the	 role	 of	 accident	 investigation	 in	 aviation	 safety	 and	 its	 main	purposes	are	addressed.	Where	accident	investigation	is	considered	as	a	reactive	process,	 its	 proactive	 character,	 through	 safety	 recommendations,	 is	 also	highlighted.	 Then,	 considering	 the	 complex	 exercise	 that	 is	 an	 air	 accident	investigation,	 the	most	 important	 challenges	 raised	 by	 such	 an	 enterprise	 are	determined.	 The	 terminology	 used	 in	 causation,	 the	 shift	 in	 focus	 that	 has	occurred	 since	 the	 early	 days	 of	 aviation,	 the	 type	 of	 events	 that	 need	 to	 be	investigated,	 the	 importance	 of	 being	 blame-free	 and	 independent,	 the	recruitment	and	training	of	accident	investigators	are	then	also	identified.	These	challenges	 as	well	 as	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 accident	 investigation	 determine	 and	highlight	 its	multi-disciplinary	character.	Finally,	human	factors	 is	addressed	in	
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greater	 detail	 by	 providing	 a	 brief	 history	 of	 its	 evolution	 as	 well	 as	 its	implications	 and	 importance	 in	 accident	 investigation.	 These	 three	 sections	provide	 evidence	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 aviation	 and	 aviation	 human	 factors	occurred	in	parallel	with	the	shift	in	focus	of	accident	investigation	and	that	the	latter	is	inseparable	from	the	umbrella	discipline	that	is	human	factors.																				
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II-2	Accident	investigation	role	
II-2-1	Accident	investigation	and	aviation	safety		Accident	 investigation	plays	a	major	role	 in	the	 improvement	of	aviation	safety	(Tench,	1985).	For	Tench	(1985),	former	head	of	the	Air	Accidents	Investigation	Branch	(AAIB)	in	the	United	Kingdom	(UK),	“Safety	is	no	accident”.	The	absence	of	accident	is	the	meaning	and	essence	of	safety.	The	International	Civil	Aviation	Organisation	 (ICAO),	 which	 sets	 requirements	 and	 recommended	 practices	 to	the	aviation	 industry	defines	safety	as	“the	state	in	which	the	possibility	of	harm	
to	 persons	 or	 of	 property	 damage	 is	 reduced	 to,	 and	maintained	at	 or	 below,	 an	
acceptable	 level	 through	a	continuing	process	of	hazard	 identification	and	safety	
risk	management”	(ICAO,	2013,	p	2-1).	This	definition	implies	the	acceptance	of	a	certain	 level	of	 risk,	which	 is	different	 from	 the	Oxford	dictionary	definition	of	Safety:	 “the	condition	of	being	protected	from	or	unlikely	to	cause	danger,	risk	or	
injury”.	 For	 everyone	who	 isn’t	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 high-risk	 industry	 and	who	is	a	common	user	of	transportation,	safety	means	being	able	to	go	from	A	to	B	safely	and	in	a	safe	manner.	In	the	aviation	industry,	safety	is	essential	to	gain	public	 trust	 in	 order	 to	 be	 profitable.	 Without	 excellent	 safety	 records,	commercial	 aviation	 would	 not	 have	 developed	 into	 the	 major	 worldwide	industry	 that	 it	 is	 nowadays.	 But	 the	 ultimate	 goal	 remains	 avoiding	 incidents	and	 accidents.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 the	 definition	 that	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 the	most	relevant	to	this	research	is:	Safety	is	“to	prevent	something	unwanted	from	
happening	or	to	protect	against	its	consequences”	(Hollnagel,	2008,	p221).			
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The	 measurement	 of	 safety	 is	 an	 important	 concern	 for	 the	 aviation	 industry	because	it	is	a	direct	evidence	of	performance	to	the	public.	In	2001,	with	an	aim	to	define	safety,	Braithwaite	(2001)	highlights	the	importance	of	linking	risk	and	safety	in	order	to	get	measurable	data	on	which	safety	can	be	judged.	“Safety	is	
not	measurable	–	risks	are.	Safety	may	be	judged	relative	to	its	level	of	risk	versus	
the	 acceptable	 level	 of	 risk.	 To	 determine	 safety	 therefore,	 involves	 two	 quite	
separate	activities;	measuring	risk	and	 judging	safety”	 (Braithwaite,	 2001,	 p19).	Nevertheless,	 safety	 is	 generally	 represented	 statistically,	 for	 example	 the	number	of	accidents	during	the	past	decades,	and	often	by	specifying	the	number	of	 fatalities	 per	 passenger	mile	 (Allward,	 1967;	 Stolzer	 et	 al,	 2008,	 p	 15).	 Yet,	Reason	 (2000)	 and	 Hollnagel	 (2008)	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 safety	 is	 often	measured	by	its	absence	rather	than	its	presence	and	“while	high	accident	rates	
may	reasonably	be	taken	as	 indicative	of	a	bad	safety	state,	 low	asymptotic	rates	
do	not	necessarily	signal	a	good	one”	(Reason,	2000,	p6).		Another	important	question	for	both	aviation	industry	and	research	is	whether	the	absence	of	accidents	is	even	possible.	As	of	2016,	Australia	still	has	not	had	a	single	 passenger	 fatality	 in	 a	 commercial	 jet	 aviation	 accident	 or	 incident.	However,	 a	 number	 of	 recent	 high-profile	 accidents	 (e.g.	 Malaysian	 Airlines	flights	MH370,	MH17,	 and	 the	Germanwings	 flight	9525)	 show	 that	 safety	 and	therefore	accident	investigation	are	still	key	challenges	for	aviation.		Whether	or	not	safety	can	be	measured	accurately	by	accident	rates,	it	is	widely	thought	 that	 investigating	 accidents	 and	 incidents	 is	 a	 major	 tool	 to	 safety	improvement.	 Jerry	Lederer,	 first	 elected	president	 of	 the	 Society	 of	Air	 Safety	Investigators	 (SASI),	 later	 the	 International	 Society	 of	 Air	 Safety	 Investigators	
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(ISASI),	 noted	 during	 its	 first	 international	 seminar	 in	 1970	 that	 “Much	 of	 the	
progress	in	the	development	of	safety	resulted	from	lessons	learned	from	accident	
investigation”	and	“There	is	no	reason	to	doubt	that	this	will	continue	and	that	new	
techniques	will	be	developed	to	aid	the	investigator	to	determine	probable	causes	
with	 less	 time	 and	 more	 accuracy	 than	 in	 the	 past”	 (Martinez,	 2014,	 p9).	 And	although	there	has	been	much	development	in	the	field	of	safety	since	the	1970s,	this	 still	 guides	 much	 of	 the	 current	 thinking	 on	 accident	 investigation	 today.		Table	1	 illustrates	how	major	 investigations	not	only	provided	better	tools	and	knowledge	for	investigators	(e.g.	investigation	and	recovery	techniques)	but	also	led	 to	 safety	 developments	 on	 aircraft	 and	 in	 the	 industry.	Whether	 it	 is	 new	equipment	 for	 increased	 safety,	 the	 creation	 or	 remodelling	 of	 procedures	 for	better	interpretation,	or	the	development	of	training,	each	major	accident	led	to	actions	that	improved	the	state	of	aviation	safety.		
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Date	 Accident	 Aftermath/	Lessons	learn	and	safety	improvements	
Nov.	1973	 Smoke	 emergency,	 diversion	 and	Crash	 of	 Pan	 American	 World	Airways	Inc.,	Clipper	flight	160	 Equipment	and	procedure	changes	regarding	smoke	emergency	New	status	for	hazardous	material	regulations,	international	hazmat	safety	initiatives	at	ICAO	and	changes	in	hazardous	materials	package	shipping	regulations	and	practices	for	air	transportation	and	other	modes	
June,	1975			 Crash	 during	 approach	 at	 New	York	JFK	due	to	wind	shear		 Identification	of	Wind	Shear	as	a	phenomenon:	change	of	focus	from	pilot	error	to	consideration	of	pilot’s	environment	Development	of	instrumentation	to	help	pilots	cope	with	these	constraints		March	1977	 Collision	 between	 KLM	 Flight	4805	 and	 Pan	 Am	 flight	 1736,	Tenerife	 Standardisation	communication	terms	between	pilots	and	ATC	with	English	as	working	language,	development	of	first	CRM	training	mandatory	for	all	pilots	Nov.1979				
Crash	 of	 Air	 New	 Zealand	 901,	Mount	Erebus	disaster	 1980:	pilot	decision	as	principal	cause,	followed	by	inquiry		1981,	dominant	cause:	alteration	of	the	flight	plan	in	the	ground	navigation	computer	without	advising	the	crew	Subsequent	litigation		Being	re-investigated	due	to	blaming	report	Knowledge	gained	on	body,	data	and	wreckage	recovery		Aug.	1985	 Crash	 on	 approach	 at	 Dallas	 -	during	 thunderstorm,	 largely	attributed	to	wind	shear	 Specific	changes	in	crew	training,	reprogramming	of	simulators	to	simulate	wind	shear	phenomenon	Development	of	runway	instrument	to	provide	pilots	with	wind	speeds	and	directions	information	Aug.	1985	 Aborted	 take	 off	 and	 fire	 of	charter	 flight	 at	 Manchester	airport	 Industry	developed	fire	resistant	cabin	interiors	to	increase	survivability	Sept	1994	 Crash	 of	 USAir	 Flight	 427:	mysterious	low	level	upset	 Extensive	simulations	to	understand	what	happened	(and	during	other	similar	events)		Research	on	cockpit	warnings,		training	pilots	for	different	emergency	situations	Revision	of	data	captured	by	FDRs	Better	relationship	with	families	of	victims	June	2009	 Disappearance	of	Air	France	flight	447	in	the	Atlantic	Ocean	 Pitot	tubes	replacement,	new	measures	for	data	and	wreckage	recovery	Pilot	Training	and	CRM	changed,	guidance	on	stall	conditions	provided	Recommendations	about	longer	FDRs	beacons	transmission	March	2014	 Disappearance	of	Flight	MH370	 Better	knowledge	on	satellite	location	Improvement	on	FDRs	transmission	and	location	Consideration	of	real	time	tracking	system	
Table	1:	How	major	investigations	improved	safety,	adapted	from	"ISASI,	50	years	of	investigation",	(Benner,	2014)	
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For	 many	 decades,	 accident	 investigation	 has	 been	 a	 synonym	 of	 safety	improvement.		However,	in	recent	years,	Stoop	and	Dekker	(2012)	questioned	how	relevant	and	proactive	 accident	 investigations	 are	 and	 criticise	 their	 low	 cost	 effectiveness.	Single	events	such	as	AF447	or	MH370	(see	table	1)	cost	millions	of	pounds	just	for	the	search	phase	and	although	they	have	helped	improve	technologies	such	as	 Flight	 Data	 Recorders	 (FDR)	 transmission,	 they	 are	 still	 of	 reactive	 nature.	Flight	Air	France	Flight	447	crashed	 in	 the	middle	of	 the	Atlantic.	 Its	recorders	were	only	found	nearly	two	years	after	the	event.	Flight	MH370,	which	departed	from	Kuala	Lumpur	for	Shanghai,	disappeared,	and	the	search	for	the	wreckage	and	FDR	are	 still	 on	 going.	 “Even	 in	aviation,	 safety	 investigations	are	criticised,	
despite	 their	 long	 lasting	 performance	 and	 proven	 value.	 Investigations	 should	
have	 become	obsolete	 and	 should	 be	 replaced	by	more	modern	 concepts”	 (Stoop	and	 Dekker,	 2012,	 p1422).	 They	 recognise	 nonetheless	 the	 evolution	 and	development	 of	 accident	 investigation	 and	 therefore	 conclude,	 “In	 this	 respect,	they	do	not	differ	 from	modern	safety	management	systems”	 (Stoop	 and	Dekker,	2012,	p1422).		These	more	modern	 concepts,	 as	 referred	by	Stoop	and	Dekker,	 include	Safety	Management	 Systems	 (SMS)	 and	 Resilience	 (Hollnagel,	 2004).	 SMS	 are	implemented	to	reduce	the	risk	of	incidents	and	accidents	by	identifying	hazards	and	 managing	 the	 risks	 that	 could	 compromise	 safety	 (Stolzer	 et	 al,	 2008).	Considerable	 evolutions	 of	 the	 cockpit	were	 developed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 previous	events.	 Amongst	 the	 important	 ones	 are	 wind	 speed	 and	 direction	 indication	(see	table	1)	and	Traffic	Alert	and	Collision	Avoidance	System	(TCAS).	Hollnagel	(2004),	 a	 key	 researcher	 on	 resilience,	 emphasizes	 the	 necessity	 of	 predicting	
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accidents	in	order	to	prevent	them,	by	using	accident	analysis	models.	According	to	 Hollnagel,	 accident	 prevention	 by	 understanding	 the	 role	 of	 barriers,	 as	opposed	 to	 single	 event	 investigation,	 would	 be	 the	 future	 of	 safety	 (i.e.	equivalent	to	those	of	risk	assessment	and	risk	analysis).	Hollnagel	(2004,	p35)	argues	 that	 “The	 value	 of	 finding	 the	 correct	 cause	 or	 explanation	 is	 that	 it	
becomes	 possible	 to	 do	 something	 constructively	 to	 prevent	 future	 accidents”.	Understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 accidents,	 as	 opposed	 to	 finding	 the	 “cause”	would	be	the	way	forward	to	improve	safety.		There	 is	 also	 a	 strong	 relationship	 between	 accident	 investigation	 and	 Safety	Management	Systems	(SMS),	particularly	 in	 large	companies	with	formal	safety	management:	SMS	defines	the	process	and	the	aim	of	accident	investigation	and	accident	investigation	can	be	used	as	a	“learning	process”,	or	feedback	loop	that	can	 improve	 the	 system	 with	 its	 recommendations	 (Harms-Ringdhal,	 2004).	Harms-Ringdhal	 (2004)	 identifies	 another	 relationship:	 that	 accident	investigation’s	 output	 is	 important	 for	 risk	 analysis	 and	 that,	 in	 turn,	 risk	analysis	 should	 be	 able	 to	 identify	 types	 of	 events	 and	 therefore	 influence	accident	investigation.		Alternatively,	Lundberg	and	 Johansson	(2006)	not	only	 insist	on	 the	 important	role	of	accident	investigation	in	safety	but	also	on	the	necessity	to	focus	on	the	resilience	and	 the	 stability	of	 a	 complex	 system.	Safety	 recommendations	 from	different	 types	 of	 events	 (regular,	 irregular	 and	 unexampled)	 identified	 by	Hollnagel’s	 accident	models	 (linear	model,	 complex	 linear	model	 and	 systemic	non-linear	 model)	 (2006)	 should	 increase	 both	 stability	 and	 resilience	 of	 a	system	in	order	to	maintain	safe	performance.	The	recommendations	published	in	 the	 aftermath	of	 an	 accident,	which	 are	 intended	 to	prevent	 a	 similar	 event	
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from	happening	 again,	 imply	 a	 pro-active	 philosophy	 in	 accident	 investigation.	So	 where	 the	 investigation	 process	 in	 itself	 is	 reactive,	 since	 it	 is	 undertaken	after	 a	 single	 event,	 the	 production	 of	 safety	 recommendations	 makes	 it	 a	recognised	tool	for	safety	improvement.	Therefore,	 accident	 investigation	 and	 modern	 safety	 management	 systems	should	 not	 replace	 one	 another	 but	 instead	 complement	 each	 other.	 “Both	
instruments	 are	 neither	 obsolete,	 nor	 modern,	 but	 each	 require	 a	 careful	
positioning	 in	 the	 risk	 decision	 making	 spectrum”	 (Stoop	 and	 Dekker,	 2012,	p1430).	Accident	 investigation	 is	 the	most	widely	used	tool	 (Roed-Larsen	et	al,	2004)	for	safety	improvement.	It	can	help	ensure	a	state	of	safety	by	producing	safety	 recommendations,	 and	 is	 relevant	as	 long	as	 it	 is	 adapted	 to	 the	 type	of	event	that	occurred.	However,	it	is	not	perfect	and	has	limitations,	which	is	why	it	should	not	be	undertaken	in	isolation.			
II-2-2	The	goal	of	an	accident	investigation		ICAO’s	 definition	 of	 an	 accident	 investigation	 is	 “a	 process	 conducted	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 accident	 prevention	 which	 includes	 the	 gathering	 and	 analysis	 of	
information,	 the	 drawing	 of	 conclusions,	 including	 determination	 of	 causes	 and,	
when	appropriate,	 the	making	of	 safety	 recommendations”.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	understanding	 what	 happened,	 how	 and	 why	 it	 happened	 and	 how	 its	recurrence	can	be	avoided.		Accident	investigation	originated	in	the	early	days	of	aviation	when	the	first	events	started	to	occur.	The	development	of	international	commercial	aviation	led	to	the	creation	of	numerous	organisations	for	regulation	
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and	investigations	(Smart,	2004).	Amongst	them,	ICAO	was	created	in	1947	after	the	publication	of	its	Chicago	Convention	that	took	place	in	1944.	It	published	a	number	of	annexes,	including	Annex	13,	which	provided	international	standards	and	recommended	practices	on	accident	and	incident	investigation,	which	have	been	variously	updated	(latest	edition	from	2010)	and	complemented	since	then	(e.g.	 ICAO	 Doc	 9756	 and	 ICAO	 Doc	 9156).	 At	 a	 European	 level,	 the	 European	Commission	 produced	 in	 2010	 the	 “Regulation	 EU	 996/2010	 of	 the	 European	Parliament	 and	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 20	 October	 2010	 on	 the	 investigation	 and	prevention	 of	 accidents	 and	 incidents	 in	 civil	 aviation	 and	 repealing	 Directive	94/56/EC”,	 which	 regulates	 the	 investigation	 of	 accident	 and	 incident	investigation.	 As	 opposed	 to	 ICAO	 Annex	 13,	 which	 provides	 standards	 and	recommended	 practices,	 EU	 996	 is	 a	 regulation	 that	 each	 European	 member	state	has	to	follow.	It	takes	precedence	over	the	regulator	from	these	countries.		In	 addition	 to	 the	 determining	 of	 causes	 of	 the	 crash	 and	 providing	 safety	recommendations,	 ICAO	 recommends	 that	 the	 investigation	 authority	 be	 fully	independent	from	any	manufacturer,	operator	or	governmental	agencies	from	its	country.	 This	 is	 to	 avoid	 any	 conflict	 of	 interest	with	 the	 industry,	 its	 purpose	being:	“the	sole	objective	of	the	investigation	of	an	accident	or	incident	shall	be	the	
prevention	 of	 accidents	 and	 incidents.	 It	 is	 not	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 activity	 to	
apportion	blame	or	liability”	(ICAO	annex	13).		In	 practice	 however,	 investigators	 have	 different	 views	 on	 investigation	purposes:	Rollenhagen	et	al	(2010)	found	that	among	the	Swedish	investigators	community,	 the	 majority	 considered	 the	 purpose	 of	 investigation	 as	 being	finding	 the	 causes	 of	 an	 event	 and	 only	 a	 minority	 to	 produce	 safety	recommendations.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 a	 previous	 study,	 Roed	 Larsen	 et	 al	 (2004)	
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found	 that	 industry	 and	 transportation	 organisations	 mostly	 considered	 the	primary	 objective	 of	 investigation	 as	 being	 “prevention	 of	 accidents	 or	
recommendation	to	reduce	or	eliminate	the	identified	threats”	(p9).		An	 alternative	 view	 is	 proposed	 by	 Van	 Vollhenhoven	 whose	 purpose	 of	investigation	is	more	orientated	towards	the	impact	it	has	on	the	society	and	the	organisations:	 “Independent	 investigations	 into	disasters,	accidents	and	 incidents	
are	 invaluable	 to	 society	 in	 general	 and	 to	 ensuring	 safety.	 They	 put	 an	 end	 to	
public	 concern	 in	 the	wake	 of	 an	 accident,	 help	 the	 victims	 and	 their	 families	 to	
come	to	terms	with	what	has	happened,	 teach	 lessons	 for	the	 future,	and	prevent	
the	 same	 thing	 happening	 again.	 They	 are	 an	 important	 aid	 in	 safeguarding	
democracy	by	making	our	actions	transparent.”		(Van	Vollhenhoven,	2002,	p19)			Although	 the	 purpose	 of	 accident	 investigation	 is	 clearly	 defined	 by	 ICAO,	 in	reality,	 its	 objectives	 can	 be	 conflicting	 depending	 on	 the	 point	 of	 view	 from	which	it	is	considered:	researcher	or	practitioner.	But	rather	than	considering	a	single	view,	this	research	sees	the	objectives	described	previously	as	challenges.				In	 one	 hundred	 years,	 accident	 investigation	 challenges	 have	 evolved	with	 the	development	of	 the	aviation	 industry,	whether	general,	commercial	or	military.	Roed-Larsen	and	Stoop	(2012)	have	 identified	external	and	 internal	challenges	for	 modern	 accident	 investigation:	 the	 allocation	 of	 blame,	 the	 shift	 towards	more	 complex	 system	 and	 non-linear	 system	 approach,	 the	 independence	 of	investigation,	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 organisation	 (uni	 modal	 or	 multi	 modal),	 the	methodology	used	by	the	investigators	and	their	training	and	competence.	Stoop	and	 Dekker	 (2012)	 also	 emphasize	 the	 challenges	 of	 the	 new	 missions	 that	accident	investigators	have	to	face:	public	trust,	support	to	victims	and	relatives	and	emergency	services	response.	
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II-3	Accident	investigation	challenges		
II-	3-	1	Causation	terminology		Starting	 with	 the	 definition	 of	 accident	 investigation,	 the	 determination	 of	causation	 terminology	 has	 always	 been	 controversial.	 The	 term	 ‘cause’,	 which	implies	 the	 nomination	 of	 guilt,	 conflicts	with	 the	 ‘blame-free’	 character	 of	 an	Annex	13	investigation	and	this	issue	is	widely	debated	in	the	industry.	The	 interpretation	 and	 definition	 of	 the	 term	 ‘cause’	 influence	 the	 whole	investigation,	 by	 impacting	what	 one	 looks	 for	 but	 also	what	 one	 considers	 as	being	part	of	the	accident	itself	(Wood	and	Sweginnis,	2006).		A	 number	 of	 recommendations	 have	 been	 made	 in	 recent	 years	 to	 try	 and	improve	 accident	 investigations.	 For	 example,	 ISASI	 recommended	 ICAO	 to	define	 two	 types	 of	 causes:	 the	 descriptive	 causes,	 which	 describe	 what	happened,	and	the	explanatory	causes,	which	explain	why	the	accident	happened	(Wood	 and	 Sweginnis,	 2006).	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 apportioning	 blame,	 the	Australian	 Transport	 Safety	 Bureau	 (ATSB)	 advises	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 word	cause	 from	 investigation	 reports.	 It	 is	 using	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘safety	 factors’	(Walker,	 2009),	 which	 is	 “an	 event	 or	 condition	 that	 increases	 safety	 risk”,	 that	can	 be	 contributory	 or	 not.	 Their	 argument	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 principle	 that,	unlike	 a	 legal	 investigation,	 determining	 causation	 is	 not	 essential	 to	 enhance	safety.	 It	 therefore	 supports	 Hollnagel’s	 (2004)	 concept	 of	 understanding	 the	nature	 of	 accident	 instead	 of	 finding	 the	 causes	 to	 improve	 safety.	 Another	benefit	of	adopting	the	term	‘contributing	safety	factor’	instead	of	‘cause’	is	that	
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it	provides	more	accuracy	about	 its	degree	of	 relation	with	 the	event.	 It	would	also	avoid	any	misinterpretation	during	an	 inquest	 following	the	publication	of	the	 report	 (Walker,	 2009).	 This	 approach	 is	 contradictory	 with	 Woods	 and	Sweginnis	 (2006),	who	 insist	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 general	 public,	 the	media	 as	well	as	organisation	need	causes	and	too	much	discussion	“would	be	a	waste	of	
time”.	ICAO	has	nevertheless	published	working	papers	on	the	topic,	concluding	that	it	is	unlikely	a	consensus	would	be	obtained	about	removing	the	term	‘cause’	from	annex	 13	 (ICAO,	 2008).	 Therefore,	 the	 amendments	 that	 were	 suggested	 to	balance	 and	 attenuate	 the	 legal	 implications	 of	 the	word	 ‘cause’	were	 that	 the	definition	of	the	latter	was	edited	by	adding	the	no	liability	factor	and	that	states	could	report	causes	and/or	contributory	factors.	Walker	(2009)	also	added	that	not	 only	 definitions	 should	 be	 made	 clear,	 they	 should	 be	 completed	 by	 a	detailed	analysis	framework	to	assist	the	investigators’	task.	Nonetheless,	there	remains	considerable	disagreement	regarding	this	issue.		
II-	3-	2	Shift	in	investigation	focus:	from	looking	for	a	single	cause	to	understanding	
complex	systems		In	 the	 early	 years	 of	 aviation	 safety,	 the	 focus	 of	 accident	 investigation	 was	mostly	on	finding	a	unique	cause	to	an	accident	and	then	shifted	towards	finding	several	 causes	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 categorised	 (primary	 cause,	 root	 cause	 etc.)	(Wood	and	Sweginnis,	2006).	The	determination	of	causes,	in	terms	of	definition	and	 implications,	 evolved	 with	 the	 development	 of	 accident	 models.	 The	 first	
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accident	 causation	 model	 developed	 was	 Heinrich’s	 domino	 theory	 (1931,	 in	Katsakiori	 et	 al,	 (2009)).	 It	 implied	 the	 linear	 progression	 of	 an	 event,	 i.e.	 one	event	causing	another	and	eventually	causing	the	accident.	It	meant	looking	for	a	single	 primary	 or	 root	 cause.	 During	 this	 period,	 accident	 investigators	 were	mainly	looking	for	technical	failures	(Dien	et	al,	2012;	Stoop	and	Dekker,	2012).	After	 the	 Second	World	War,	 aviation	 technology	 became	 increasingly	 reliable	and	the	investigator’s	focus	shifted	to	the	human	operator	(Dien	et	al	2012).	In	the	 1970s,	 the	 concepts	 of	 Human-Machine	 Interaction	 (HMI)	 and	 ergonomics	were	developed	and	started	to	be	 incorporated	into	 investigations.	At	the	time,	accidents	were	 caused	 by	 a	 technical	 failure,	 a	 human	 error	 or	 another	 factor	that	 was	 put	 in	 a	 category	 called	 ‘other’	 (Hollnagel,	 2004).	 So	 although	 the	human	factor	was	considered	during	the	investigation,	the	blame	was	put	on	the	operator	 doing	 the	 error.	 From	 linear	 causality,	 accident	 investigation	models	moved	 towards	multi-causality	with	Reason’s	 introduction	 of	 active	 and	 latent	failures	 concepts,	 in	 the	 late	 1980s,	 early	 1990s.	 It	 brought	 the	 notion	 of	organisational	 factors	as	causal	 factors.	Accident	models	became	an	 interaction	between	 more	 factors.	 As	 the	 aviation	 system	 became	 more	 complex,	 more	complex	 accident	models	were	developed.	 Figure	2	 shows	 the	 evolution	of	 the	type	of	causes,	from	single	to	complex.	(Hollnagel,	2004,	p33).		
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Figure	2:	Development	in	types	of	causes	(Hollnagel,	2004,	Barriers	and	Accident	Prevention,	p33)	
	The	evolution	of	the	type	of	causes	occurred	with	the	development	of	technology	and	 knowledge	 but	 also	 in	 parallel	 with	 the	 development	 of	 accident	 models	(from	linear	to	complex).		Moreover,	Hollnagel	 (2004)	 studied	 the	evolution	of	 attribution	of	 causes	over	the	 years	 (see	 figure	 3).	 It	 coincides	 with	 the	 different	 focuses	 of	 the	investigation	described	by	Dien	et	al	(2012),	 from	technical	 failure,	 to	operator	errors	and	then	to	organisational	errors.						
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Figure	 3:	 Trends	 in	 the	 attribution	 of	 accident	 causes	 (Hollnagel,	 2004,	 Barriers	 and	 Accident	
Prevention,	p46)	
	Figure	3	shows	an	increase	in	accidents	attributed	to	human	performance.	It	is,	however,	unlikely	that	operators’	performance	diminished.	Instead,	the	industry	started	to	understand	it	in	greater	detail,	different	types	of	error	were	identified	and	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 environment	 on	 the	 operators’	 performance	 was	considered.	 Equally,	 technical	 failures	 still	 occur,	 but	 investigations	 are	 now	focusing	 on	 the	 reason	 why	 they	 occurred,	 i.e.	 why	 the	 equipment	 failed,	considering	its	design	phase	up	to	its	operation	and	maintenance.	Reason	(2008,	p131)	refers	to	a	“widening	of	the	scope	of	accident	investigation”.	This	evolution	is	 cumulative	 and	 not	 exclusive	 (Reason,	 2008;	 Dien	 et	 al	 2012).	 Figure	 4	illustrates	the	shift	in	focus	during	accident	investigation.			
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Figure	4:	Shift	in	emphases	of	accident	investigation	(Reason,	2008,	The	Human	Contribution,	p131)	
	As	well	as	adapting	to	the	increasing	knowledge	and	development	in	technology,	accident	investigation	had	to	adapt	to	the	ever-growing	aviation	industry.	More	recently,	 the	 interpretation	of	 safety	and	 its	 emphasis	was	 confronted	by	a	big	change:	 the	 need	 for	 shifting	 from	 a	 reactive	 attitude	 to	 safety,	 to	 a	 more	proactive	approach.	This	is	best	illustrated	by	Eurocontrol’s	Safety	I	vs.	Safety	II	document,	which	illustrates	how	the	organisation	broadened	its	vision	of	safety	(see	table	2).	The	proactive	approach	(or	Safety	II),	which	it	aspires	to,	implies	a	constant	 desire	 to	 anticipate	 events	 whereas	 previously,	 Safety	 I	 consisted	 in	adapting	only	after	an	event	had	occurred,	i.e.	react	after	a	major	event.	
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Table	 2:	 Shift	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	 Safety,	 Redrawn	 from	 Safety	 I	 vs.	 Safety	 II:	 a	 white	 paper	
(Eurocontrol,	2013)	
Table	2	highlights	the	need	for	investigating	what	goes	right	as	opposed	to	just	concentrating	on	what	goes	wrong.	As	with	the	evolution	of	 investigative	 focus	from	 technical	 failure	 to	 organisational	 factors,	 Safety	 I	 and	 Safety	 II	 are	 two	complementary	views	and	should	not	replace	one	another	(Eurocontrol,	2013).		
II-	3-	3	Investigating	incidents			According	 to	 ICAO	 Annex	 13,	 entitled	 “Aircraft	 accident	 and	 incident	investigation”,	accidents	and	serious	incidents	should	both	be	investigated.	The	definition	 of	 an	 accident	 is	 often	 pretty	 straightforward	 and	 clear	 for	 the	industry	and	investigation	organisations.	It	is	“an	occurrence	associated	with	the	
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operation	of	an	aircraft	which	takes	place	between	the	time	any	person	boards	the	
aircraft	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 flight	 until	 such	 time	 as	 all	 such	 persons	 have	
disembarked,	in	which:	
a/	a	person	is	fatally	or	seriously	injured	[…]	
b/	the	aircraft	sustains	damage	or	structural	failure	[…]	
c/	the	aircraft	is	missing	or	completely	inaccessible	[…]”	(ICAO	annex	13,	chapter	1)	When	it	comes	to	incidents	however,	although	the	definition	is	provided,	there	is	room	 for	 interpretation.	 The	 definition	 found	 in	 Annex	 13	 is:	 “An	 occurrence,	
other	than	an	accident,	associated	with	the	operation	of	an	aircraft	which	affects	
or	could	affect	the	safety	of	operation”.	But,	in	order	to	know	the	type	of	incident	that	 needs	 to	 be	 investigated,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 refer	 to	 ICAO	 Doc	 9156,	 The	Accident/Incident	 reporting	manual.	 EU996/2010	 stipulates	 it	 is	 to	 be	 applied	for	 both	 accidents	 and	 serious	 incidents	 investigations.	 A	 serious	 incident	 is	defined	 as	 one	 “involving	 circumstances	 indicating	 that	 there	 was	 a	 high	
probability	 of	 an	 accident”.	 Member	 states	 are	 obliged	 to	 investigate	 such	 an	event	 should	 it	 occur	on	 their	 territory	 (Article	5,	EU996/2010).	 It	 is	 however	the	 investigation	 authority	 that	 decides	 to	 what	 extent	 it	 is	 going	 to	 be	investigated	and	that	same	organisation	might	decide	to	investigate	other	types	of	incident	if	it	is	believed	that	would	be	beneficial	for	safety.	Eurocontrol’s	 Safety	 II	 concept	 advocates	 the	 investigation	 of	what	went	 right	(see	table	2),	for	example	an	incident	with	a	positive	outcome.	Investigating	what	went	 right	 on	 that	 day	might	 help	 prevent	what	 could	 have	 gone	wrong.	 Rose	(2004),	inspired	by	Reason	(1997),	associates	incidents	with	no	loss	of	life	with	‘free	lessons’,	particularly	for	organisations,	encouraging	self-reporting.	It	is	one	
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concept	used	by	Reason	(1997)	for	his	definition	of	safety	culture	(see	figure	5).	Incident	reports	and	 investigations	allow	the	 identification	of	barrier	 failure	as	well	as	barrier	efficiency.	It	also	enables	trends	analysis.		
	
	
Figure	5:	Learning	from	incident,	from	"'Free	lessons'	in	aviation	safety",	Rose,	2004	
	Baker	 (2010)	 defends	 the	 necessity	 to	 investigate	 incidents	 because	 they	 are	more	 frequent	 than	 accidents.	 They	 therefore	 provide	more	 data	 on	 which	 to	build	lessons	that	could	help	improve	the	system.	She	adds	that	positive	outcome	and	 ‘successful	 performance’	 should	 also	 be	mentioned	 in	 order	 to	 show	 that	improvement	could	be	made	as	well	as	providing	motivation.	When	referring	to	minor	 incident	 investigations,	 Strauch	 (2002)	 mentions	 ‘proactive	investigations’.	This	adds	further	to	the	view	that	accident	investigation	can	be	a	proactive	tool.			
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However,	Rose	(2004)	points	out	that	where	more	organisations	do	investigate	some	of	these	incidents,	they	tend	to	do	it	in	the	same	way	that	they	investigate	accidents.	He	adds	that	this	is	not	necessarily	the	most	appropriate	way	since	it	does	not	provide	good	information	on	the	circumstances	of	the	event:	incidents	should	not	only	be	treated	as	an	isolated	occurrences	but	instead	organisations	should	 learn	 from	 them	 and	 outcomes	 shared	 with	 the	 industry	 for	 a	 wider	learning.			
II-	3-	4	Independent	and	blame	free	investigations		In	 order	 to	 maintain	 public	 trust	 and	 remain	 credible,	 aircraft	 accident	investigation	 faced	 the	 necessity	 to	 be	 independently	 run	 from	 any	 state	regulatory	agency	as	well	as	being	blame-free	(Smart,	2004;	Stoop	and	Dekker,	2012).		EU	 996/2010,	 requires	 that	 “The	 safety	 investigation	 authority	 shall	 be	
functionally	 independent	 in	 particular	 of	 aviation	 authorities	 responsible	 for	
airworthiness,	 certification,	 flight	 operation,	 maintenance,	 licensing,	 air	 traffic	
control	 or	 aerodrome	operation	and,	 in	 general,	 of	 any	 other	 party	 or	 entity	 the	
interests	or	missions	of	which	could	conflict	with	 the	 task	entrusted	 to	 the	 safety	
investigation	authority	or	influence	its	objectivity.”	According	 to	 Stoop	 (2009,	 2012),	 this	 need	 for	 independence	 from	 the	 state	appeared	 after	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 and	 increased	 the	 requirements	 for	quality	and	credibility.	It	therefore	created	the	necessity	for	quality	training	and	certification	 for	 accident	 investigators.	 Smart	 (2004)	 details	 three	 major	
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government	reviews	of	aircraft	accident	investigation	(in	1945,	1948	and	1961)	that	 led	 to	 firmly	 establishing	 the	 independence	 of	 investigation	 bodies.	 For	Smart	(2004,	p112),	former	head	of	the	UK	AAIB,	the	independence	is	“perhaps	
the	most	 important	prerequisite	 for	public	and	 industry	 trust.	 […]	 It	ensures	 that	
there	 can	 be	 no	 perception	 of	 conflict	 of	 interest	 which	 reduces	 the	 scope	 for	
“cover-up”	or	conspiracy	theories.”	Independent	investigations	are	now	a	citizens’	right	 and	 society’s	 duty	 (Van	Vollenhoven,	 European	Transport	 Safety	 Council,	2001).	This	independence	can	be	demonstrated	to	the	public	and	industry	in	the	report	published	after	an	event,	by	demonstrating	objectivity	and	transparency	in	 the	 investigation.	 	 Besides	 the	 independence	 from	 regulators	 and	 the	transport	 industry,	 the	 investigation	needs	 to	be	 independent	 from	the	 judicial	authorities	(Marinho	de	Bastos,	2004).	The	safety	investigation	shall	indeed	not	apportion	blame	or	liability	(ICAO	Annex	13,	EU996/2010)	whereas	it	is	the	role	of	 the	 judicial	 investigation	 to	 prosecute	 an	 individual	 or	 an	 organisation.	 In	countries	 where	 judicial	 and	 safety	 investigations	 are	 run	 in	 parallel	 it	 can	become	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 organisations	 to	 gain	 political	 support	 in	 order	 to	have	free	access	to	evidence	and	necessary	resources	(such	as	FDRs).		Remaining	 independent	 from	 other	 agencies	 enables	 accident	 investigators	 to	maintain	 an	 objective	 view	 on	 the	 culture	 of	 these	 organisations,	 should	 they	become	involved	in	an	event.	The	final	report	would	therefore	provide	facts	only,	based	 on	 evidence	 as	 opposed	 to	 opinion.	 Adopting	 a	 blame-free	 policy	 forces	the	 investigators	 to	 move	 away	 from	 only	 focusing	 on	 the	 individual	 and	 in	theory	 leads	 them	 towards	 investigating	 technical	 issues	 as	 well	 as	 human	factors	 and	 organisational	 issues,	 in	 other	words,	 understanding	 the	 impact	 of	
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the	environment	on	the	operators.	The	environment	is,	among	other	things,	the	organisation	culture.		
II-	3-	5	The	accident	investigators		Accident	 investigators	 are	 the	main	 actors	 in	 accident	 investigations.	 They	 are	the	 people	 gathering	 evidence,	 analysing	 the	 data	 and	writing	 the	 final	 report	that	 contains	 the	 safety	 recommendations,	 which	 intend	 to	 improve	 aviation	safety.	It	is	the	reason	why	they	need	to	be	highly	skilled.	According	to	Smart	(2004,	p113),	“the	most	important	factors	in	establishing	trust	
in	 the	 investigation	 process	 is	 that	 of	 the	 professional	 qualities	 of	 the	 individual	
investigators”.	Since	they	are	dealing	with	the	people	involved	and	their	relatives,	their	credibility	is	essential:	knowledge	and	expertise	will	allow	them	to	gather	relevant	information	and	evidence;	respect,	sensitivity	and	personal	qualities	are	essential	when	dealing	with	 survivors,	 next	of	 kin	 and	witnesses	 to	make	 sure	they	do	not	feel	isolated.	ICAO’s	Manual	of	Accident	Investigation	(ICAO,	2003b)	provides	 guidance	 on	 the	 qualities	 required	 for	 an	 accident	 investigator.	Agencies	need	to	recruit	someone	who	is	more	than	just	an	aviation	expert	since	accident	 investigation	 is	 a	 specialist	 task	 in	 itself.	 Marinho	 de	 Bastos	 (2004)	emphasizes	 the	 fact	 that	 credibility	 is	 gained	 by	 availability	 of	 adequate	expertise,	as	well	as	keeping	a	close	contact	with	 industry	and	regulators	to	be	able	to	adapt	to	the	evolution	of	technology,	while	keeping	their	independence.	Stoop	 and	 Roed	 Larsen	 (2009)	 describe	 two	 essential	 skills	 for	 accident	investigators	as	being	familiar	with	a	broad	range	of	disciplines	and	the	ability	to	
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multi-task,	 i.e.	 run	 several	 lines	 of	 investigations	 simultaneously,	 and	 this	 to	enable	them	to	determine	the	causes	of	failure	that	led	to	an	event.	Tench	(1985)	adds	another	 important	point:	 investigators	need	 to	be	able	 to	appreciate	how	human	 beings	 behave	 under	 stress.	 Personal	 skills	 are	 therefore	 of	 greater	importance	in	accident	investigators’	character.	Flaherty	(2008),	in	her	study	of	the	 skills	 and	 behaviors	 required	 for	 an	 effective	 investigator,	 identified	 that	interpersonal	and	communication	skills	were	essential,	whereas	technical	skills	could	be	acquired	during	specific	training.	Like	Tench	(1985),	Smart	(2004)	and	Stoop	 and	 Dekker	 (2012)	 identified	 dealing	 with	 family	 and	 relatives	 as	 one	major	 challenge	 that	 investigators	 have	 to	 face.	 Flaherty	 therefore	 suggests	recruitment	policies	to	be	more	orientated	towards	non-technical	skills	such	as	report	 writing	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 deal	 with	 people.	 Recruitment	 policies	 are	indeed	 personal	 to	 each	 investigation	 body.	 Some	 countries	 like	 France	 often	hire	young	engineering	graduates	 (from	aeronautical	 school),	while	others	 like	the	UK	hire	engineers	or	pilots	with	decades	of	experience.	Regarding	HF	skills,	not	all	organisations	 look	for	human	factors	or	psychology	background	in	their	new	recruits.		Training	 is	 also	 unique	 to	 each	 organisation.	 ICAO’s	 manual	 for	 accident	investigation	(2003b)	mentions	training	as	an	essential	part	of	the	investigator’s	career,	 due	 to	 the	 almost	 unlimited	 task	 of	 investigating	 accidents.	 This	 is	 to	allow	the	inspectors	to	keep	developing	their	skills	and	knowledge	and	stay	up	to	date.	Despite	its	importance	and	necessity,	training	for	accident	investigators	does	not	have	any	standard	qualification.	In	2002,	Braithwaite	notes	that	there	is	no	 high-qualification	 recognising	 the	 training	 undertaken	 by	 accident	
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investigators,	or	any	accredited	training.	According	to	Braithwaite	(2004),	doing	so	would	benefit	the	entire	aviation	industry.		Being	independent	but	keeping	close	contact	with	the	industry,	no	allocation	of	blame,	 public	 trust,	 quality	 of	 the	 investigators,	 keeping	 them	 up-to-date	with	technology	 and	 research,	 are	 all	 inter-related	 challenges	 that	 accident	investigation	 bodies	 and	 investigators	 need	 to	 balance	 as	 best	 as	 they	 can	 in	order	 to	 improve	aviation	 safety.	All	 these	aspects	of	 accident	 investigation,	 as	well	 as	 the	 determination	 of	 causes	 from	 different	 disciplines,	 highlight	 the	multi-disciplinary	character	of	aircraft	accident	investigation	and	the	difficulties	concerning	 the	 recruitment	 and	 training	 of	 investigators.	 Independence,	transparency,	 credibility	 and	 influence	 are	 four	 principles	 that	 accident	investigation	should	follow	(Marinho	de	Bastos,	2004).	As	demonstrated	in	II-3,	keeping	to	these	principles	can	be	challenging.	Vuorio	et	al	(2014)	list	points	that	occupational	 accident	 investigators	 should	 learn	 from	 aircraft	 accident	investigations:	independence	of	the	investigation;	real	time	investigation,	which	means	 investigating	 as	 soon	 as	 possible	 after	 the	 accident,	 and	 including	interviewing	 the	 witnesses	 in	 order	 to	 get	 as	 much	 information	 as	 possible;	guidelines	 and	 education,	 referring	 to	 ICAO	 Annex	 13	 and	 its	 standardised	approach;	the	systemic	view;	and	finally	the	responsibility	towards	the	relatives	of	those	involved	in	the	event.	These	learning	points	are,	as	detailed	in	II-3,	also	the	 greatest	 challenges	 that	 aircraft	 accident	 investigators	 have	 faced	 over	 the	years.			
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II-	4	Human	factors	in	accident	investigation		Amongst	all	the	disciplines	approached	during	an	accident	investigation,	human	factor	 has	 attracted	 considerable	 interest.	 As	 illustrated	 by	 table	 1,	 the	 largest	aviation	accidents	often	involved	a	major	human	factors	element	that	needed	to	be	 investigated	 in	 order	 to	 make	 safety	 improvement	 and	 avoid	 the	 similar	reoccurrence.	 The	 accidents	 that	 occurred	 at	 Tenerife	 in	 1977,	mid	Atlantic	 in	2009	(see	table	1)	and	in	Kegworth	in	1989	are	used	as	examples.		
II-	4-	1	Human	factors	in	aviation:	from	human	factor	to	human	factors		Human	 factors	 is	 an	 umbrella	 term	 that	 encompasses	 multiple	 fields,	 such	 as	psychology,	 physiology	 and	 ergonomics;	 more	 precisely	 it	 is	 built	 upon	 those	disciplines:	 “it	 relies	 on	 the	 knowledge	 base	 and	 research	 results	 from	multiple	
fields	 (from	 computer	 science	 to	 anthropology)	 to	 do	 so”	 (Woods	 and	 Dekker,	2000).	The	term	human	factors	in	itself	appeared	in	the	1950s	and	was	regarded	as	a	synonym	of	ergonomics.	The	discipline	however	appeared	in	the	early	days	of	aviation,	with	the	first	manned	flights	(Edwards,	1988,	in	Wiener	and	Nagel).	Although	definitions	are	plentiful	Edwards	(1988,	p9)	selected	the	 following	as	an	introduction	to	human	factors:	“Human	 factors	 (or	 ergonomics)	may	 be	 defined	 as	 the	 technology	 concerned	 to	
optimize	 the	 relationships	 between	 people	 and	 their	 activities	 by	 the	 systematic	
application	 of	 the	 human	 sciences,	 integrated	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 system	
engineering”.	
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Edwards	described	the	evolution	of	the	discipline	from	its	appearance	until	the	1950s.	The	early	days	of	aviation	saw	a	rapid	development	 in	 instrumentation,	putting	 emphasis	 on	 cockpit	 layout,	which	 has	 remained	 in	 the	 human	 factors	discipline	and	is	today	referred	as	flight	deck	design.	Between	the	two	wars,	the	focus	was	more	on	the	pilot’s	flying	skills	and	whether	or	not	one	should	rely	on	the	 instruments,	 an	 issue	 that	 remains	 key	 to	 this	 day,	 particularly	 with	 the	increase	of	automation	in	the	cockpit.	It	then	shifted	towards	pilot	selection	and	training	and	research	was	conducted	into	stress	and	fatigue.	Amalberti	 (2001)	 illustrates	 the	 development	 of	 the	 discipline	 from	 the	 1950s	until	 the	 year	 2000	 (see	 figure	 6).	 He	 highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 1970s	 and	1980s	 were	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 individual,	 understanding	 psychological	processes	and	human	behaviors.	Big	scale	events	such	as	Tenerife	(see	table	1)	and	Three	Mile	Island	(nuclear	accident	that	occurred	in	1979	in	the	US)	in	the	late	 1970s	 triggered	 a	 change	 towards	 organizational	 focus.	 This	 timeline	correlates	with	the	shift	in	focus	detailed	by	Hollnagel	(2004)	and	Reason	(2008)	(see	figures	3	and	4).	
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Figure	 6:	 Evolution	 of	 human	 error	 research,	 from	 "The	 paradoxes	 of	 almost	 totally	 safe	
transportation	systems",	Amalberti	(2001)	
	Research	 development	 in	 human	 factors	 therefore	 influenced	 the	 accident	investigation	process	and	 it	 could	also	be	argued	 that	 the	evolution	of	aviation	industry	and	 the	accident	 investigation	process	had	an	 impact	on	 the	 research	focus.		In	 the	 early	 days	 of	 aviation,	 the	 focus	 was	 on	 looking	 for	 human	 error	 and	failure	(Heinrich,	1931).	As	Korolija	and	Lundberg	(2010)	highlight,	this	process	lasted	until	 the	 late	1950s,	when	there	was	a	better	understanding	of	cognitive	process	 (Amalberti,	2010).	 In	 the	1990s,	 the	 terms	 then	evolved	with	Reason’s	
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research	 (1990).	 The	 blaming	 terms	 such	 as	 error,	 failure,	 recklessness,	nervousness	gave	way	to	slips	and	lapses,	and	‘ignorance	of	regulations’	turned	into	‘violations’	(Korolija	and	Lundberg,	2010).			
II-	4-	2	The	importance	of	the	consideration	of	human	factors	in	accident	
investigation		Human	 factors	 is	 involved	 in	 almost	 all	 aircraft	 accidents	 or	 incidents	(Wiegmann	 and	 Shappell,	 1997,	 2001,	 2003,	 2009),	 in	 one-way	 or	 another.	 A	stagnation	of	accident	 rate,	or	more	accurately	an	asymptotic	 reduction	 (i.e.	 as	the	rate	decreases	towards	zero,	it	is	harder	to	improve),	has	also	been	observed	during	the	past	decades	and	this	 is	where	authors	have	different	views:	on	one	hand	 Shappell	 and	 Wiegmann	 (2009)	 attribute	 the	 stagnation	 of	 aviation	accident	rate	to	the	remaining	error	and	therefore	developed	research	to	classify	these	 errors	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 why	 they	 happened	 and	 avoid	 their	recurrence.	O’Hare	(2000)	also	attributed	the	stagnation	in	the	high	proportion	of	human	error	accidents	to	the	lack	of	common	taxonomies.		However,	Maurino	(2010)	relates	it	to	“systemic	nature	in	the	safety	problems	faced	by	contemporary	
aviation”	(p953)	and	offers	to	reduce	the	allocation	of	focus	and	blame	towards	operational	people	and	instead	have	a	“macro	view	of	the	aviation	system”.		In	accident	 investigation,	 the	major	shift	happened	when	 the	 trend	 in	research	moved	 from	 the	 ‘bad	 apple	 theory’	 to	 the	 ‘good	 apple	 theory’	 (Dekker,	 2002).	That	 is	 to	 say	 the	 attention	 shifted	 towards	 people	 in	 higher	 management	positions	and	organisation	culture,	as	opposed	to	focusing	only	on	operators.	In	
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1990,	 Reason	 published	 his	 organizational	 accident	model	 (also	 known	 as	 the	Swiss	cheese	model,	see	figure	7)	that	describes	the	types	of	defenses	that	stop	an	accident	from	happening,	but	also	how	they	can	fail.			
	
Figure	7:	Reason's	Swiss	cheese	accident	causation	model	(Reason	1997,	p12)	
New	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘pre-condition	 for	 unsafe	 acts’,	 	 ‘active	 failure’	 and	 ‘latent	failure’	 appeared.	The	 term	 ‘unsafe	acts’	 still	 remains	 in	use	but	 is	 followed	by	some	understanding	of	why	they	are	happening	(e.g.	attentional	failure,	memory	failure),	 avoiding	 blaming	 interpretation.	 The	 term	 ‘error’	 loses	 its	 negative	meaning	when	balanced	against	‘violation’.	Dekker’s	‘good	apple’	theory	puts	the	human	 in	 the	 center	 of	 a	 system	 and	 places	 human	 errors	 as	 a	 symptom	 of	 a	failing	system	(Dekker,	2002).	According	to	him,	the	way	human	error	should	be	investigated	 is	by	putting	oneself	 in	 the	 situation	of	 the	operator	and	 trying	 to	understand	why	that	person	took	the	decisions	that	were	taken	at	the	time	and	most	of	all,	why	they	made	sense	(Dekker,	2006).	The	key	is	to	avoid	hindsight	bias	(Dekker,	2002,	2006;	Dismukes	et	al	2007),	because	it	will	“forever	keep	you	
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from	really	understanding	human	error”	(Dekker,	2006,	p28).	Dekker’s	approach	on	 understanding	 human	 error	 has	 been	 widely	 approved,	 used	 and	 adapted.	Maurino’s	 comment	 on	 this	 book	 was	 “this	 is	 the	 kind	 of	message	 the	 industry	
needs	to	listen	to”.	Investigating	human	error	following	the	‘Good	apple	theory’,	i.e.	considering	the	human	 as	 part	 of	 a	 system,	 understanding	 the	 environment	 in	 which	 the	operator	 (pilot,	 air	 traffic	 controller,	 maintenance	 engineer)	 is	 performing,	corresponds	 more	 to	 Edward’s	 definition	 of	 human	 factors.	 Human	 error	 is	 a	symptom	 of	 the	 system,	 i.e.	 the	 human	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 without	 its	environment.	 Human	 performance	 should	 be	 analyzed	within	 context,	without	neglecting	 organisational	 influences	 (Maurino,	 2000).	 The	 SHEL	 model	 (see	figure	 8),	 developed	 by	 Edwards	 in	 1972	 and	 later	 adapted	 by	 Hawkins	illustrates	 what	 this	 environment	 is.	 It	 “addresses	 the	 importance	 of	 human	
interaction”	 and	 “helps	 the	 investigator	 apply	 the	 Reason	 model	 on	 accident	
causation,	which	 treats	 the	accident	as	an	outcome	of	a	 series	of	 interactive	and	
enabling	events”	(ICAO,	1993,	p16).	The	most	critical	component	is	the	Liveware	in	 the	 centre	 (human	operator).	 It	 is	 surrounded	by	Liveware	 (other	humans),	Software	 (rules,	 regulations,	 procedures),	 Hardware	 (aircraft,	 equipment,	displays)	and	Environment	(internal	and	external	environment	such	as	weather,	terrain	 but	 also	 the	 economic,	 social,	 politic	 context	 in	 which	 the	 operator	 is	performing).	 Investigating	 human	 factors	 consists	 of	 understanding	 the	interfaces	 between	 those	 components	 and	 considering	 the	 Liveware	 means	understanding	human	performance	within	this	environment.	
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Figure	8:	SHEL	model,	adapted	from	Hawkins,	1975	(1993,	ICAO	Digest	n°7,	p16)	
	In	 Safety	 I,	 or	 reactive	 approach,	 investigating	 Human	 Factors	 would	 mean	understanding	 what	 went	 wrong	 between	 each	 of	 the	 components.	 Safety	 II	however,	 would	 look	 at	 where	 the	 barriers	 in	 place	 or	 the	 interfaces	 were	effective	and	avoided	a	dramatic	outcome.	Up	to	the	1990s	(when	Reason	published	his	accident	model),	it	was	more	about	investigating	the	human	factor	(e.g.	Beaty,	1969)	that	was	in	focus,	i.e.	studying	the	 pilot’s	 behavior	 to	 understand	what	 he	 did	 ‘wrong’.	 The	 human	 error	was	attributed	to	either	a	failure	in	the	technology	or	a	human	error	(Maurino,	2000).	But	 nowadays,	 human	 error	 should	 be	 considered	 the	 starting	 point	 of	 an	investigation	 (Dekker,	 2002;	 Maurino,	 2000).	 Findings	 should	 lead	 to	 “error	
tolerance	 and	 error	 recovery”	 rather	 than	 “error	 suppression”	 (Maurino	 2000,	p956);	because	error	is	human.	Although	 there	has	been	 a	 real	 effort	 to	 reduce	blame	of	 a	 single	 individual	 in	accident	 reports,	 a	 lot	 of	 investigators	 consider	 ‘the	 human	 factor’	 or	 ‘human	error’	as	one	of	the	most	common	causes	for	accidents	(Rollenhagen	et	al,	2010).		
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Contemporary	 investigation	 should	 understand	 that	 error	 is	 normal	 to	 human	performance	(Dismukes,	2010,	in	Salas	and	Maurino).	Baker	(2010)	emphasizes	the	 fact	 that	 although	 the	 field	 of	 human	 factors	 is	 increasingly	 taken	 into	account,	“there	is	still	a	degree	of	apprehension”	(p28-3)	and	it	is	still	considered	as	 “speculative”	 and	 not	 as	 credible	 as	 other	 disciplines.	 The	 shift	 in	 safety	described	 in	 II-3	 will	 only	 be	 possible	 if	 investigators	 acknowledge	 the	importance	of	human	factors	and	consider	it	as	a	‘core	discipline’.	They	need	to	address	 the	 collective	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 individual.	 Often	 investigators	 fail	 to	address	the	‘why’	properly	because	they	stop	too	soon.	Deeper	consideration	of	human	factors	is	necessary	(Maurino,	2000,	Kletz,	2006,,	Baker	2010),	because	if	HF	issues	are	ignored,	they	cannot	be	learned	from	for	the	future	(Baker,	2010).			
II-	4-	3	HF	investigation	in	practice			Several	guidelines	for	how	to	consider	human	factors	exist.	ICAO	published	two	documents	 outlining	 human	 factors	 and	 human	 factors	 training	 for	 accident	investigators:	ICAO	“Human	Factors	digest	n7:	investigation	of	human	factors	in	accidents	 and	 incidents”,	 published	 in	 1993,	 and	 the	 Human	 Factors	 Training	Manual	published	in	1998.		The	 first	 one	 provides	 general	 information	 on	 the	 purpose	 of	 investigating	human	 factors	 and	 guidelines	 on	 how	 to	 conduct	 such	 an	 investigation.	 It	suggests	the	use	and	application	of	Hawkins’s	SHELL	model	(1975)	(see	figure	8)	and	 Reason’s	 Swiss	 cheese	 model	 (see	 figure	 7)	 and	 provides	 checklists	 and	solutions	to	existing	issues	such	as	the	belief	that	human	factors	is	too	soft	and	
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human	 nature	 cannot	 be	 changed.	 It	 also	 suggests	 more	 training	 for	 accident	investigators,	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 better	 understanding	 and	 therefore	 a	 better	consideration:	
“Better	 Human	 Factors	 training	 for	 investigators	 will	 develop	 a	 more	 thorough	
understanding	of	what	 the	 investigation	of	Human	Factors	 entails”	 (ICAO,	 1993,	p4).	The	 other	 main	 relevant	 document	 is	 ICAO’s	 HF	 training	 manual,	 doc	 9683,	published	 in	 1998.	 It	 presents	 contemporary	 aviation	 human	 factors	 and	 the	importance	of	a	systemic	approach.	It	dedicates	its	chapter	4	to	HF	training	for	accident	 investigators.	 	 However,	 like	 digest	 n7,	 it	 uses	 the	 Swiss	 cheese	 and	SHELL	 models	 as	 main	 model,	 which	 is	 limiting.	 For	 example,	 no	 detailed	information	is	given	about	what	information	should	be	collected.		Reason’s	 Swiss	 cheese	 model	 (see	 figure	 7),	 published	 in	 1990	 was	 the	 first	accident	 model	 introducing	 active	 and	 latent	 failures.	 And	 although	 Edwards	approached	it	earlier	 in	his	SHELL	model	(see	figure	8),	Reason	also	developed	the	 importance	 of	 environment	 and	 organisational	 factors.	 Numerous	organisations	have	adjusted	this	model	for	their	need.	The	ATSB	has	adapted	it	and	 train	 all	 their	 investigators	 in	 the	 use	 of	 their	 new	model.	However,	 some	researchers	 have	 identified	 limitations	 to	 Reason’s	 model.	 Dekker	 (2006)	considers	 it	as	an	oversimplification	of	an	accident.	 It	 focuses	 too	much	on	 the	holes	 (failures)	 and	 does	 not	 allow	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 whole	 system.	According	 to	 Dekker,	 the	 Swiss	 cheese	 model	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 a	 system	failed	nor	allows	an	understanding	of	why	the	operator’s	decisions	made	sense	at	the	time	of	the	event.		
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It	is	important	to	note	that	this	model	was	only	a	small	part	of	Reason’s	work	and	that	 he	 was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 to	 advocate	 the	 importance	 of	 effective	 risk	management	 and	 that	 human	 error	 can	 be	 moderated	 but	 not	 eliminated	(Reason,	1997).		Wiegmann	and	Shappell	(2003)	consider	that	Reason’s	model	does	not	give	any	indications	of	what	the	failures	are	or	how	to	identify	them.	They	also	mention	that	 its	 academic	 tone	 is	not	 easily	 applicable	by	practitioners.	 It	 is	with	 these	limitations	 in	 mind	 that	 they	 adapted	 it	 to	 create	 their	 analysis	 tool:	 Human	Factors	Analysis	Classification	System	(HFACS).		Since	the	1980s,	there	has	been	a	major	increase	in	the	number	of	human	factors	trainings	 developed	 for	 aviation	 operators	 (Edkins,	 2005).	 Human	 factors	training	has	proven	itself	effective	in	the	aviation	industry,	with	for	example	the	evidence	of	better	human	performance	after	Crew	Resource	Management	(CRM)	training	(Salas,	1999).	Although	Edkins	(2005,	in	Harris	and	Muir)	highlights	the	lack	 of	 cost	 effectiveness	 evidence	 for	 human	 factors	 training,	 he	 suggests	 the	consolidation	 of	 the	 “existing	 evidence	 on	 the	 commercial	 benefits	 of	 human	
factors	training”	 (p	117,	2005).	 In	 the	UK	rail	 industry,	Rose	 (2009)	and	Evans		(2013)	published	research	on	the	development	of	a	human	factors	investigation	course.	 The	 latter	 reports	 the	 positive	 impact	 of	 human	 factors	 awareness	training	on	accident	investigators.	The	results	of	the	research	include	evidence	of	a	 better	 investigation	 process	 and	 improvement	 in	 the	 way	 organisations	consider	and	investigate	human	factors.	Rose’s	(2009)	training	was	aimed	at	line	managers	 at	Network	Rail,	 in	 the	 form	of	 an	 e-training	 and	 its	 impact	 has	 not	been	 fully	 identified	 yet.	 There	 has	 not	 been	 any	 published	 research	 on	 the	benefits	of	human	factors	training	for	aviation	accident	investigators.		
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The	quality	of	 the	training	 is	also	of	essential	 importance.	Braithwaite’s	(2004)	identification	of	the	need	for	training	accreditation	would	be	even	more	relevant	in	human	factors.	There	are	numerous	training	programs	available	for	accident	investigators	but	only	a	few	of	them	provide	a	follow	up	on	their	effectiveness,	or	refresher	courses	to	allow	investigators	to	stay	up	to	date.	Besides,	each	of	these	courses	 is	 different	 in	 content,	 length	 and	 focus.	 There	 has	 been	 no	 published	research	 on	 the	 sort	 of	 knowledge	 air	 accident	 investigators	 should	 acquire	 in	human	 factors	nor	 to	what	extent	 they	should	apply	 it	during	an	 investigation.	Rollenhagen	 et.	 al.	 (2010)	 are	 some	 of	 the	 only	 researchers	 giving	 some	specifications	 on	 the	 type	 of	 human	 factors	 training	 accident	 investigators	should	 receive.	 They	 discovered	 that	 Swedish	 investigators	 often	 had,	 within	each	 other,	 different	 understanding	 about	 human	 factors	 and	 safety	 culture,	which	therefore	should	be	approached	more	accurately	during	training.	In	1997,	Wiegmann	and	Shappell	developed	a	taxonomy	of	unsafe	operations	to	facilitate	the	investigation	of	human	error	that	evolved	into	a	worldwide	use	and	adapted	analysis	tool:	HFACS.	It	was	created	with	the	intention	of	making	human	error	 investigation	 accessible	 and	 understandable	 to	 general	 investigators	 and	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 theory	 and	 practice	 (Wiegmann	 and	 Shappell,	 2001,	2003).	 Saleh	 et	 al	 (2010)	 also	 recommend	 greater	 partnerships	 between	academia	 and	 other	 parties	 (industry	 and	 government)	 in	 order	 to	 develop	better	research	and	education	and	enhance	safety.	They	also	emphasize	the	need	for	more	 interactions	between	 the	different	 academic	disciplines	 that	 could	be	involved	in	accident	investigation	research	and	system	safety.	Rollenhagen	et	al.	(2010)	 found	 that	 amongst	 one	 hundred	 Swedish	 accident	 investigators	 from	
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different	sectors,	only	a	few	of	them	actually	knew	about	the	different	academic	models	available.		As	 mentioned	 earlier,	 accident	 models	 have	 evolved	 from	 linear	 to	 more	systemic	approach.	In	the	literature,	a	lot	has	been	developed	on	these	systemic	accident	 analysis	 methodologies	 (Reason,	 1990;	 Rasmussen	 1997;	 Hollnagel,	2004;	Salmon	et	al,	2012;	Underwood	and	Waterson,	2013).	In	fact,	according	to	Salmon	et	al	(2012),	HFACS,	Accimap	and	Systems-Theoretic	Accident	Model	and	Processes	 (STAMP)	 (Leveson,	 2004)	 are	 the	 three	 analysis	 methods	 that	dominate	HF	research.	However,	the	way	Wiegmann	and	Shappell	(2003)	noted	regarding	 the	 Reason’s	 model	 low	 applicability,	 Underwood	 and	 Waterson	(2013)	identified	a	gap	between	theory	and	practice	(i.e.	safety	practitioners	do	not	always	practically	employ	these	analysis	methods)	that	needs	to	be	bridged	in	 order	 to	 investigate	 accidents	 more	 thoroughly	 and	 develop	 safety	recommendations	addressing	systems	failure.		Strauch	 (2002)	 provides	 guidance	 on	 how	 investigators	 should	 understand,	consider	and	investigate	human	factors	by	providing	comprehensive	definitions	and	information	on	error	within	a	complex	system,	as	well	as	guidance	on	data	gathering	and	analysis.		HF	should	be	considered	as	a	core	discipline	and	dealt	with	by	experts.	In	2002,	the	 CAA	 published	 its	 Fundamentals	 in	 Human	 Factors	 concepts.	 It	 stipulates	(2002,	chapter	2,	page	1):				
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“Curiously	enough,	we	retain	a	lawyer	for	advice	about	a	legal	problem,	or	
hire	 an	 architect	 to	 build	 a	 house,	 or	 consult	 a	 physician	 when	 trying	 to	
establish	the	diagnosis	of	a	medical	problem,	but	when	it	comes	to	solving	
Human	Factors	problems,	we	have	adopted	an	intuitive	and	in	many	cases	
perfunctory	approach,	even	though	many	lives	may	depend	on	the	outcome.	
A	background	of	many	years	of	 industry	experience	or	 thousands	of	 flying	
hours	may	have	little	or	no	significance	when	looking	for	the	resolution	of	
problems	 which	 only	 a	 thorough	 understanding	 of	 Human	 Factors	 can	
provide.”	
	There	 is	 no	 reason	 why	 this	 principle	 should	 not	 apply	 to	 human	 factors	 in	accident	investigation	(ICAO,	1998).	Being	a	human	being	does	not	make	oneself	a	 human	 factors	 expert.	 Baker	 (2010)	 also	 supports	 the	 presence	 of	 human	factors	 experts	 but	 for	 a	 different	 reason:	 “To	accept	 the	principle	 that	 anyone	
with	training	can	conduct	human	factors	investigations,	is	to	denigrate	the	role	of	
human	 factors	 in	 the	 investigations	 and	 is	 also	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 collection	 of	
data	 of	 a	 lower	 quality	 than	 the	 one	 that	might	 otherwise	 have	 been	 achieved”	(p28-4).	 Besides,	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 human	 factors	 specialist	 within	 the	investigation	 team	 would	 bring	 more	 assurance	 of	 the	 objectivity	 of	 the	conclusions	drawn	from	the	investigation	i.e.	that	the	results	are	not	the	subject	of	 only	 one	 individual’s	 point	 of	 view	 and	 do	 not	 come	 from	 biases	 or	preconceived	ideas	(Baker	2010).			
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II-	4-	4	Human	Factors	Integration		The	 importance	of	 integrating	and	applying	human	 factors	 is	not	 limited	 to	air	accident	 investigation.	As	 identified	previously,	Rose	 (2009)	 and	Evans	 (2013)	conducted	 research	 on	 HF	 training	 for	 investigators	 and	 managers	 in	 the	 rail	industry.  Similarly, regarding	accident	investigation,	the	importance	of	taking	a	system	approach	and	considering	organisational	factors	is	applicable	to	a	range	of	industries	beyond	aviation.		This	is	illustrated	by	the	wide	variety	of	research	that	has	employed	or	adapted	 the	Reason’s	Swiss	Cheese	model	 (Larouzee	and	Guarnieri,	2015)	or	Wiegmann	and	Shappell’s	tool	HFACS.	For	example,	Ren	et	al.	(2008)	and	Fukuoka	and	Furusho	(2016)	applied	the	latter	in	the	context	of	the	maritime	 industry	 whereas	 Jennings	 (2008)	 applied	 it	 in	 defence.	 Conversely,	Kamoun	and	Nicho	(2014)	used	a	similar	approach	in	a	healthcare	setting.	 	
The	 challenges	 faced	 by	 human	 factors	 in	 air	 accident	 investigation	 are	 also	common	to	other	industries.		Meister		(1967)	found	that	engineers	and	designers	lacked	interest	in	human	factors	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	a	social	science.	 	Later	research	 by	 Meister	 (1982)	 pointed	 out	 that	 engineers	 and	 government	personnel	were	not	convinced	about	 the	value	of	HF	and	were	 lacking	 training	on	the	topic.	More	recently,	Helander	(2000)	found	that	there	were	a	number	of	possible	reasons	why	HF	was	not	implemented,	including	consideration	of	HF	as	common	sense	and	being	too	abstract	to	be	useful.	Waterson	and	Kolose	(2010)	found	 that	 this	 attitude	 of	 considering	 HF	 as	 common	 sense	 still	 remains.	 In	2011,	Peterson	et	al	pointed	out	that	in	the	maritime	industry,	engineers	need	to	acknowledge	 that	 social	 sciences	such	as	HF	are	more	 than	common	sense	but	
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that	 in	 order	 for	HF	 to	 have	more	 impact,	 HF	 experts	 need	 to	 understand	 the	heuristic	nature	of	engineering.		Perrow’s	 work	 (1983),	 cited	 by	 Jensen	 (2002)	 and	 Dul	 and	 Neumann	 (2005,	2009)	attribute	the	difficulty	of	HF	acceptance	to	organisational	issues.	Amongst	these	 issues	 is	 the	 small	 number	 of	 ergonomists	 actually	 working	 for	 these	companies	 and	 that	 it	 is	 not	 always	 accepted	 by	 business	 managers.	 These	problems	limit	HF	specialists’	influence	and	restrict	their	perspective.		Moreover,	 the	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	 is	 not	 only	 important	 in	 the	investigation	 process	 (i.e.	 considering	 the	 human	 within	 a	 system)	 it	 is	 also	essential	 from	 the	 design	 of	 a	 system	 to	 its	 manufacture	 and	 in	 turn	 to	 its	operation	and	possible	 failure	(i.e.	 investigation).	As	an	example,	Cullen	(2007)	highlights	 that	 it	 is	 essential	 for	 the	 designers	 in	 high	 hazard	 industries	 to	integrate	HF	in	the	early	design	phase	of	a	system,	 i.e.	consider	the	system	end	users	in	order	to	avoid	operational	problems	and	in	turn	potential	safety	issues.	Thus,	multiple	sectors	such	as	aviation,	rail,	nuclear,	defence	and	also	healthcare	rely	on	quality	Human	Factors	Integration	(HFI)	to	produce	safe	systems.		Seeing	 that	HFI	 is	 as	 essential	 in	other	 industries	 as	 it	 is	 in	 aviation	and	 in	 air	accident	 investigation,	 and	 that	 many	 challenges	 are	 shared	 amongst	 these	sectors,	the	benefits	of	the	research	for	other	industries	are	clear.		
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II-5	Conclusion	of	the	literature		As	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 literature	 review,	 accident	 investigation	 is	 strongly	related	 to	 safety	 and	 to	 human	 factors.	 The	 shift	 of	 focus,	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	aviation	system	as	well	as	the	evolution	of	human	factors	occurred	at	the	same	time	and	are	 complementary.	Addressing	 the	 challenges	 faced	by	 investigation	organisations	 such	 as	 independence,	 blame-free	 policy,	 dealing	 with	 relatives,	quality	 of	 investigators,	 training,	 public	 trust	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	 safety	could	 be	 greatly	 assisted	 and	 benefit	 from	 a	 full	 acknowledgement,	understanding	and	integration	of	human	factors.		Much	 has	 been	 developed	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 human	 factors,	 human	 factors	integration	and	the	need	for	more	thorough	HF	investigations.	A	large	part	of	the	existing	literature	also	focuses	on	accident	investigation	cases	and	methods	and	tools	 for	 accident	 analysis,	 in	 multiple	 high	 hazard	 industries.	 Numerous	methods	have	been	developed	 in	order	 to	assist	 accident	 investigators	 in	 their	task.	According	the	Sklet	(2004)	these	analytical	methods	may	be	needed	to	help	the	investigators	to	organise	and	structure	all	the	data	from	an	accident	and	be	able	 to	 understand	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 system	 involved	 (multiple	 and	 inter	related	 causal	 factors).	 Each	of	 them	can	be	used	 at	 the	different	 stages	of	 the	investigation,	 have	 different	 areas	 of	 application	 and	 have	 strength	 and	weaknesses	 as	 described	 by	 Sklet	 (2004).	 He	 therefore	 suggests	 the	 use	 of	several	analysis	methods	for	a	more	thorough	investigation	and	the	necessity	to	have,	within	the	multi-disciplinary	team,	one	person	familiar	with	these	tools	in	order	to	make	a	relevant	selection	depending	on	the	circumstances	of	the	event.		
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In	fact,	whether	the	tools	and	methods	created	for	accident	analysis	are	human	factors	orientated	or	not,	they	are	not	always	accessible	or	relevant	to	the	needs	of	 accident	 investigators	 who	 often	 don’t	 have	 the	 academic	 mind	 that	 the	developers	 of	 these	 tools	 have.	 Although	 some	 efforts	 are	 being	 made,	 the	industrial	 constraints	are	not	always	 taken	 into	account	and	 there	 is	a	need	 to	bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 academics	 and	 the	 industry	 (Dien	 et	 al,	 2012).	 Some	researchers	such	as	Saleh	et	al	(2010),	Rollenhagen	et	al	(2010),	and	Underwood	and	Waterson	 (2013)	 have	 identified	 the	 need	 for	 more	 partnership	 between	academic	and	 industry	worlds	 so	accident	 investigators	are	more	aware	of	 the	tools	 available	 and	 how	 to	 use	 them.	 Such	 partnership	 could	 also	 enable	 the	development	of	more	practical	tools.		Underwood	and	Waterson	(2013)	insist	on	the	 fact	 that	 more	 effort	 should	 be	 made	 to	 ensure	 that	 systemic	 accident	analysis	tools	meet	the	needs	of	practitioners.			This	weakness	in	training	is	also	present	in	the	actual	meaning	of	human	factors	(Rollenhagen	et.	Al.,	2010).	But	overall	very	little	is	made	explicit	about	the	type	of	knowledge	investigators	should	acquire,	the	sort	of	training	they	should	receive	in	HF	in	order	to	conduct	relevant	 HF	 investigations	 and	 whether	 organisations	 should	 hire	 an	 expert.	(Rollenhagen	et.	al.	2010).	Training	requirements	do	exist	but	no	standards	have	been	 defined	 and	 this	 creates	 different	 level	 of	 understanding	 and	 therefore	disagreement	 on	 the	 depth	 into	 which	 HF	 should	 be	 looked	 into	 during	 an	investigation.	There	is	a	need	to	keep	asking	why	(Kletz,	2006),	which	naturally	raises	the	challenge	of	the	scope	of	the	investigation:	the	depth	to	which	accident	investigators	need	to	dig	in	order	to	understand	why	operators	behaved	the	way	they	did	at	the	time	of	the	event	and	why	it	made	sense	to	them.	
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Original	 human	 factors	 problems	 create	 new	 ones	 and	 this	 will	 continue	 to	happen	with,	for	example,	the	development	of	automation.	Human	 factors	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 as	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 accident	 and	incident	 investigation.	 There	 are	 several	 guidelines	 provided	 by	 ICAO	 or	regulators	 regarding	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 issues	 but	 there	 are	 no	 strict	requirements	 regarding	 how	 to	 integrate	 them	 in	 investigation	 reports.	 This	could	be	one	of	the	reasons	why	it	is	not	always	acknowledged	in	a	satisfactory	way.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 there	 are	 other	 factors	 involved,	 but	 they	 remain	unclear.	Moreover,	 no	 practical	 solutions	 to	 address	 these	 issues	 have	 been	 provided.	This	 research	 is	 attempting	 to	 address	 these	 deficiencies	 and	 bridge	 this	 gap	between	 research	 and	 industry,	 in	 other	 words	 providing	 practical	recommendations	on	how	to	better	integrate	HF	in	an	accident	investigation.	
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Chapter	III	–	Research	design	
	
III-	1	Introduction	
	Chapter	III	details	the	research	design	adopted	for	the	thesis,	which	represents	the	plan	to	conduct	 the	research	(Creswell,	2009).	 It	 is	 influenced	by	three	key	related	 elements:	 the	 research	 paradigm,	 the	 research	 objectives	 and	 the	research	strategy.	Each	of	these	three	elements	is	outlined	in	following	section.	This	 is	 followed	by	 addressing	 the	methods	of	 data	 gathering	 and	 the	 analysis	employed	to	fulfil	the	aim	of	this	research,	which	is:	
To	 examine	 the	 training	 needs	 of	 air	 accident	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	 develop	
more	thorough	integration	of	human	factors	in	accident	investigations.		The	 final	part	of	 this	chapter	describes	 the	role	of	 the	Training	Needs	Analysis	(TNA)	process	and	its	application	to	the	research.			
III-	2	Research	Design				Three	 important	 components	are	 involved	 in	constructing	 the	 research	design:	the	 research	 paradigm	 (also	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 philosophy	 or	‘worldview’	of	the	researcher),	the	research	objectives	that	help	accomplish	the	goal	of	 this	 thesis,	 and	 research	 strategy.	The	 research	design	 for	 this	 thesis	 is	presented	in	figure	9.	
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Figure	9:	Research	design
1:	To	identify	the	current	role	of,	and	key	human	factors	challenges	for	air	accident	investigators	
3:	To	evaluate	the	relevance	and	efficiency	of	human	factors	training	provision	for	air	accident	investigators		
2:	To	analyse	human	factors	integration	in	accidents	investigation	reports	 Accidents	investigation	reports	review	using	content	analysis		
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III-	2-	1	Research	paradigm			The	 research	 paradigm,	 also	 called	 a	 researcher’s	 ‘worldview’,	 represents	 the	assumptions	 taken	 by	 the	 researcher	 on	 their	 belief	 and	 view	 of	 the	 world	(Creswell	 and	 Plano	 Clark,	 2007).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 establish	 this	 research	paradigm	 at	 the	 start	 because	 it	 will	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 how	 the	 research	 is	designed	 and	 conducted,	 i.e.	 which	 methods	 are	 employed	 to	 fulfil	 what	objectives.	These	worldviews	are	defined	and	categorised	by	a	range	of	different	elements	known	as	ontology,	epistemology	and	methodology	(Healy	and	Perry,	2000;	Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007).	While	ontology	represents	the	nature	of	the	reality	being	investigated,	epistemology	defines	the	relationship	between	the	researcher	 and	 the	 research.	 The	 methodology	 is	 the	 process	 by	 which	 the	research	is	conducted.			In	 the	 literature,	 four	main	 paradigms	 are	 developed	 (Healy	 and	 Perry,	 2000;	Robson,	 2002;	 Creswell	 and	 Plano	 Clark,	 2007;	 Denscombe,	 2008;	 Creswell,	2009;	 Bryman,	 2012).	 These	 can	 broadly	 be	 viewed	 as	 representing	 part	 of	 a	continuum	 (Newman	 and	 Benz,	 1998),	 with	 purely	 quantitative	 approaches	sitting	on	one	end	of	the	scale	and	qualitative	techniques	on	the	other	(see	figure	10).	A	purely	quantitative	approach	to	research	can	be	referred	to	as	a	‘positivist’	approach.	Positivism	adopts	a	quantitative	and	deductive	approach	to	research,	stating	that	research	should	place	value	on	objectivity	and	rigour,	as	opposed	to	subjective	 intuition.	 A	 researcher	with	 a	 positivist	 view	 separates	 him/herself	from	the	world	they	are	studying.	There	is	a	need	to	 identify	and	assess	cause-effect	relationships,	in	the	most	objective	way,	to	obtain	objective	conclusions	on	
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the	reality.	This	 is	 to	say	 that	 there	 is	an	objective	 ‘truth’	which	the	researcher	seeks	to	find.			Worldview	element	 Positivism	 Pragmatism	/	Realism	 Advocacy	and	Participatory	 Constructivism	Ontology	 Reality	is	real	and	apprehensible	 ‘Real-world’	research:	Reality	is	real	but	imperfectly	and	probabilistically	apprehensible	
Political	reality	 Multiple	realities	
Epistemology	 Objectivist:	true	findings,	researcher	separated	from	the	world	that	is	being	investigated	
Objectivist	and	Subjectivist	(modified	objectivist):	researcher	collects	what	works	to	answer	the	research	question	
Subjectivist	/	Collaboration:	Researcher	involves	participants	
Subjectivist	researcher	and	reality	are	close	and	inseparable	
Methodology	 Deductive	(verification	of	theories)	 Deductive	and	inductive	 Mainly	inductive	 Inductive	(generation	of	theories)	
	
Figure	 10:	 The	 research	 paradigm	 continuum	 (adapted	 from	 Healy	 and	 Perry,	 2000,	 p119;	 and	
Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007,	p24)	
	At	 the	other	end	of	 the	spectrum	sits	 constructivism,	which	embraces	a	purely	qualitative	approach	and	adopts	an	inductive	approach	to	research.	This	means	that	 theory	 is	 generated	 from	 individual	 perspectives.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	positivist	 paradigm,	 a	 researcher	 following	 a	 constructivist	 philosophy	acknowledges	the	close	link	between	himself/herself	and	the	research,	and	that	multiple	 ‘realities’	 exist	 deduced	 from	observations	 of	 reality	 (i.e.	 an	 inductive	logic).			
																		QUANTITATIVE																MIXED	METHODS																	MAINLY	QUALITATIVE					QUALITATIVE	
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There	are	 two	 further	schools	of	 thought	 that	adopt	different	elements	of	both	the	 positivist	 and	 constructivist	 paradigms	 to	 varying	 degrees.	 They	acknowledge	 the	 value	 of	 adopting	 a	 mixed-methods	 approach.	 Researchers	following	 an	 advocacy	 and	 participatory	 philosophy	 position	 themselves	more	on	 the	qualitative	side	of	 the	spectrum,	advocating	an	ontological	position	 that	there	 exists	 a	 political	 reality,	 with	 a	 mostly	 subjectivist	 epistemological	standpoint.	Like	constructivist	philosophies	 this	also	adopts	a	 largely	 inductive	logic		(Healy	and	Perry,	2000;	Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007;	Creswell,	2009).			The	 remaining	 paradigm	 located	 on	 the	 spectrum	 is	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	pragmatism,	or	realism.	It	too	can	be	considered	as	a	mixed-methods	approach,	adopting	both	qualitative	 elements	but	 also	quantitative	 components	 (more	 so	than	 advocacy	 and	 participatory).	 Like	 positivism	 it	 claims	 that	 there	 is	 an	objective	 ‘reality’,	 but	 that	 this	 reality	 is	 imperfectly	 and	 probabilistically	apprehensible	(Creswell	and	Plano	Clark,	2007).	 In	other	words,	 there	remains	an	inescapable	question	mark	(however	small)	regarding	the	absolute	 ‘truth’	of	the	 observed	 reality.	 As	 a	 paradigm	 it	 seeks	 to	 remain	 largely	 objective	throughout,	 whilst	 acknowledging	 that	 subjectivity	 and	 external	 factors	 exist	within	research.	It	can	also	adopt	either	a	deductive	or	inductive	methodological	approach.			With	 this	 in	 mind,	 this	 research	 positions	 itself	 in	 the	 pragmatism	 paradigm	(greyed	on	figure	10).	It	uses	a	mixed-methods	research	design,	which	means	it	recognises	 the	 importance	 of	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 research	methods.	 It	 uses	 all	 the	 approaches	 available	 to	 understand	 and	 solve	 the	
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problem	(Johnson	and	Onwuegbuzie,	2004;	Johnson	et	al.	2007;	Creswell,	2009).	Creswell	and	Plano	Clark	(2007,	p18)	describe	this	research	design:		“Mixed	methods	research	is	a	research	design	with	methodology	and	methods.	As	a	
methodology,	 it	 involves	 collecting,	 analysing,	 and	 mixing	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	approaches	at	many	phases	in	the	research	process	…	As	a	method,	it	
focuses	on	collecting,	analysing	and	mixing	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	in	a	
single	study	or	series	of	studies.”		While	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 categorise	 research	 paradigms	 in	 this	 way,	 it	 is	acknowledged	 that	 ‘real-world’	 research	 often	 does	 not	 fall	 neatly	 into	 any	particular	 category.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 research	 lend	themselves	 to	different	paradigms,	or	 that	different	parts	of	various	paradigms	appeal	to	the	researcher.	It	may	also	be	that	different	researchers	with	different	paradigms	may	approach	the	research	differently.	Having	said	this,	considering	the	 researcher’s	 philosophical	 view	 of	 the	world,	 a	 pragmatic	 view	 is	 adopted	here	to	fulfil	the	aim	of	the	research.	Its	pragmatic	approach	necessarily	focuses	around	 the	 problem,	 and	 the	 questions	 (or	 objectives)	 asked	 are	 of	 primary	importance	to	the	methods	adopted.			
III-	2-	2	Research	Objectives		The	 second	 element	 that	 occupies	 a	 large	 part	 in	 the	 research	 design	 are	 the	objectives.	 Fulfilling	 these	 objectives	 is	 how	 this	 research	 contributes	 to	knowledge:	 they	 are	 the	 steps	 the	 research	 is	 taking	 to	 fulfil	 the	 aim,	 a	 list	 of	
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tasks	 to	 accomplish	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 research.	 These	 objectives	 are	 extremely	important	since	they	strongly	influence	the	strategies,	or	methods,	employed	to	reach	the	aim	of	the	research.	The	objectives	guiding	this	research	are	 listed	in	figure	9	and	are	as	follows.				
1- To	identify	the	current	role	of	and	key	human	factors	challenges	for	
air	accident	investigators.	A	review	of	the	literature	was	undertaken	in	chapter	II	to	consider	the	context	of	aviation	 safety	 within	 which	 accident	 investigation	 and	 human	 factors	 are	essential	 elements.	 The	 challenges	 faced	 by	 accident	 investigators	 and	 their	organisations	are	identified.		
2- To	 analyse	 human	 factors	 integration	 in	 accident	 investigation	
reports.	Chapter	 IV	presents	 the	 review	of	 accident	 investigation	 reports	 using	 content	analysis,	 and	 evaluates	 the	 consideration	 and	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	within	it.		
3- To	 evaluate	 the	 relevance	 and	 efficiency	 of	 human	 factors	 training	
provision	for	air	accident	investigators.	In	 chapter	 V,	 a	 survey	 by	 means	 of	 an	 online	 questionnaire	 was	 conducted	amongst	 the	air	 accident	 investigators’	 community	 to	examine	 the	 content	and	efficiency	of	their	current	training	in	human	factors.		
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4- To	assess	the	training	needs	of	air	accident	investigators.	Chapter	VI	and	Chapter	VII	 together	 fulfil	 this	objective	using	a	methodological	triangulation.	 Chapter	 VI	 presents	 semi-structured	 interviews	 completed	 with	human	factors	investigators.	Given	their	different	views	on	different	points,	and	the	somewhat	subjective	limitations	of	qualitative	analysis	of	interviews,	another	questionnaire	 was	 conducted	 with	 the	 same	 participants	 in	 Chapter	 VII.	 This	allowed	 the	 development	 of	 valid	 findings	 regarding	 human	 factors	 expertise	involvement	and	training	provision	for	accident	investigators.		
5- To	 provide	 recommendations	 for	 developing	 human	 factors	
integration	in	accident	investigations.	Chapter	VIII	provides	a	discussion	and	conclusions	on	the	use	of	TNA	on	the	way	accident	 investigation	 organisations	 should	 integrate	 human	 factors,	 via	expertise,	training	and	methodology.		
III-	2-	3	Research	Strategy	
	The	third	element	that	influences	the	research	design	is	the	strategy	used	to	fulfil	the	objectives.	 It	represents	the	different	methods	used	to	answer	the	research	question,	which	could	be	called	the	‘plan	of	action’.	While	the	research	paradigm	determines	the	type	of	methods	that	are	used,	the	research	strategy	determines	the	actual	methods	that	are	employed.			
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From	 the	 beginning	 it	was	 possible	 to	 discount	 a	 number	 of	 possible	 research	strategies.	For	example,	given	that	the	research	concerns	current	events,	archival	or	 historical	 analyses	were	 discounted.	 Purely	 experimental	 designs	were	 also	not	considered	given	that	these	require	the	researcher	to	have	full	control	over	events	in	the	study	so	they	can	be	replicated.	Given	the	philosophical	position	of	the	researcher,	(i.e.	 the	adoption	of	a	mixed	methods	approach),	the	objectives,	the	 findings	 from	 the	 researcher’s	 previous	 study,	 and	 the	 conclusions	emanating	from	the	literature	review,	an	adaptation	of	a	Training	Needs	Analysis	(TNA)	was	selected	as	the	most	appropriate	method	for	conducting	the	analysis	and	 fulfilling	 the	overall	 research	aim.	 	This	 technique	will	be	used	as	a	 logical	guide	 to	 link	 the	 different	 studies	 and	 draw	 conclusions	 about	 the	 overall	purpose	of	this	thesis.	The	nature	of	the	TNA	required	several	different	methods	to	 be	 used.	 These	 are	 introduced	 and	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 their	 relevant	chapters.	 However,	 the	 overall	 justification	 for	 the	 use	 of	 TNA	 as	 a	 broad	strategic	approach	to	conducting	the	research	is	presented	here.	The	role	of	the	TNA	 and	 its	 relationship	 to	 the	 thesis	 is	 shown	 in	 figure	 9.	 An	 introduction	 to	TNA,	 its	 purpose	 and	 the	 process	 for	 conducting	 a	 TNA	 are	 addressed	 in	 the	following	section.			
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III-3	TNA			This	research	 is	designed	as	an	adaptation	of	a	Training	Needs	Analysis	(TNA),	analysing	 the	 need	 for	 human	 factors	 training	 provision	 to	 air	 accident	investigators.	 By	 gathering	 and	 analysing	 data	 from	 different	 sources	 of	evidence,	 it	 aims	 to	 examine	 the	 training	needs	of	 air	 accident	 investigators	 in	order	 to	 develop	 more	 thorough	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 accident	investigations.	This	method	has	been	chosen	to	attempt	to	answer	the	challenges	faced	 by	 accident	 investigators	 in	 integrating	 human	 factors	 in	 accident	investigations	 and	bridge	 the	 gap	between	 research	 and	 industry,	 identified	 in	chapter	II.		
III-	3-	1	TNA	purpose		Training	Needs	Assessment	or	Training	Needs	Analysis	is	a	process	that	consists	of	gathering	and	analysing	information	about	the	need	to	fill	a	gap	or	improve	a	performance,	or	correct	a	deficiency,	in	order	to	identify	whether	training	could	meet	 that	 need.	 (Brown,	 2002;	 Barbazette,	 2006).	 It	 is	 “an	on	going	process	of	
gathering	 data	 to	 determine	 what	 training	 needs	 exist	 so	 that	 training	 can	 be	
developed	to	help	the	organisation	to	accomplish	their	objectives”	 (Brown,	2002,	p569).	 Where	 it	 traditionally	 applies	 to	 one	 organisation	 or	 one	 department	within	an	organisation,	this	process	is	here	applied	to	air	accident	investigation	organisations.	Accident	investigation	organisations’	objectives	are	to	understand	why	 an	 event	 happened	 without	 apportioning	 blame,	 and	 avoid	 similar	
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occurrences	 by	 providing	 safety	 recommendations.	 Moreover,	 despite	 the	 fact	that	 this	 tool	 is	mainly	used	by	human	 resources	 (Boydell,	 1990;	Bee	and	Bee,	1994)	 and	driven	by	 business	 needs,	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 use	 of	TNA	is	very	wide.	Griffiths	and	Lees	(1995)	referred	to	TNA	as	a	human	factors	analysis	 tool	because	 it	 offered	 them	a	 structured	 tool	 to	 facilitate	 information	gathering	and	the	identification	of	gaps	between	current	operators	performance	and	the	one	required	with	new	technology	and	new	design.	This	thesis	will	use	this	process	similarly,	as	a	structure	to	draw	conclusions	supporting	the	aim	of	the	research.		TNA	is	the	first	stage	of	a	systematic	training	cycle	(see	figure	11)	and	is	itself	a	multiple	stages	process.			
	
Figure	11:	Training	cycle,	from	Buckley	and	Caple,	1995,	p27	
	TNA	should	be	undertaken	before	training	design	to	make	sure	it	addresses	the	relevant	issues	and	is	aimed	at	the	right	people.	Bowman	and	Wilson	(2008)	add	that	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 individual	 and	 those	 of	 the	organisation	when	conducting	a	TNA.	 It	 is	also	 important	 to	note	 that	TNA	can	
Training	Needs	Analysis	
Design	training	
Training	delivery	
Training	evaluation	
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also	help	identify	issues	that	cannot	be	solved	by	training	and	therefore	suggest	and	provide	different	solutions	(Brown,	2002;	Barbazette,	2006).				
III-	3-	2	TNA	process		Barbazette	 (2006)	 describes	 TNA	 as	 being	 a	 three-phase	 process:	 1-	 Gather	information,	2-	Analyse	 information	and	3-	Create	a	 training	plan	that	offers	to	resolve	 the	 performance	 deficiency.	 This	 structure	 will	 be	 followed	 for	 this	thesis,	however	since	 the	conclusions	drawn	 from	a	specific	 set	of	data	will	be	the	basis	for	collecting	the	next	pieces	of	information,	all	the	information	will	be	initially	 analysed	 independently.	 They	 will	 then	 be	 analysed	 altogether	 and	define	 whether	 or	 not	 training	 is	 the	 solution	 to	 enhanced	 human	 factors	integration	 in	 air	 accident	 investigations.	 Brown	 (2002)	 adds	 that	 a	 thorough	analysis	examines	 training	needs	on	the	organisational	 level,	 the	 task	 level	and	the	 individual	 level.	Since	 this	 thesis	 is	an	adaptation	of	a	TNA,	 it	will	 focus	on	looking	 at	 the	 organisational	 and	 task	 levels.	 It	 means	 identifying	 the	 sort	 of	training	and	knowledge	investigation	organisations	need	to	implement	to	better	integrate	human	factors.		At	the	task	level,	it	consists	of	identifying	the	needs	depending	on	the	role	of	the	investigator.	TNA’s	purpose	is	to	identify	the	gap	between	the	performance	and	the	job	requirements	and	the	target	population	(Bee	and	Bee,	1994;	Barbazette,	2006),	i.e.	who	should	potentially	undertake	the	training,	should	training	needs	be	 identified.	 	 It	 also	 enables	 the	 research	 to	 identify	 the	 deficiencies	 of	 the	
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current	 training.	 Applied	 to	 this	 research,	 the	 process	 of	 TNA	 identifies	 the	training	needs	depending	on	 the	 investigators’	 role	 as	well	 as	 the	non-training	related	solutions	to	produce	more	thorough	human	factors	investigations.	Typically,	the	information	to	gather	to	undertake	a	TNA	comes	from	observation,	questionnaires,	 face-to-face	 interviews	 and	 documentation	 review	 (Anderson,	1994;	Brown,	2002;	Barbazette,	2006).	Consequently,	the	researcher’s	previous	study	in	Chapter	I,	the	literature	review	in	Chapter	II	and	the	review	of	accident	reports	in	Chapter	IV	are	here	identifying	the	gap	between	the	requirements	of	a	thorough	investigation	where	human	factors	is	essential	and	the	challenges	faced	by	the	investigators	to	do	so.	The	questionnaire	amongst	a	sample	of	89	accident	investigators	identifies	the	deficiencies	of	the	current	training,	and	the	variations	depending	on	the	investigators’	role.	Semi-structured	interviews	with	HF	experts	and	HF	investigators	and	a	subsequent	questionnaire	conducted	with	these	same	interviewees	 provide	 valuable	 insight	 on	 the	 content	 of	 that	 training	 and	 on	additional	solutions.		
III-	4	Summary		This	research	design	is	characterised	by	three	main	components:	its	pragmatism	paradigm,	 or	 worldview,	 its	 objectives	 and	 its	 mixed	 methods	 approach,	 that	follow	 a	 TNA	 process.	 Both	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 analysis	 methods	 are	employed	in	order	to	fulfil	each	individual	objective	and	overall	answer	the	aim	of	 the	 research.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 TNA	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 training	 needs	 for	accident	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	more	 thoroughly	 integrate	 human	 factors	 in	
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accident	investigations	but	also	to	provide	additional	solutions	addressing	these	issues.	The	 first	step	 to	 identify	 training	needs,	 i.e.	whether	 training	could	be	a	solution	to	the	challenges	highlighted	in	the	literature,	 is	to	determine	whether	these	 challenges	 are	 identified	 in	 actual	 accident	 reports	 by	 evaluating	 the	human	 factors	 integration	within	 these	 reports.	 This	phase	 is	 presented	 in	 the	following	chapter,	Chapter	IV.		 	
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Chapter	IV	–Accident	investigation	reports	analysis	
	
IV-	1	Introduction		Accident	investigation	reports	are	the	product	of	safety	investigations.	NIAs	from	the	member	states	are	required	to	publish	a	report	based	on	the	ICAO	Annex	13	format,	detailing	the	facts,	analysis	and	findings	from	an	investigation,	as	well	as	providing	 safety	 recommendations	 if	 necessary	 to	 avoid	 similar	 occurrence.	Therefore,	 accident	 reports	 are	 appropriate	 documents	 to	 examine	 in	 order	 to	understand	how	human	factors	issues	are	approached	in	accident	investigations.		This	 chapter	 presents	 a	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	 analysis	 section	 of	 15	 accident	investigation	 reports	 from	 five	 different	 NIAs.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	understand	 how	 human	 factors	 is	 dealt	 with	 and	 how	 it	 is	 integrated	 within	accident	 reports,	 thus	 fulfilling	 the	 second	 objective	 of	 this	 thesis,	 which	 is	 to	analyse	the	human	factors	integration	in	accident	investigation	reports.		The	 following	 section	 presents	 the	 sample	 of	 accident	 reports	 selected	 to	undertake	 this	 study,	while	 section	3	describes	 the	method	of	 content	analysis	employed	for	the	analysis	of	this	part	of	the	research.	In	turn,	findings	from	the	analysis	 are	presented	 and	 a	 conclusion	 is	 provided	 in	 the	 final	 section	of	 this	chapter,	section	5.			
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IV-	2	Accident	reports		
IV-	2-	1	The	use	of	documents	in	research		In	social	research,	documents,	whether	written,	visual	or	oral,	can	be	treated	as	data,	 the	written	 format	 being	 the	most	 common	 source	 of	 documentary	 data	used	(Robson,	2002;	Denscombe,	2003).	Document	or	text	is	a	term	here	used	to	describe	 data,	 consisting	 of	 words,	 that	 have	 been	 recorded	 without	 the	intervention	of	the	researcher	(Silverman,	2001).		Using	 documents	 for	 social	 research	 presents	 the	 advantage	 of	 being	 an	unobtrusive	 method,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 the	 researcher	 is	 not	 present	 when	 the	document	 is	 being	 written	 and	 therefore	 the	 person	 producing	 it	 is	 not	influenced,	nor	his/her	behaviour	affected	by	the	research	(Robson,	2002).			Different	 types	 of	 written	 documents	 exist:	 books	 and	 journals,	 the	 internet,	newspapers,	 magazines,	 records	 (e.g.	 official	 documents	 from	 organisations),	personal	 documents	 such	 as	 letters,	 memos	 and	 diaries,	 and	 finally	 official	government	 publications	 or	 documents,	 such	 as	 official	 reports	 (Denscombe,	2003;	 Bryman,	 2012).	 While	 books	 and	 journals	 are	 often	 valued	 from	 an	academic	 point	 of	 view	 due	 to	 the	 peer	 review	 process	 they	 undergo,	 the	credibility	and	authenticity	of	sources	 from	other	sources,	such	as	the	 internet,	can	be	harder	to	establish.		Accident	 investigation	 reports	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 official	 government	publications	 since	 NIAs	 are	 governmental	 agencies,	 although	 they	 must	 also	remain	independent	from	the	state	and	the	regulator	(see	Chapter	II).	In	the	UK	for	example,	the	AAIB	is	part	of	the	Department	for	Transport.	Analysing	official	
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publications	 such	as	accident	 investigation	 reports	published	by	NIAs	presents	numerous	 benefits	 for	 the	 researcher.	 These	 documents	 are	 credible	 and	authoritative,	since	they	are	produced	by	experts	investigators	employed	by	the	state	 (Denscombe,	 2003).	 They	 are	 also	 necessarily	 objective	 and	 impartial,	which	is	an	essential	attribute	of	safety	investigation.	As	identified	in	chapter	II,	all	 accident	 reports	must	also	be	 independent	and	blame	 free,	 as	 stipulated	by	ICAO	Annex	13.		Nonetheless,	 a	 number	 of	 considerations	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	using	documents	as	a	source	of	evidence.	Namely,	as	a	researcher	it	is	important	to	assess	a	documents	authenticity,	credibility,	representativeness	and	meaning	(Denscombe,	2003).		In	this	context,	authenticity	reflects	the	genuine	nature	of	a	document	to	ensure	that	 it	 has	 not	 been	 copied	 or	 reproduced	 in	 some	 way.	 Here,	 reports	 were	downloaded	directly	from	the	website	of	the	NIA	in	question	to	ensure	that	the	reports	studied	were	original.	Credibility	is	here	ensured	as	far	as	possible	by	the	fact	 that	 the	 reports	 are	written	 by	 trained	 investigators	who,	 as	 part	 of	 their	role,	 have	 to	 limit	 biases	 and	 conduct	 blame-free	 investigations,	 which	 are	published	by	independent	NIAs.	It	is	recommended	that	the	subsequent	reports	are	then	published	following	the	format	outlined	in	ICAO	Annex	13.		The	reports	selected	 for	 examination	 in	 this	 research	are	 representative	 and	 typical	 of	 this	approach.	 Moreover,	 as	 each	 analysed	 document	 reports	 an	 occurrence	 of	 its	own,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 relationship	 existing	 between	 the	 reports.	 Thus,	 the	analysis	could	not	 ignore	 the	context	of	each	accident.	Finally,	 considering	 that	accident	reports	are	aimed	at	the	industry	and	the	public,	 their	meaning	has	to	remain	unambiguous,	accessible	and	understandable	to	non-experts.	
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IV-	2-	2	Accident	report	format		After	 an	accident	or	 serious	 incident,	 the	NIA	 is	notified	and	 then	must	decide	whether	 to	 conduct	 an	 investigation.	 While	 ICAO	 Annex	 13	 (2010)	 provides	international	 standards	 and	 recommended	 practices	 on	 how	 to	 conduct	 as	investigation,	 it	 is	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 relevant	 national	 or	 international	regulator	 to	 adapt	 and	 enforce	 them.	 For	 example,	 in	 Europe,	 EASA	 enforces	Annex	13	guidelines	via	EU996/2010	(see	Chapter	II).	The	latter	document,	and	part	 IV	 of	 ICAO’s	 manual	 of	 Aircraft	 Accident	 and	 Incident	 Investigation	 (doc	9756,	2003b)	give,	amongst	other	documents,	clear	and	detailed	guidance	on	the	format	of	the	final	report	that	needs	to	be	published	after	the	investigation.	The	purpose	 of	 this	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 standardisation	 on	 the	 most	 appropriate	 and	relevant	 way	 to	 present	 a	 final	 report	 from	 an	 accident	 investigation	 (ICAO,	2010).	The	first	part	of	the	report	should	therefore	contain	factual	information,	which	 provides	 the	 evidence	 gathered	 and	 explained	 regarding	 the	 event,	 and	enclosing	the	following:	-	History	of	flight	-	Damage	to	aircraft	and	other	damage	-	Personnel	information	-	Aircraft	information	-	Meteorological	information	-	Aids	to	navigation	-	Communications	-	Aerodrome	information	-	Flight	recorders	
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-	Wreckage	and	impact	information	-	Medical	and	pathological	information	-	Fire	-	Survival	aspects	-	Tests	and	research	-	Organisational	and	management	information	-	Additional	information	-	Useful	or	effective	investigative	techniques	The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 report	 is	 the	 analysis,	 which	 details	 the	 analysis	 of	relevant	factual	information	covered	in	the	first	section.	It	should	also	make	clear	what	 is	 pertinent	 for	 the	 determination	 of	 conclusions	 and	 causes.	 It	 is	 this	second	part	of	the	reports	that	is	being	analysed	in	this	study.	The	third	part	of	the	 report	 lists	 the	 conclusions,	which	are	 findings	and	causes	 (immediate	and	systemic),	 based	 on	 the	 previous	 analysis.	 The	 fourth	 part	 of	 the	 final	 report	states	 safety	 recommendations	 if	 appropriate	 to	 the	 occurrence.	 A	 common	approach	 to	 document	 analysis	 is	 content	 analysis	 (Robson,	 2002)	 and	 is	detailed	in	the	third	section	of	this	chapter,	section		IV-	3.		
IV-	2-	3	Sampling		In	 order	 to	 get	 a	 rich	 understanding	 of	 the	 content	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 an	investigation,	 and	 identify	 the	 type	 of	 attributed	 causes	 that	 investigators	considered	 important	 to	 the	 occurrence,	 the	 researcher	 focussed	 only	 on	 the	analysis	 section	 of	 each	 report	 (Cedergren	 and	 Petersen,	 2011).	 Overall,	 15	
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accident	 reports	 were	 selected	 for	 analysis	 from	 reports	 published	 by	 five	different	NIAs	 (three	 for	 each	 organisation).	 The	process	 by	which	 these	were	selected	is	explained	below.			Accident	 investigation	 reports	 from	 NIAs	 are	 published	 on	 their	 respective	website	after	the	investigation	and	are	therefore	available	to	the	public.	 	 It	was	decided	 to	analyse	 reports	 from	accidents	or	 serious	 incidents,	where	 the	 final	reports	 are	 commonly	made	available.	Additionally,	 only	 fixed-wing,	 scheduled	passenger	 commercial	 aircraft	 occurrences	 were	 selected,	 and	 not	 cargo	 or	general	 aviation	 occurrences.	 This	 was	 due	 to	 the	 higher	 public	 interest	 and	media	 attention	 usually	 associated	 with	 the	 former,	 meaning	 that	 full-scale	investigation	reports	are	not	always	generated	for	general	aviation	instances.			According	 to	 ICAO	 Annex	 13,	 the	 state	 in	 which	 the	 instance	 occurred	 is	responsible	 for	undertaking	the	safety	 investigation	of	 the	 incident	or	accident,	and	is	responsible	for	publishing	the	final	report.	Additionally,	the	nationality	of	the	aircraft	manufacturer,	the	operator	and/or	the	state	where	the	aircraft	was	registered	may	all	send	accredited	representatives	to	assist	the	investigation	and	sometimes	publish	their	own	reports.		Consequently,	when	selecting	the	reports	on	which	to	base	the	analysis	a	balance	had	 to	 be	 reached	 between	methodological	 considerations	 regarding	 the	 need	for	 a	 broad,	 representative	 sample	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 more	 pragmatic	considerations	concerning	the	accessibility	of	the	reports	and	the	time	required	to	conduct	the	research	on	the	other	hand.	This	approach	involved	an	element	of	subjectivity	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 researcher,	 in	 that	 a	 decision	 had	 to	 be	 made	
	 74	
regarding	which	reports	(and	by	association	NIAs)	were	included	in	the	analysis,	and	conversely	those	which	were	to	be	excluded.			With	this	in	mind,	it	made	sense	to	focus	on	reports	from	NIAs	based	in	mature	(and	by	association),	larger	air	transport	regions.	They	also	needed	to	be	current	members	 of	 ICAO.	 The	 rationale	 for	 this	 was	 to	 maximise	 the	 spread	 of	 the	sample	in	terms	of	geographical	coverage	and	the	number	of	flights	included,	as	well	as	ensuring	that	the	reports	studied	had	all	been	published	recently	under	current	ICAO	Annex	13	guidelines.	Given	that	the	analysis	sought	to	assess	up	to	date,	contemporary	use	of	human	factors	in	accident	investigations,	it	made	little	sense	to	focus	on	reports	from	relatively	minor	NIA	whose	most	recent	reports	may	 have	 been	 published	 some	 years	 ago.	 Additionally,	 since	 NIAs	 in	 mature	regions	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 lead	 and	 influence	 ‘best	 practice’	 in	 accident	investigation	and	reporting	in	smaller	regions	than	vice	versa,	 it	made	sense	to	focus	on	the	former.	According	 to	 IATA,	 the	 United	 States	 is	 the	 largest	 scheduled	 passenger	 air	transport	 market	 in	 the	 world,	 with	 over	 632	 million	 passengers	 handled	 in	2014	 (IATA,	 2015).	 In	 Europe,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 is	 the	 largest	 scheduled	passenger	market	(188	million	passengers),	while	South	Africa	 is	 the	 largest	 in	Africa	 (over	 20	 millions).	 Additionally,	 Australia	 is	 the	 largest	 market	 in	 the	Southwest	 Pacific	 region	 (84	million	 passengers).	 Consequently,	 the	 NIA	 from	each	of	 these	key	markets	was	 selected	 for	 inclusion	 in	 the	analysis:	 the	NTSB	(United	States),	AAIB	(United	Kingdom),	the	Accident	and	Incident	Investigation	Division	(AIID,	South	Africa),	and	ATSB	(Australia).		
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Ideally,	 it	 would	 also	 have	 been	 beneficial	 to	 analyse	 reports	 from	 China	 (the	largest	passenger	market	 in	Asia),	Saudi	Arabia	(Middle	East)	and	Brazil	 (Latin	America).	 However,	 these	 reports	 were	 not	 freely	 available	 in	 English	 via	 the	respective	agency	websites,	which	made	them	difficult	to	analyse.		To	 address	 this	 potential	 limitation,	 a	 fifth	 NIA,	 the	 Bureau	 d’Enquetes	 et	d’Analyses	(BEA)	from	France	was	 included	in	the	analysis.	While	representing	only	 the	 5th	 largest	 passenger	 market	 in	 Europe	 in	 terms	 of	 scheduled	passengers	 handled	 (IATA,	 2015),	 Airbus,	 one	 of	 the	 two	 largest	 commercial	aircraft	manufacturers	in	the	world,	is	based	in	France	(the	other	manufacturer,	Boeing,	is	based	in	the	United	Stated,	which	was	already	included	in	the	study).	Collectively,	Airbus	and	Boeing	aircraft	account	for	the	majority	of	air	passenger	traffic	 worldwide	 (IATA,	 2015).	 Given	 that	 the	 nation	 of	 the	 aircraft	manufacturer	 in	 question	 is	 permitted	 to	 send	 an	 accredited	 representative	 to	assist	 the	 investigation,	 the	 BEA	 was	 added	 in	 the	 sample	 accordingly	 as	representing	a	‘mature’	organisation.			The	selection	of	NIAs	for	 inclusion	in	the	study	also	related	to	the	variations	in	their	organisational	structure,	and	how	this	may	relate	to	how	human	factors	is	addressed	within	them.	The	ATSB	and	NTSB	are	both	multi-modal	organisations,	which	means	 that	 they	 investigate	 all	 type	 of	 transportation	 accident	 (air,	 rail,	marine	 and	 sometimes	 road)	 whereas	 the	 BEA,	 the	 AIID	 and	 the	 AAIB	 only	conduct	air	accident	investigation	and	are	therefore	considered	unimodal.	Baxter	(1995),	 Cedergren	 and	 Petersen	 (2011),	 Stoop	 (2004)	 suggests	 that	 the	multi	modal	 format	 is	 the	most	 beneficial	way	 to	 undertake	 transportation	 accident	investigation	 because	 it	 enables	 the	 sharing	 of	 resources,	 particularly	 in	
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technical	 investigative	 specialties	 such	 as	 human	 factors	 and	 human	performance,	 which	 are	 believed	 to	 be	 non-modal	 specific	 and	 where	 the	knowledge	can	therefore	be	applied	across	all	modes.	Furthermore,	multi-modal	organisations	 may	 also	 emphasize	 the	 fact	 that	 accidents	 are	 not	 isolated	technological	events	that	can	be	understood	in	their	specific	context	(Jakobsson,	2011).	Collectively,	human	factors	and	particularly	methodology	could	therefore	become	 a	 priority	 in	 the	 investigation,	 and	 thus	 lead	 to	 more	 harmonised	investigations	(Stoop,	2004;	Jakobsson,	2011).		There	 are	nevertheless	 arguments	 against	 the	multi-modal	 format,	 such	 as	 the	loss	 of	 in-depth	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 specific	 to	 the	 mode	 (Stoop,	 2004).	This	 can	 be	 overcome	 to	 some	 extent	with	multi-modal	 organisations,	 like	 the	ATSB,	who	 still	 have	human	 factors	 experts	 specialised	 in	 one	mode.	 Selecting	both	multi	(ATSB,	NTSB)		and	unimodal	(AAIB,	AIID,	BEA)		NIAs	for	the	analysis		provides	a	more	representative	sample	of	how	human	factors	is	investigated	in	main	 accident	 investigation	 agencies.	 Of	 the	 NIA	 selected,	 the	 3	most	 recently	published	 reports	 (prior	 to	 January	 2016)	were	 selected	 for	 the	 analysis.	 This	gave	a	total	of	15	reports	in	total,	which	are	summarised	in	table	3,	including	the	dates	 of	 occurrence.	 The	 pages	 of	 the	 analysis	 are	 indicated	 for	 reference	purposes.		
	 77	
Report	number	 Pages	of	analysis	section		 Organisation	 Human	factors	expert	involved	(as	indicated	on	the	report)	 Date	of	accident	 Accident	1	 82	to	103	 AAIB	 Yes:	external	 24-05-2013	 Accident:	Fan	cowl	doors	from	both	engines	detached	from	the	a/c,	causing	damage.	Return	to	land,	fuel	leak,	fire.		2	 56	to	67	 AAIB	 No		 16-04-2012	 Accident:	Smoke	warning	in	cargo	hold	despite	extinguishers	triggered,	Return	to	land,	injuries	during	evacuation	3	 23	to	26	 AAIB	 No	 26-09-2009	 Serious	incident:	Crew	took	off	from	wrong	taxi	intersection	4	 77	to	125	 NTSB	 Probably	in-house	specialist		 06-07-2013	 Accident:	Descent	below	visual	glide	path	and	impact	with	seawall	5	 40	to	58	 NTSB	 Probably	in-house	specialist	 20-12-2008	 Accident:	Runway	side	excursion	during	attempted	take	off	in	cross	wind	conditions	6	 78	to	118	 NTSB	 Probably	in-house	specialist	 15-01-2009	 Accident:	Loss	of	thrust	after	bird	strike,	and	subsequent	ditching	7	 86	to	98	 BEA	 Yes:	external	and	only	for	fatigue	issues	 29-03-2013	 Accident:	Un-stabilised	approach,	runway	overrun	8	 44	to	49	 BEA	 No	 16-10-2012	 Accident:	Longitudinal	runway	excursion	during	landing	on	a	runway	contaminated	by	water		9	 167	to	195	 BEA	 Yes:	HF	working	group	including	external	experts	and	investigators	 01-06-2009	 Accident:	Loss	of	control	and	stall	after	pitot	probes	obstruction,	impact	with	the	sea	
10	 131	to	141	 ATSB	 Yes:	in-house	 04-11-2010	 Accident:	In-flight	uncontained	engine	failure	11	 75	to	90	 ATSB	 Yes:	in-house	 20-03-2009	 Accident:	Tail	strike	and	runway	overrun	12	 191	to	211	 ATSB	 Yes:	in-house	 07-10-2008	 Accident:	In-flight	upset	13	 82	to	130	 AIID	 Unknown	 22-12-2013	 Accident:	Collision	with	building	near	taxi	lane	14	 103	to	118	 AIID	 Unknown	 07-12-2009	 Accident:	Runway	overrun	15	 8	to	9	 AIID	 Unknown	 03-05-2008	 Serious	incident:	Tail	strike	
Table	3:	Reports	selected	for	the	analysis	
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IV-	3	Content	analysis			
IV-	3-	1	Definition			Qualitative	 research	 is	 the	 “kind	 of	 research	 that	 produces	 findings	 not	 arrived	 at	 by	
means	 of	 statistical	 procedures	 or	 other	means	 of	 quantification”	 (Strauss	 and	 Corbin,	1990,	 p17).	 Robson	 (2002)	 noted	 that	 there	 are	 four	 broad	 approaches	 to	 qualitative	analysis;	 quasi-statistical,	 template,	 editing,	 and	 immersion,	 as	 presented	 in	 table	 4.	These	four	approaches	can	also	be	put	on	a	continuum	regarding	their	objectivity:	from	very	objective	(nearly	quantitative)	to	more	subjective	(high	level	of	interpretation	from	the	researcher).		Type	of	analysis	 Example	of	method	 Attributes	Quasi	statistical	 Content	analysis	 Word	and	phrase	frequencies	in	the	text	Transform	qualitative	data	into	quantitative	format	Template	 Thematic	analysis	 A	priori	codes	(but	flexible	because	can	be	changed)	called	‘templates’	used	to	categorise	parts	of	the	text	
Editing	 Grounded	theory	 No	a	priori	codes	Codes	developed	on	the	researcher’s	interpretation	of	patterns	in	the	text	Immersion	 	 Least	structured	Very	interpretive	Emphasizing	researcher’s	insights				 Table	4:	Types	of	qualitative	analysis	approach	(based	on	Robson,	2002)	
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All	of	these	analytical	methods	involve	coding	the	text	to	be	analysed	(Robson,	2002),	in	a	more	or	less	flexible	way.	A	‘code’	consists	of	different	categories,	or	themes,	to	which	specific	bits	of	 the	data	will	be	assigned.	To	run	a	more	objective	analysis,	 the	code	 is	determined	 prior	 to	 the	 analysis,	 based	 on	 previous	 research	 or	 theories.	 In	 this	instance,	the	coding	process	is	used	to	organise	and	objectively	describe	the	content	of	communication	(Berelson,	1952	in	Bryman	2012;	Kondracki	et	al,	2002).	At	the	opposite	end	of	the	spectrum,	methods	such	as	grounded	theory	develop	codes	as	the	analysis	is	being	 conducted	 and	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 less	 objective	 because	 it	 involves	 greater	interpretation	and	insight	from	the	analyst.	The	particularity	of	grounded	theory	is	that	it	allows	the	researcher	to	build,	as	opposed	to	test,	theories.			For	this	study,	it	was	considered	important	that	a	more	systematic,	objective	approach	was	 used	 in	 order	 to	 generate	 objective,	 and	 comparable	 research	 findings.	 Content	analysis	was	subsequently	selected	as	 the	method	 for	analysis.	Content	analysis	 is	 “an	
approach	to	the	analysis	of	documents	and	texts	that	seeks	to	quantify	content	in	terms	of	
predetermined	 categories	 and	 in	 a	 systematic	 and	 replicable	 manner”	 (Bryman,	 2012,	p290).	 It	 is	 a	 methodology	 that	 allows	 the	 systematic,	 objective	 and	 quantitative	description	of	the	content	of	documents.	Krippendorff	(1980)	refers	to	content	analysis	as	 a	 tool	 to	 process	 scientific	 data	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 replicable	 by	 other	 researchers	(systematic)	and	therefore	of	high	reliability.		Content	analysis	can	be	quantitative	or	qualitative,	and	consists	of	transforming	text	into	quantitative	data	 (numbers).	 For	 example,	 this	may	 include	 counting	 the	 frequency	of	terms	or	words	 in	a	text	and	comparing	 it	with	other	words	or	units,	or	coding	words	using	 numbers	 (weight)	 (Krippendorf,	 1980;	 Bos	 and	 Tarnai,	 1999;	Neuendorf,	 2002;	Bryman,	2012).	However,	purely	quantitative	content	analysis,	 also	 referred	 to	as	 text	
	 80	
quantification,	has	been	criticised	for	ignoring	the	context	and	meanings	of	what	is	being	analysed	(Bos	and	Tarnai,	1999;	Hsieh	and	Shannon,	2005).			To	some	extent,	qualitative	content	analysis	can	overcome	these	limitations.	Kondracki	et	 al	 (2002)	defines	 the	 qualitative	 content	 analysis	 as	 being	 a	way	 to	 examine	 latent	meanings	inside	the	document.	Bryman	(2012)	describes	qualitative	content	analysis	as	the	most	prevalent	approach	to	qualitative	analysis	of	written	documents.	Additionally,	he	 notes	 that	 the	 types	 of	 questions	well	 suited	 to	 content	 analysis	 include	what	gets	reported,	 and	how,	why	 and	where	 it	 gets	 reported.	 In	 this	 sense	 it	 can	be	 considered	well	adapted	to	the	nature	of	this	study,	seeing	as	it	seeks	to	evaluate	what	is	the	human	factors	 content	 in	 accident	 investigation	 reports,	 and	 how	 deep	 it	 is.	 Moreover,	according	to	Denscombe	(2003),	content	analysis	is	suited	to	texts	that	are	descriptive	and	 factual,	 and	 less	open	 to	 interpretation	 (as	 is	 the	 case	with	accident	 investigation	reports).			As	 each	 accident	will	 have	 different	 causal	 and	 contributory	 factors,	merely	 counting	human	 factors	 related	 terms	 (i.e.	 a	 quantitative	 approach)	 would	 not	 be	 a	 fair	representation	 of	 the	 way	 human	 factors	 was	 approached	 and	 considered	 in	 the	accident	investigation.	Here,	what	is	being	said,	and	why	it	is	being	said,	are	as	important	to	 the	 analysis	 as	 to	 how	 often	 a	 particular	 term	 occurred	 in	 the	 text.	 Ultimately,	 the	process	 of	 content	 analysis,	 whether	 qualitative	 or	 quantitative,	 should	 remain	 a	systematic	tool	to	highlight	the	presence	or	absence	of	particular	 ideas	or	themes,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	are	covered	in	the	document	(Kondracki,	2002).		
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For	 this	 analysis	of	 accident	 investigation	 reports,	predefined	categories	were	 initially	applied	 to	 the	 documents	 (i.e.	 a	 largely	 deductive	 approach).	With	 the	 framework	 in	place,	 the	 researcher	 then	 analysed	 passages	 of	 text	 around	 each	 code,	 how	deeply	 it	was	approached	in	the	relevant	paragraphs,	which	brings	this	part	of	the	analysis	closer	to	a	qualitative	content	analysis	approach.	This	way	of	conducting	content	analysis	can	be	 broadly	 seen	 as	 adopting	 a	 summative	 approach,	 which	 starts	 by	 counting	 and	quantifying	predetermined	words,	and	then	exploring	their	usage	(Hsieh	and	Shannon,	2005).	This	way,	 the	 study	also	 remains	 consistent	with	 the	mixed-methods	approach	undertaken	for	the	thesis.		
IV-	3-	2	Process			The	 process	 of	 conducting	 content	 analysis	 can	 be	 summarised	 in	 very	 clear	 steps	(Robson,	2002;	Denscombe,	2003;	Bryman,	2012):	identify	the	research	question,	decide	explicitly	 on	 the	 sample	 strategy,	 define	 the	 recording	 unit,	 develop	 categories	 for	analysis,	 and	 carry	 out	 the	 analysis.	 These	 steps	 need	 to	 be	 applicable	 to	 all	 units	 of	analysis	and	made	explicit	in	order	to	be	replicable	(Krippendorff,	1980).		The	 objective	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 analyse	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 human	 factors	 is	addressed	 in	 accident	 investigation	 reports.	 By	 examining	 the	 analysis	 section	 of	accident	 reports,	 the	 study	 identifies	 the	 nature	 and	 scope	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 air	accident	investigation	reports,	as	explained	in	section	IV-	2.			Once	the	documents	have	been	chosen,	the	text	needs	to	be	broken	down	into	smaller	units	to	be	analysed.	Here,	paragraphs	concerning		‘human	factors’	were	selected	as	the	
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unit	of	analysis,	and	sections	of	 text	 identified	as	concerning	human	factors	were	then	analysed	in	more	detail.	Within	each	section,	relevant	categories	were	developed.	These	related	 to	 the	 two	 main	 topics	 of	 the	 human	 factors	 discipline	 for	 aircraft	 accident	investigation,	 human	 performance	 and	 error,	 and	 organisational	 issues	 and	 were	determined	 from	 the	 literature	 review	 (see	 also	 Chapter	 II).	 To	 help	 identify	 these	categories	within	 the	 text,	a	number	of	keywords	related	to	human	factors	were	used.	These	keywords	were	taken	from	the	ICAO	Human	Factors	Digest	number	7,	a	document	that	focuses	on	human	factors	in	incidents	and	accidents	investigation	(1993,	p39	to	44,	see	 Appendix	 A).	 This	 includes	 two	 checklists,	 A	 and	 B,	 which	 provide	 a	 complete	overview	of	the	different	human	factors	issues	that	could	be	relevant	for	an	accident	or	incident	investigation.	The	checklists	were	designed	specifically	to	assist	investigators	in	determining	HF	issues	that	need	further	investigation	and	analysis,	which	make	them	a	reliable	 source	 to	 identify	 HF	 content	 in	 a	 report.	 Examples	 of	 these	 keywords	 were	‘fatigue’,	‘reaction	time’,	‘circadian	rhythm’,	‘stress’,	‘training’,	and	procedure’.			For	the	purpose	of	the	analysis,	each	of	the	keywords	were	searched	for	and	identified	in	the	text.	Paragraphs	containing	these	words	were	then	analysed	in	detail	to	examine	the	context,	 identify	 how	 specific	 human	 factors	 terms	were	 employed,	whether	 they	 are	explained,	whether	they	are	linked	to	references	and	whether	they	answer	the	question	‘why’	a	specific	event	occurred.		
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IV-	4	Findings	and	discussion		
IV-	4-	1	Findings	from	individual	reports		Having	downloaded	each	of	the	15	reports	from	the	investigation	organisation	websites,	the	 analysis	 section	of	 each	 report	was	 identified	 and	analysed	using	 content	 analysis	(see	table	3	for	list	of	reports).	This	was	done	by	identifying	the	human	factors	content	using	 the	 ICAO	 keywords,	 as	 previously	 discussed.	 The	 analysis	 for	 each	 report	 is	presented	individually	below.			Reports	1,	2,	and	3	are	AAIB	reports	as	indicated	in	table	3.	The	first	report	investigates	an	accident	involving	the	detachment	of	engine	cowl	doors,	causing	damage.	A	fuel	leak	and	a	 fire	consequently	occurred	when	 the	aircraft	 returned	 to	 land.	The	report	has	a	strong	human	factors	 focus,	with	two	sections	 fully	dedicated	to	human	factors	 issues,	one	section	regarding	human	performance	 is	entitled	“Engineering	human	factors”	and	one	section	regarding	organisational	issues,	entitled	“Organisational	aspects”.	The	main	causal	factor	of	the	accident	is	described	as	being	“maintenance	error”.		Analysis	in	the	report	 emphasises	 human	 factors	 issues	 involved	 in	 the	 accident,	 such	 as	 fatigue	(mentioned	 7	 times)	 and	 the	 swap	 error	 (identified	 as	 a	 slip,	 which	 is	 when	 the	technicians	 intended	 to	 return	 to	 the	 right	 aircraft	 but	 their	 actions	 did	 not	meet	 the	plan)	 that	 occurred.	 Indeed,	 the	 term	 ‘error’	 appears	 18	 times	 in	 the	 analysis	 section.	Related	terms	are	also	explained	in	the	analysis,	and,	where	appropriate,	are	supported	with	evidence.	For	example,	the	term	‘fatigue’	 is	used	with	the	employment	of	metrics,	or	bio	mathematical	model,	to	‘measure’	the	level	of	fatigue	of	the	workers	involved	and	
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to	help	determine	that	it	may	have	had	an	impact	on	their	performance.	Other	areas	are	approached	 such	 as	 ‘barriers’,	 ‘workload’	 and	 ‘visual	 cues’.	 In	 this	 report,	 the	 human	factors	content	could	be	considered	to	reach	its	purpose	of	explaining	‘why’	people	did	what	they	did	and	why	it	made	sense	for	them	at	the	time	in	question.			Report	 number	 2,	 relates	 to	 an	 accident	 injuring	 passengers	 on	 evacuation	 after	 the	cargo	hold	smoke	warning	was	 triggered.	 In	contrast	with	 the	previous	report,	 it	does	not	develop	any	human	 factors	 issues.	 It	 is	 apparent	 that	human	 factors	experts	were	not	consulted	during	 the	 investigation,	as	shown	by	 the	relative	 lack	of	human	 factors	related	terms	in	the	text.	The	causal	and	contributory	factors	of	the	accident	listed	in	the	analysis	 section	 related	 mostly	 to	 technical	 failures.	 The	 only	 human	 factors	 terms	present	 are	 ‘communication’	 and	 ‘decision	 making’,	 but	 these	 only	 appear	 once	 and	twice,	 respectively,	 and	 in	 any	 case	were	 not	 considered	 to	 be	 either	 contributory	 or	causal	 factors.	 They	 were	 therefore	 not	 developed	 deeply	 in	 the	 analysis.	 Clear	communication	issues	are	reported	between	cabin	crew	and	the	cockpit,	as	well	as	with	the	 ATC	 but	 they	 are	 not	 analysed	 in	 any	 great	 detail,	 despite	 there	 perhaps	 being	 a	compelling	case	to	do	so.			The	third	report,	 investigating	a	serious	 incident	concerning	a	crew	who	took	off	 from	the	wrong	taxi	intersection,	clearly	states	“the	investigation	focused	on	the	human	factors	
issues	 relating	 to	 the	 crew	 and	 the	 ATCOs,	 the	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 airfield	 and	 the	
regulator	 who	 had	 oversight	 for	 SKB”	 (p23).	 Indeed,	 within	 the	 contributory	 factors,	human	 factors	 issues	 play	 a	 significant	 role	 throughout.	 For	 example,	 two	 out	 of	 four	such	factors	were	listed	as	“the	crew	did	not	brief	the	taxi	routine”	and	“The	trainee	ATCO	
did	not	 inform	the	 flight	crew	that	 they	were	at	 Intersection	Bravo”	 (p27).	 The	 analysis	
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section	of	the	report	is	relatively	short	(only	three	and	a	half	pages)	and	human	factors	are	 not	 developed	 in	 great	 depth.	 Human	 factors	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘disorientation’	 and	‘confirmation	bias’	are	only	mentioned	very	briefly	 in	 the	report,	and	 in	each	case	are	not	 developed	 in	 any	 detail	 in	 the	 analysis.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 ‘confirmation	bias’,	the	term	is	referred	to	once,	with	only	three	sentences	relating	to	it	in	the	analysis.	Moreover,	no	references	are	used	as	supporting	evidence.	Furthermore,	the	report	does	not	make	any	reference	to	the	use	of	human	expertise,	which	was	surprising	given	that	the	nature	of	the	accident	would	suggest	that	this	could	have	at	least	been	considered	as	a	factor.			The	 reports	 from	 the	 NTSB,	 reports	 number	 4,	 5,	 and	 6	 did	 involve	 a	 human	 factors	specialist	 because	 the	 organisation	 has	 their	 own	 in-house	 HF	 investigators	 who	 are	part	of	the	investigation	team.	In	the	investigation	reported	in	report	number	4,	which	investigated	 an	 accident	 involving	 an	 aircraft	 descending	 below	 visual	 glide	 path	 and	impacting	the	seawall,	human	factors	is	deeply	embedded	in	the	analysis	and	has	been	investigated	 and	 reported	 in	 considerable	 depth.	 As	 an	 illustration,	 an	 entire	 8-page	section	 of	 the	 report	 is	 dedicated	 to	 flight	 crew	 performance,	 treating	 issues	 such	 as	fatigue,	monitoring,	and	communication.	 ‘Fatigue’	 for	example	appears	22	times	 in	 the	analysis	 section,	 with	 very	 specific	 related	 terms	 such	 as	 ‘circadian’	 (as	 in	 circadian	rhythm)	and	‘sleep’	occurred	6	and	15	times,	respectively.	In	the	case	of	the	latter,	the	number	of	hours	of	 sleep	 the	pilots	 received	before	 the	accident	was	also	provided	as	evidence	to	support	the	analysis.		The	 analysis	 in	 report	4	 also	 approached	 issues	brought	by	 automation	 and	 indicated	that	 part	 of	 these	 issues	 were	 identified	 from	 interviewing	 the	 crew:	 “the	 pilot	 flying	
made	 several	 statements	 that	 indicated	 he	 had	 an	 inaccurate	 understanding	 of	 some	
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aspects	 of	 the	 airplane’s	 autoflight	 system”	 (p93).	 The	 depth	 of	 human	 factors	understanding	 in	 the	 investigation	 was	 also	 highlighted	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 on	 several	occasions	in	the	text,	reference	was	made	to	key	human	factors	literature.	For	example,	references	to	mental	models	(p93)	were	supported	by	reference	to	key	published	texts	in	 the	 area.	 This	 indicated	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 expertise	 and	 understanding	 in	 human	factors,	 more	 so	 than	 many	 of	 the	 other	 reports	 where	 human	 factors	 terms	 were	generally	mentioned	only	briefly,	if	at	all.	The	probable	causes	and	contributory	factors	were	attributed	to	human	factors	issues.		Report	 5	 concerned	 a	 runway	 excursion	 during	 an	 attempted	 take	 off	 in	 cross	 wind	conditions.	 Amongst	 other	 areas,	 the	 analysis	 section	 focused	 on	 the	 pilots’	 actions,	training,	 and	 experience	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ATCs’	 obtaining	 and	 dissemination	 of	 wind	information,	which	 are	 all	 related	 to	 human	 factors.	 Regarding	 the	 pilots’	 actions,	 the	sequence	of	events	is	very	detailed	and	the	report	provides	explanations	that	are	likely	to	 be	 the	 reasons	 why	 they	 acted	 this	 way,	 depending	 on	 the	 instruments	 output.	Environmental	 conditions	 (gusty	wind)	 are	 also	 analysed	 in	 details,	which	provided	 a	clear	image	of	the	conditions	at	the	time	of	the	accident	and	how	it	impacted	the	crew’s	decision.	This	element	is	significant	in	human	factors,	as	identified	in	the	SHELL	model.	Another	human	 factors	element	 is	also	assessed	here,	namely	 the	nature	of	 the	crew’s	training.	 Thus,	 the	 analysis	 looks	 deeper	 than	 just	 the	 pilots’	 actions	 because	 it	 also	assesses	 the	 level	 of	 training	 the	 crew	 received	 regarding	 the	 specific	 conditions	 they	faced	preceding	the	accident.	In	this	sense	the	analysis	went	‘one	step	further’	and	also	investigated	why	the	training	received	by	the	crew	was	insufficient.				
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The	sixth	report	 investigates	the	ditching	of	an	aircraft	after	 loss	of	thrust	caused	by	a	bird	 strike.	 The	 analysis	 in	 report	 6	 focused	primarily	 on	 crew	performance,	 training,	checklist	design,	and	procedures,	as	well	as	some	more	technical	issues.	Of	these,	crew	performance,	 training,	 and	 checklist	 design	 are	 considered	 human	 factors	 issues	 and	together	represented	about	a	quarter	of	the	analysis	section.	A	key	aspect	of	the	incident	related	 to	 the	 crew’s	 failure	 to	 complete	 a	 mandatory	 checklist.	 Here,	 human	 factors	issues	were	explored	and	examined	in	some	considerable	depth	to	ascertain	the	reasons	why	this	may	have	occurred.	For	example,	“they	were	not	able	to	start	part	2	and	3	of	the	
checklist	because	of	the	airplane’s	low	altitude	and	the	limited	time	available”	(p87).			In	addition	to	the	checklist	itself,	the	analysis	also	discussed	the	decisions	made	by	the	crew	that	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	sequence	of	events.	For	example,	descriptions	of	tests	run	in	a	simulator	are	given,	where	the	aircraft	was	subjected	to	similar	conditions	to	that	of	the	accident	in	question.	Considerable	depth	is	given	in	report	to	other	factors	that	 are	 important	 from	 a	 human	 factors	 perspective,	 including	 pilots’	 stress	 level,	workload,	 tunnel	 vision,	 or	 visual	 illusion.	 	 Academic	 references	 are	 also	 used	 in	 the	report	to	help	support	different	human	factors	phenomenon,	as	discussed	in	the	text.			While	 Reports	 4,	 5	 and	 6	 all	 address	 human	 factors	 issues	 to	 varying	 degrees,	 none	mentions	a	specific	tool	or	methodology	that	could	have	been	used	to	run	the	accident	analysis.	While	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	say	whether	 this	was	a	deliberate	omission	on	 the	part	of	the	investigative	team	and	that	they	decided	not	to	employ	such	tool,	or	whether	there	 was	 indeed	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 available	 accident	 analysis	 tools	 or	methodologies,	it	was	still	notable	given	that	other	reports	such	as	10,	11	and	12	did	use	these	tools.		
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	Reports	7,	8	and	9,	from	the	BEA	did	not	involve	internal	dedicated	HF	expertise.	They	however	 did	 refer	 to	 external	 expertise	 in	 reports	 7	 and	 9.	 Report	 number	 7,	 which	related	 to	 an	 un-stabilised	 approach	 leading	 to	 a	 runway	 overrun,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	technical	 issues,	 approached	 numerous	 human	 factors	 issues	 regarding	 the	 crew’s	performance	as	well	as	organisational	 issues	such	as	the	airline’s	culture.	For	example	‘fatigue’	 (which	 appears	 14	 times	 in	 the	 analysis	 section)	 was	 identified	 as	 a	 factor	responsible	 for	 the	 crew’s	 poor	 situation	 awareness.	 The	 report	 also	 looked	 at	 the	different	 ‘layers’	 or	 barriers	 protecting	 the	 accident	 from	happening	 described	 by	 the	Reason’s	 model,	 a	 key	 model	 for	 accident	 investigation	 (Reason,	 1990).	 For	 this	investigation,	 an	 external	 expert	 in	 fatigue	 was	 consulted.	 References	 to	 academic	papers	do	not	appear	 in	 this	analysis	but	do	appear	 in	 the	expert’s	report	provided	 in	appendix	of	the	report	(in	French).	Apart	from	the	fatigue	issue,	the	analysis	section	of	this	 report	 does	 not	 go	 into	 deep	 details	 regarding	 the	 crew’s	 performance,	 by	 for	example	 not	 looking	 further	 as	 to	 why	 the	 crew	 did	 not	 prepare	 adequately	 for	 the	approach.	 It	however	 looks	 thoroughly	 into	 the	organisational	 factors	such	as	 training	that	had	an	impact	on	the	crew’s	performance.			Report	 7	 further	 illustrates	 the	 value	 of	 incorporating	 human	 factors	 expertise	 and	understanding	in	an	investigation	report.	In	this	case,	by	examining	fatigue	as	a	possible	cause	of	why	the	crew	had	not	performed	as	expected,	it	was	possible	to	produce	a	more	complete	 assessment	 of	 the	 incident	 and	 help	 improve	 the	 airline’s	 policy	 as	 a	 direct	result.				
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In	the	next	report,	report	8,	which	involves	a	runway	excursion	due	to	aquaplaning,	the	analysis	also	develops	human	factors	issues	to	a	certain	degree.	For	example,	while	the	report	 does	 not	 draw	 upon	 any	 specific	 academic	 literature	 it	 does	 examine	organisational	 issues	by	investigating	the	safety	culture	of	the	company.	However,	 this	level	 of	 detail	 was	 not	 found	 throughout	 the	 report,	 with	 some	 potentially	 important	human	 factors	 issues	 receiving	 only	 brief	 recognition	 in	 the	 text.	 For	 example,	 when	describing	the	difficulty	for	the	crew	to	estimate	their	altitude,	the	report	merely	noted,	“he	[the	pilot]	seemed	to	focus	on	control	of	the	aeroplane	because	he	did	not	know	how	
far	 from	 the	 threshold	 he	 was	 landing.	 The	 crew	 did	 not	 realise	 that	 the	 runway	 was	
contaminated	and	that	the	landing	was	long”.	This	passage	appears	 to	allude	to	several	potentially	important	human	factors	related	issues,	including	attention	or	workload	but	these	are	not	explained	in	any	great	detail.		Report	number	9,	which	concerns	the	 loss	of	control	of	 the	aircraft	 followed	by	a	stall	and	 impact	with	 the	 sea,	was	published	after	a	number	of	 interim	reports	and	 the	HF	element	was	investigated	by	a	team	of	external	experts.	The	first	section	of	the	analysis	is	based	on	the	group’s	work,	and	provides	considerable	detail	on	the	crew’s	behaviour	and	 decisions.	 From	 this,	 the	 report	 attempts	 to	 establish	whether	 the	 findings	 were	specific	to	that	crew	in	question	or	whether	they	could	be	generalised.	Thus,	the	analysis	is	 attempting	 to	 remove	any	bias.	The	analysis	 section	does	not	provide	 references	as	evidence	 of	 the	 statements	 but	 many	 human	 performance	 terms	 are	 employed	 to	describe	 the	 event	 (e.g.	 ‘lack	 of	 confidence’,	 ‘workload’,	 and	 ‘attention	 selectivity’).	 As	with	 the	 two	 previous	 reports,	 the	 investigation	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 the	 crew’s	performance,	 it	also	 looks	at	 the	crew’s	 training,	ergonomics	 issues	with	some	display	
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and	 other	 ‘latent’	 issues.	 It	 does	 however	 produce	 a	 report	 showing	 a	 much	 deeper	understanding	of	human	performance	issues	than	reports	7	and	8.		Reports	10,	11,	and	12,	produced	by	the	ATSB,	involved	internal	human	factor	expertise	since	the	ATSB	has	a	team	of	in-house	human	factors	investigators.	Moreover,	the	ATSB	is	also	known	to	base	their	analysis	on	their	own	tool	that	was	developed	using	James	Reason’s	Swiss	cheese	model.	The	first	part	of	the	analysis	of	report	number	10,	which	concerns	 an	 in-flight	 uncontained	 engine,	 mainly	 focuses	 on	 technical	 issues	 that	occurred	 with	 the	 engine.	 It	 however	 looks	 further	 than	 the	 technical	 failure	 and	investigates	 the	 manufacture	 of	 the	 engine	 in	 detail,	 from	 the	 manufacturing	 of	specifications	to	inspections.	For	example,	considerable	attention	is	paid	to	the	wording	of	the	inspection	procedures	(‘procedure’	is	mentioned	10	times	in	the	analysis	section).		Thus,	 it	 can	be	 considered	 to	 investigate	 organisation	 issues	with	 considerable	 depth.	Like	a	number	of	the	other	reports,	reference	to	human	factors	literature	is	not	made.			While	some	of	the	reports	did	not	employ	an	analytical	framework,	Report	11	uses	the	ATSB	 tool	 as	 a	 framework	 for	 analysis.	 This	 investigation	 relates	 to	 a	 tail-strike	 and	runway	 overrun	 event.	 In	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 analysis	 section	 it	 is	 stated,	 “The	
analysis	 begins	 with	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 occurrence	 events,	 before	 discussing	 the	
individual	 actions	 and	 local	 conditions	 that	 affected	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 flight	 crew	(p75)”.	It	follows	the	ATSB	analysis	model	explained	at	the	beginning	of	the	report	and	clearly	provides	a	clear	and	easy	to	understand	structure.	The	 issue	of	human	error	 is	covered	extensively	in	the	report,	which	also	looks	at	procedural	issues,	uses	references	and	 explains	 in	 great	 detail	 human	 performance	 phenomena.	 Additionally,	 the	 report	investigates	why	the	aircraft’s	crew	did	not	detect	any	errors	during	take-off.	The	report	
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found	 that	 this	was	due	 largely	due	 to	 crew	distraction,	which	consequently	 formed	a	large	part	of	the	analysis.			Analysis	in	report	12	mainly	focused	on	the	investigation	of	a	technical	failure,	 leading	to	an	in-flight	upset	and	resulting	injuries.	However,	 it	 investigates	how	this	 limitation	was	 not	 identified	 by	 the	 manufacturer	 failure	 mode	 analysis	 or	 safety	 assessment.	Besides,	 it	 investigates	 human	 performance	 by	 analysing	 the	 crew’s	 response,	communication	and	workload	during	the	event.		Due	to	the	absence	of	human	error,	the	depth	of	the	human	factors	content	in	this	analysis	section	is	limited.		Reports	13,	14	and	15	were	selected	from	the	AIID	from	South	Africa.	Unlike	the	other	NIA,	 a	 few	 reports	had	 to	be	discounted,	 as	 they	did	not	 contain	any	of	 the	keywords	listed	on	the	ICAO	checklist.	Hence,	reports	13,	14	and	15	represent	the	3	most	recent	reports	 which	 also	 have	 at	 least	 one	 human	 factors	 issue	 mentioned.	 In	 each	 case	(perhaps	unsurprisingly),	it	is	evident	that	there	has	been	little,	if	any,	input	from	human	factors	specialists.	It	was	however	unknown	to	the	researcher	whether	the	team	has	an	in-house	 HF	 expert.	 In	 each	 of	 the	 reports	 human	 factors	 issues	 are	 mentioned	infrequently,	 and	 where	 they	 are	 discussed,	 the	 discussion	 is	 largely	 superficial	 and	lacking	detail	or	depth.			Report	13,	which	concerns	the	collision	with	a	building	near	a	taxiway,	does	not	address	human	 factors	 issues	 separately	 within	 the	 report	 but	 includes	 it	 within	 wider	discussions	of	the	technical	aspects	of	the	incident.	This	varies	notably	from	the	majority	of	 the	other	 reports,	where	human	 factors	 issues	 are	 treated	 separately,	 usually	 in	 its	own	 specific	 section.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 report	 is	 entirely	without	mention	 of	
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human	 factors.	 For	 example,	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 ATC	 and	 the	 cabin	 crew	 was	detailed	 following	 the	 sequence	 of	 events.	 The	 flight	 crew’s	 performance	 was	 also	considered	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 explain	 why	 the	 aircraft	 taxied	 the	 wrong	 way.	 As	 with	several	 other	 instances	 where	 potentially	 significant	 human	 factors	 issues	 arose	 but	were	not	examined	in	detail,	the	report	does	not	analyse	why	the	pilots	did	not	read	the	correct	 information	concerning	the	taxiway	in	their	brief.	This	 is	merely	referred	to	as	‘loss	of	situational	awareness’,	but	this	is	not	explained	further.		Similarly,	analysis	in	report	14	is	limited	in	terms	of	human	factors	content.	The	accident	refers	to	a	runway	overrun.	The	crew’s	performance	and	why	the	pilot	took	4	seconds	before	applying	the	brakes	was	not	analysed,	although	 it	 is	 likely	that	at	 least	 to	some	degree	 this	 decision	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 having	 an	 important	 human	 factors	 element.	Organisational	 issues	are	nonetheless	approached	 in	 considerable	detail.	 For	example,	the	regulating	authority	oversight	of	runway	adherence	assessment	and	regulations	are	analysed.	It	discusses	the	relevance	of	specific	checklists	regarding	runway	frictions	and	the	limitations	in	the	process	of	testing	runway	frictions.			The	final	report	in	the	sample,	report	15,	refers	to	a	tail	strike	on	take	off.	It	has	only	a	very	short	analysis	section	(one	page),	and	as	such	its	use	was	limited.	However,	it	does	mention	the	crew’s	wrong	input	and	lack	of	error	identification	due	to	distraction,	albeit	with	 little	 analytical	 depth.	 Similarly,	 potential	 organisational	 issues	 are	 also	 not	addressed.	In	this	sense	the	content	of	the	report	in	terms	of	its	human	factors	content	is	consistent	with	the	other	reports	from	the	South	African	NIA.			 	
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IV-	4-	2	Discussion		The	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	 15	 reports	 highlighted	 different	 levels	 of	 depth,	understanding	 and	 application	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 the	 reporting	 of	 incidents	 and	accidents.	 While	 each	 of	 the	 incidents	 varied	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 specific	 nature,	geographical	location,	timing,	and	aircraft	involved,	the	majority	of	the	reports	made	at	least	some	reference	to	human	factors	issues,	albeit	to	varying	degrees.	In	terms	of	the	issues	most	commonly	addressed	in	the	reports,	the	majority	of	investigations	examined	organisational	 issues.	 Additionally,	 issues	 relating	 to	 human	 error	 and	 performance	were	cited	 in	a	number	of	reports,	while	 the	content	of	 the	procedures,	organisational	policies,	and	regulatory	oversight,	were	examined	where	relevant	to	the	investigation.			While	it	is	possible	that	the	sample	reports	merely	lent	themselves	to	the	type	of	issues	mentioned,	it	is	also	possible	that	there	were	other	potentially	important	human	factors	issues	that	were	not	considered.	As	addressed	in	the	literature,	and	as	illustrated	by	the	extensive	 list	 of	 ICAO	 keywords,	 human	 factors	 as	 an	 issue	 is	 much	 broader	 than	suggested	by	the	content	of	some	reports.		Indeed,	on	a	number	of	occasions	the	reports	appeared	 to	 refer	 to	 important	 human	 factors	 issues,	 and	 particularly	 human	performance	 issues,	 but	 then	more	 often	 than	not	 failed	 to	 assess	 them	 in	 any	depth.	This	 raises	 some	 important	questions	 about	 the	 role	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 the	 accident	investigation	process.	For	example,	it	is	not	known	to	what	extent	investigators	are	even	aware	 of	 the	 role	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 investigations,	 or	 whether	 they	 have	 the	confidence	to	address	them	properly	even	where	they	are	known	about.	Conversely,	 it	may	be	the	case	that	human	factors	issues	are	understood	well,	but	for	whatever	reason	are	overlooked.		In	any	case,	such	questions	require	further	investigation.		
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Certainly,	 the	 significant	 variation	 in	 the	 length	of	 the	 analysis	 sections	of	 each	of	 the	reports	 gives	 a	 clear	 indication	 of	 the	 varying	 degrees	 to	 which	 human	 factors	 were	considered.	While	the	nature	of	the	event	itself	will	inevitably	dictate	the	extent	to	which	a	report	is	more	technical,	operational	or	human	factors	focussed	to	some	degree,	it	was	clear	that	the	investigations	utilising	a	human	factors	expert	(either	internal	or	external)	generated	 the	 longest	 and	 most	 in-depth	 human	 factors	 analysis.	 This	 too	 raises	important,	unresolved	questions,	such	as	whether	human	factors	experts	were	allocated	to	the	investigations	precisely	because	of	the	nature	of	the	event,	or	because	the	incident	occurred	 under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 an	 NIA	 that	 happened	 to	 have	 an	 in-house	 human	factors	team	and	a	culture	of	addressing	human	factors	issues	(i.e.	the	NTSB	and	ATSB).		If	 the	 latter	 is	 the	 case,	 it	 raises	 the	 possibility	 that	 some	 events	 could	 fail	 to	 be	investigated	sufficiently	simply	because	of	where	they	occurred	in	the	world.			On	 occasions	 where	 human	 factors	 expertise	 is	 provided	 by	 an	 external	 specialist,	 it	makes	sense	that	the	non-HF	investigators	and	Investigator	In	Charge	(IIC)	are	able	to	understand	such	specialist	 information	 in	order	 to	 integrate	 the	 relevant	 findings	 into	the	 investigation	 process	 and	 link	 it	 to	 the	 facts	 developed	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	investigation	report.	However,	it	is	not	clear	to	what	extent	these	people	do	(or	do	not)	receive	 relevant	 training	 in	 human	 factors	 issues,	 how	 it	 is	 administered,	 what	 this	training	 entails,	 or	 how	 it	 is	 viewed	 by	 practitioners.	 Addressing	 these	 unresolved	questions	subsequently	form	a	key	priority	for	this	research.					
	 95	
IV-	5	Conclusion		The	 content	 analysis	 of	 fifteen	 air	 accident	 investigation	 reports	 from	 five	 different	organisations	highlighted	different	levels	of	depth	in	terms	of	the	human	factors	content.	It	 was	 highlighted	 that	 the	 involvement	 of	 a	 specialist	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	structure	and	content	of	the	human	factors	element.	It	was	found	that	the	organisations	with	 in-house	expertise	were	generally	producing	more	detailed	and	thorough	reports	in	 terms	of	human	 factors.	 Some	reports	were	 treating	HF	 in	 considerable	depth	with	references	to	academic	literature.	It	also	raised	questions	about	the	comprehension	and	perception	of	human	factors	issues	by	investigators.				This	 study	 also	 pinpointed	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 good	 understanding	 from	 the	 non-HF	investigators	in	order	to	correctly	integrate	HF	element	to	the	investigation	report,	draw	conclusions	and	make	safety	recommendations	if	necessary.	However,	it	was	not	clear	to	what	extent	these	individuals	receive	specific	human	factors	training.			In	this	sense,	findings	from	the	analysis	lend	support	to	issues	from	the	literature.	More	investigation	 is	 nonetheless	 necessary	 to	 understand	 why	 some	 reports	 still	 have	 a	limited	HF	content,	why	some	 investigators	seem	to	have	a	better	understanding	 than	others	 and	 why	 for	 the	 organisations	 without	 in-house	 specialists,	 a	 HF	 expert	 was	involved	 only	 for	 some	 investigations.	 Thus,	 the	 next	 chapter	 examines	 the	 depth	 of	training	received	by	accident	investigators,	particularly	in	human	factors,	from	all	over	the	world,	using	an	online	questionnaire.		 	
	 96	
Chapter	V	–	Accident	investigators’	training		
	
V-	1	Introduction			As	developed	in	chapter	III,	TNA	implies	the	gathering	of	data	from	different	sources	in	order	 to	 identify	 whether	 or	 not	 training	 would	 be	 the	 most	 appropriate	 method	 to	improve	performance.	In	order	to	find	out	whether	or	not	training	would	benefit	human	factors	 integration	 within	 air	 accident	 investigations	 reports	 and	 safety	recommendations,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 first	 obtain	 data	 on	 the	 sort	 of	 training	 accident	investigators	 are	 undertaking	 as	 well	 as	 its	 relevance.	 Therefore,	 an	 online	questionnaire	was	conducted	amongst	the	accident	investigators	community,	using	the	tool	Qualtrics.	The	purpose	of	this	survey	was	to	evaluate	the	relevance	and	efficiency	of	human	 factors	 training	provision	 for	air	accident	 investigators,	 thus	 fulfilling	 the	 third	objective	of	this	thesis	(see	chapter	III).		The	survey	sample	was	 targeted	at	current	air	accident	 investigators	 from	around	 the	world.	 This	 was	 done	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 survey	 was	 widely	 distributed	 to	 maximise	survey	responses,	but	also	to	enable	comparisons	to	be	made	between	different	types	of	accident	 investigators	 in	 different	 agencies	 to	 see	 how	 their	 approaches	 to	 human	factors	vary.	The	following	section	addresses	the	method	for	conducting	the	survey.	This	is	followed	by	an	analysis	of	the	main	findings	from	the	survey.		
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V-	2	Method	for	conducting	the	survey		An	 online	 self-completion	 questionnaire	 was	 chosen	 for	 conducting	 the	 survey.	 A	questionnaire	format	was	chosen	because	its	function	is	to	provide	an	accurate	form	of	measurement	 (Oppenheim,	 1992),	 in	 this	 case	 the	 proportion	 of	 investigators	 who	receive	 training	 in	 human	 factors	 and	 the	 content	 and	 significance	 of	 this	 training.	Questionnaires	are	widely	used	in	this	type	of	research	as	they	allow	the	researcher	to	reach	a	 large	number	of	participants	at	minimal	 cost,	provide	 flexibility	 in	 the	 type	of	questions	 that	 can	be	asked,	 and	 leaves	 the	 respondent	 flexibility	 in	place,	 timing	and	manner	 in	which	 they	decide	 to	complete	 it.	An	online	questionnaire	was	chosen	here	over	a	traditional	mail,	one-to-one	or	phone	format	because	it	enabled	the	questionnaire	to	 be	 distributed	 worldwide	 rapidly	 and	 at	 no	 additional	 cost,	 with	 completed	questionnaires	 automatically	 saved	 and	 thus	 easily	 accessible.	 The	 software	 used	 to	conduct	 the	 questionnaire,	 Qualtrics,	 also	 enabled	 the	 download	 of	 data	 directly	 into	SPSS,	the	software	used	for	the	quantitative	analysis	of	the	results.			Although	 these	 attributes	 are	 recognised	 benefits	 of	 online	 survey,	 there	were	 also	 a	number	of	potential	limitations	that	needed	to	be	taken	into	account	when	designing	the	questionnaire	 (Evans	 and	Mathur,	 2005).	 The	 lack	 of	 control	 of	who	 the	 respondents	were	was	mitigated	by	two	filter	questions,	“Are	you	an	accident	investigator?”	and	“Did	
you	 receive	 formal	 training?”	 	 The	 possibility	 of	 a	 low	 response	 rate	was	 balanced	 by	sending	 invitations	 to	 complete	 the	 survey	 to	 a	 large	 number	 of	 investigation	organisations	and	accident	 investigators,	whose	email	addresses	were	available	 to	 the	researcher	through	ISASI	membership	and	on	the	ICAO	website.	As	noted	by	Evans	and	Mathur	(2005),	some	respondents	may	perceive	survey	invitations	as	unsolicited	‘junk’	
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mail.	To	counter	this,	the	link	to	the	questionnaire	was	attached	to	an	email	coming	from	a	 Cranfield.ac.uk	 address.	 The	 Cranfield	 Safety	 and	 Accident	 Investigation	 Centre	(CSAIC)	runs	an	accident	investigation	course,	which	will	have	been	attended	by	many	of	the	investigators	included	in	the	survey	sample.		Therefore,	it	was	thought	that	most	people	 who	 were	 sent	 the	 email	 invitation	 would	 have	 recognised	 its	 origin	 and	therefore	would	not	have	merely	dismissed	it	as	‘junk’	mail.				The	 e-mail	 invitation	 sent	 to	 potential	 participants	 initially	 explained	 the	 aim	 of	 the	research	 and	 introduced	 the	 researcher.	 A	 right	 of	 withdrawal,	 anonymity	 and	 the	researcher’s	contact	details	were	also	made	available	to	the	respondents.	The	survey	did	not	ask	the	name	of	the	respondent	nor	the	organisation	for	which	they	were	working	to	encourage	honesty	 in	 their	 answers.	 Full	 ethical	 approval	 for	 conducting	 the	 research	questionnaire	was	granted	by	Cranfield	University	Research	Ethics	System	(CURES).			
V-	2-	1	Survey	structure		Considering	the	nature	of	the	survey,	and	the	need	to	obtain	relevant	data	from	a	range	of	respondents,	questions	in	the	survey	were	designed	so	that	they	closely	aligned	with	the	overall	purpose	of	the	survey.	This	meant	that	the	vast	majority	of	questions	in	the	survey	were	 closed-ended,	 or	pre-coded	open	questions	 (Brace,	 2004)	 and	 structured	because	 they	 enabled	 the	 respondents	 to	 answer	 succinctly,	 helped	 facilitate	 the	analysis	with	direct	 coding,	 and	were	useful	 to	 test	hypotheses	and	compare	different	answers	(Oppenheim,	1992;	Robson,	2002;	Neuman,	2006).			
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In	 total,	 the	 questionnaire	 contained	 21	 questions.	 Of	 these,	 nine	 questions	 were	measured	on	a	five-point	Likert	scale,	while	one	question	was	measured	on	a	four-point	Likert	 scale.	 These	 allowed	 for	 more	 accurate	 measurement	 on	 depth	 of	 training,	importance	 and	 confidence.	 For	 the	 remaining	 questions,	 four	 were	 YES/NO	 or	YES/NO/NEUTRAL	 questions	 and	 the	 rest	 were	 pre-coded	 questions,	 in	 order	 to	categorise	the	participants	but	also	in	order	to	list	the	different	categories	of	training.	A	category	 “Other,	 please	 specify”	 was	 added	 to	 questions	 that	 might	 need	 further	explanation	from	the	respondents.	For	example,	the	question	“What	type	of	investigator	
are	 you?”	 had	 available	 response	 options	 of	 “1-	 Operation,	 2-	 Engineering,	 3-	 Human	
factors,	4-	Other,	please	specify”,	in	case	the	respondent	did	not	 identify	 their	 role	with	either	of	 the	 first	 three	options.	The	 final	question,	 “For	the	purpose	of	feedback	please	
provide	your	email	address”	was	the	only	open	ended	question	included	in	the	survey.	It	was	clearly	indicated	as	an	optional	question	and	that	the	information	will	stay	strictly	confidential	(see	Appendix	B).			A	 pilot	 was	 run	 amongst	 the	 CSAIC	 department,	 from	 which	 a	 10	 minutes	 average	completion	time	was	determined.	The	pilot	also	led	to	some	wording	modifications,	by	changing	potentially	ambiguous	or	misleading	questions.	The	pilot	also	raised	the	need	for	 classifying	 the	questions	 into	 sections,	 and	 to	 indicate	 clearly	how	some	questions	were	 not	 a	 repetition	 but	 instead	 similar	 inquiries	 about	 a	 different	 topic.	 The	questionnaire	appears	in	Appendix	B.	The	sections	were	as	follows.		- Background:	questions	permitting	the	description	of	the	sample	- Initial	training:	questions	regarding	the	depth	and	importance	of	different	areas	related	to	the	accident	investigation	process.	The	list	of	the	different	topics	was	listed	in	ICAO	training	guidelines.	This	section	was	mainly	to	identify	the	sort	of	
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initial	training	accident	investigators	received,	depending	on	their	role.	Its	intent	was	 also	 to	 put	 the	 respondent	 at	 ease	 and	 not	 just	 start	 with	 human	 factors	related	questions.	- Additional	 and	 refresher	 training:	 questions	 about	 the	 type	 of	 additional	 and	recurrent	training	and	the	frequency	of	refresher	training	investigators	may	have	received.	 Each	 of	 the	 topics	 was	 also	 taken	 from	 the	 recommended	 practices	provided	by	ICAO	training	guidelines	for	accident	investigators.	- Human	factors:	regarding	content	of	HF	training,	importance	and	confidence.		
V-	2-	2	Summary	of	the	survey	sample		The	questionnaire	 link	was	 then	sent	 to	a	 large	network	of	accident	 investigators	and	accident	investigation	organisations,	who	were	then	asked	to	share	it	with	colleagues	or	those	 they	 thought	 would	 be	 appropriate	 to	 also	 complete	 the	 survey	 (known	 as	‘snowball’	sampling),	when	possible.	Around	120	invitations	were	sent.	The	link	stayed	‘live’	and	the	data	was	gathered	 for	a	period	of	 three	months	 from	November	2013	to	January	2014.			A	total	of	124	responses	were	gathered	including	115	respondents	who	replied	YES	to	the	 filter	question	 “Are	you	an	accident	investigator?”	Of	 these,	112	also	replied	YES	 to	the	 question	 “Did	 you	 receive	 formal	 training?”.	 Finally,	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 valid	 and	reliable	 results,	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 was	 only	 run	 on	 the	 89	 fully	 completed	questionnaires	 (23	 respondents	 failed	 to	 complete	 all	 questions	 in	 the	 survey).	Consequently,	the	final	survey	sample	consisted	of	89	respondents.	All	the	questions	are	presented	in	Appendix	B,	which	is	the	questionnaire	sent	to	the	investigators.			
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Figure	12:	Location	of	the	respondents	
	The	 89	 respondents	were	 located	 all	 around	 the	world,	with	 the	majority	 residing	 in	Europe	(42%)	and	North	America	(26%)	(see	figure	12),	and	the	majority	were	working	for	 National	 Investigation	 Agencies	 (83%)	 i.e.	 the	 national	 organisations	 that	 run	independent	safety	investigations	(see	figure	13)	in	their	country.								
42%	
26%	
18%	
13%	
1%	Location	
Europe	North	America	Oceania	Asia	Africa	
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Figure	13:	Type	of	organisation	respondents	work	for	
The	 level	 of	 experience	 of	 the	 investigators	 was	 measured	 by	 the	 number	 of	investigations	 they	 had	 undertaken	 to	 date.	 The	 results	 show	 that	 the	 majority	 of	investigators	in	the	sample	were	relatively	experienced,	with	two	thirds	of	them	having	conducted	20	or	more	investigations	in	their	career	(see	figure	14).	In	comparison,	11%	of	 respondents	had	 conducted	11-20	 investigations,	while	9%	and	12%	of	 the	 sample	had	conducted	between	6-10	and	1-5	 investigations,	respectively.	One	respondent	had	not	yet	completed	any	investigation.		
	
Figure	14:	Investigators'	level	of	experience:	number	of	investigations	undertake	
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	The	investigators	also	held	different	roles	within	their	organisation	(see	figure	15).	Most	of	them	were	“operations”	and	“engineering”	investigators.	This	implies	that	during	an	investigation	their	role	would	mean	that	they	focus	mainly	on	the	operations	side	(pilot,	cockpit,	 flight)	 and	 the	 engineering	 ones	 would	 focus	 more	 on	 the	 technical	 side	(aircraft,	 engines,	 maintenance).	 20%	 of	 the	 sample	 identified	 themselves	 as	 being	“general”,	“all	types”	or	lead	investigator.	For	the	purpose	of	the	analysis	this	group	are	considered	and	labelled	as	“General”.		
	
Figure	15:	Types	of	investigators	
	The	89	respondents	 therefore	 formed	a	representative	sample	of	 the	population	of	air	accident	 investigators	 with	 formal	 training,	 since	 it	 covers	 all	 level	 of	 experience,	different	roles	and	a	variety	of	places.			
	
37%	
26%	9%	
20%	
8%	 Operations	Engineering	Human	Factors	General	Others	
	 104	
V-	3	Survey	findings			
V-	3-	1	Initial	training		According	to	the	ICAO	Training	guidelines	for	aircraft	accident	investigators	(Circ.	298,	2003a),	 a	 large	 number	 of	 topics	 should	 be	 covered	 during	 the	 investigators	 initial	training,	 undertaken	 before	 they	 start	 the	 job.	 It	 should	 provide	 them	 with	 a	 good	introduction	 to	 the	 job	 and	 the	 running	 of	 an	 investigation.	 This	 coincides	 with	 the	multi-disciplinary	aspect	of	investigating	an	accident.	All	the	different	topics	are	detailed	in	the	ICAO	guidelines,	and	were	used	in	the	questionnaire	as	the	categories	to	describe	the	content	of	initial	training.			The	question	“How	deep	was	your	initial	training	in	these	areas?”	 	asked	respondents	to	rate	the	depth	of	training	they	had	received	in	each	of	these	20	separate	topic	areas.	This	highlighted	a	number	of	important	areas	for	analysis,	namely	that	despite	being	listed	as	important	topics	to	be	approached	in	the	ICAO	guidelines,	some	training	areas	were	not	part	of	the	initial	training	of	some	of	the	respondents.	For	example,	10%	of	them	did	not	receive	any	training	on	the	examination	of	maintenance	documentations,	9%	of	them	on	power	 plants,	 and	 8%	 of	 the	 respondents	 had	 no	 training	 on	 how	 to	 write	recommendations	and	deal	with	media	and	families.	This	could	imply	that	the	guidelines	are	 not	 always	 being	 applied	 properly	 nor	 considered.	 ICAO	 only	 provides	recommended	practices	and	has	no	regulatory	power.	Nonetheless,	it	shows	that	some	investigators	do	not	have	the	recommended	initial	training	skills.			
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Information	 gathering	 techniques	 (72%	 of	 respondents),	 accident	 site	 safety	 (70%),	administrative	 arrangement	 (70%)	 and	 interviewing	 (70%)	were	 all	 areas	where	 the	majority	of	investigators	had	received	deep	or	extremely	deep	training.	In	comparison,	26%	of	the	engineering	investigators	and	25%	of	the	human	factors	investigators	claim	not	to	have	received	any	training,	or	received	only	brief	training,	on	interviewing	during	their	initial	training	programme.	While	this	might	have	been	covered	in	further	training	as	 part	 of	 their	 specialisation,	 this	 still	 seems	 like	 a	 relatively	 low	 proportion	considering	 that	 interviewing	 is	 considered	 as	 an	 important	 source	 of	 evidence	 and	witness	 interviewing	 is	 a	 topic	 that,	 according	 to	 ICAO’s	 training	 guidelines	 (2003a),	should	be	covered	in	basic	investigators’	training	courses.			The	examination	of	maintenance	documentation	was	approached	deeply	 for	only	25%	of	the	respondents.	Amongst	the	engineers,	 for	whom	maintenance	documentation	are	essential	pieces	of	evidence,	45%	of	them	received	no	training	or	only	brief	training	on	this	 subject.	 Similarly	 to	 interview	 techniques,	 this	 figure	 might	 reflect	 the	 fact	 that	experienced	engineers	who	become	investigators	are	expected	to	be	familiar	with	such	documentations,	or	 that	 this	aspect	will	be	covered	 in	 their	 further	 specialist	 training.	Analysis	techniques,	which	should	be	approached	in	order	to	allow	the	investigators	to	know	how	far	the	investigation	should	be	pursued	as	well	as	testing	hypotheses	(ICAO,	cir	298)	had	been	approached	in	depth	for	only	45%	of	the	respondents.	Report	writing	and	 recommendations	 is	 also	 a	 crucial	 topic	 since	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 an	 accident	investigation	 is	 to	 publish	 a	 report	 that,	 where	 appropriate,	 provides	 safety	recommendations	to	avoid	similar	occurrences.	This,	however,	does	not	appear	to	have	been	 reflected	 in	 the	 depth	 of	 initial	 training	 received	 by	 the	 investigators,	 seeing	 as	31.5%	of	them	claimed	to	have	received	no	training	or	only	brief	training	on	that	topic.	
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In	turn,	those	who	claimed	not	to	have	received	this	training	were	roughly	equally	split	between	human	factors	investigators	(50%)	and	engineers	(48%).			ICAO	 training	 guidelines	 emphasize	 that	 “no	 accident	 investigation	 can	 be	 complete	
without	a	thorough	consideration	of	Human	Factors	issues	involved”	(ICAO,	2003a,	p11).	Of	 the	 twenty	 topics	 outlined	 by	 ICAO,	 two	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 directly	 relating	 to	human	 factors	 investigation:	 human	 performance	 and	 organisational	 factors.	 During	their	 initial	 training,	 it	was	 found	 that	 55%	 of	 the	 respondents	 (i.e.	 a	 little	 over	 half)	received	 deep	 training	 in	 human	 performance	 and	 37%	 in	 organisational	 factors	(including	 37.5%	 of	 the	 human	 factors	 investigators).	While	 55%	might	 seem	 like	 an	encouraging	 figure,	 particularly	 when	 compared	 to	 other	 disciplines,	 these	 findings	would	suggest	 that	 there	 is	 still	 room	 for	 improvement	with	regards	 to	 the	depth	and	scope	 of	 human	 factors	 training	 in	 initial	 training	 regimes,	 particularly	 regarding	organisational	factors.	Importantly,	it	could	also	imply	that	the	initial	training	provided	is	 not	 as	well	 adapted	 to	 the	needs	 of	 running	 a	 thorough	 accident	 investigation	 as	 it	could	 be.	 Figure	 16	 shows	 the	 percentage	 of	 respondents	 who	 received	 in-depth	 or	extremely	 in-depth	 training	 for	 each	 of	 the	 20	 topic	 areas.	 The	 two	 areas	 relating	 to	human	factors	are	indicated.		
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Figure	16:	Percentage	of	investigators	who	received	in-depth	training	in	different	topics
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The	apparent	disparity	or	lack	of	standardisation	in	terms	of	the	range	of	topics	covered	in	initial	training	schemes	raises	some	important	issues.	While	there	will	inevitably	be	some	time	restrictions	with	regards	to	training	provision,	meaning	that	in	reality	it	may	be	impractical	or	unnecessary	to	provide	in-depth	training	to	 all	 applicants	 for	 all	 topic	 areas,	 it	 is	 significant	 the	 extent	 to	 which	respondents	 varied	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 training	 they	 had	 received.	 While	 it	 is	possible	that	respondents	may	have	forgotten	or	lost	track	of	the	initial	training	they	had	received,	given	that	in	some	cases	this	may	have	been	several	years	ago,	it	seems	unlikely	that	this	would	explain	these	variations	alone.	Furthermore,	it	appears	that	the	role	of	the	investigator	has	little	impact	in	terms	of	the	training	they	 receive,	 given	 that	 few	 discernible	 patterns	 emerge	 from	 the	 data	 in	 this	regard.	Rather,	it	seems	more	likely	that	the	findings	are	a	function	of	the	large	number	of	courses	available	around	the	world,	the	lack	of	accreditation	(and	the	standardisation	 this	 would	 bring),	 the	 organisations’	 policy	 with	 regards	 to	training,	 and	 the	 limited	 resources	 and	 access	 to	 skilled	 trainers	 available	 to	different	organisations.			
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V-	3-	2	Advanced	courses		As	well	as	initial	training	and	on-the-job	training,	some	investigators	undertake	specialised	 courses	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 more	 responsibilities	 and	 develop	 their	knowledge.	The	different	courses	may	vary	depending	on	the	investigator’s	role	and	 the	 organisation.	 Overall,	 media	 relations	 and	 human	 factors	 are	 the	specialist	 courses	 that	 most	 investigators	 undertook	 (72%	 and	 67%,	respectively).	 This	 indicates	 that	 although	 human	 factors	 is	 not	 always	approached	 deeply	 during	 initial	 training	 it	 is	 often	 taught	 in	 a	 separate,	specialised	 course.	 Figure	 17	 shows	 the	 percentage	 of	 investigators	 who	received	advanced	courses.	It	illustrates	that	human	factors	investigators	do	not	receive	 many	 of	 the	 very	 technical	 specialised	 courses	 such	 as	 helicopter	investigation	 or	 fire	 and	 explosions.	 The	 fact	 that	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 HF	investigators	receive	training	in	management	of	a	large	site	and	dealing	with	an	inquest,	 would	 suggest	 that	 they	 tend	 not	 to	 be	 deployed	 on	 site	 or	 are	 the	investigator	in	charge.	Regarding	the	latter,	it	is	important	to	note	that	there	are	of	 course	 fewer	 IICs,	 which	 inevitably	 means	 that	 fewer	 investigators	 will	undertake	 such	 specialist	 courses.	 	 There	 is	 very	 little	 difference	 between	 the	advanced	courses	operations,	engineering	and	general	investigators	undertake.	
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Figure	17:	Advanced	courses	undertaken	by	accident	investigators	
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may	have	 been	 the	 result	 of	 less	 experienced	 investigators	 not	 having	 been	 in	post	 long	 enough	 to	have	 received	 refresher	 training,	 on	 inspecting	 the	data	 it	was	shown	that	the	majority	(70%)	of	these	responses	came	from	investigators	who	had	completed	more	than	10	investigations	in	their	careers.			Looking	 now	 at	 the	 different	 type	 of	 investigators	 (figure	 18),	 the	 main	 area	where	most	of	them	do	receive	recurrent	training	at	least	every	5	years	or	more	often	is	‘accident	site	safety’.	This	could	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	in	order	to	do	their	 job	efficiently,	 investigators	also	need	to	be	working	safely	despite	the	different	 hazards	 that	 an	 accident	 site	 can	 present.	 This	 is	 a	 safety-critical	subject.	 There	 is	 a	 large	 disparity	 in	 the	 frequency	 of	 recurrent	 training	 in	‘regulations’	 (80%	of	 the	engineers	never	or	rarely	receiving	refresher	training	on	 the	 subject,	 whereas	 it	 only	 affects	 40	 and	 50%	 of	 the	 other	 types	 of	investigators),	in	‘aircraft	systems	and	technical	knowledge’	and	‘human	factors’.	The	engineers	and	operations	investigators	are	the	ones	who	seem	to	receive	HF	recurrent	 training	 the	 least	 frequently,	 despite	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 discipline.	This	 corresponds	 to	 respectively	 40%	 and	 50%	 of	 them,	 which	 is	 a	 high	proportion	 considering	 that	 human	 factors	was	 not	 approached	 deeply	 during	their	initial	training	(see	figure	16).	It	therefore	seems	like	that	although	they	do	undertake	 one	 specialist	 course	 in	 human	 factors,	 they	 do	 not	 update	 their	knowledge	 via	 refresher	 training.	 Unsurprisingly	 almost	 all	 HF	 investigators	(87.5%)	 undertake	 HF	 refresher	 training	 at	 least	 every	 5	 years.	 Accident	investigation	 is	 a	 multi-disciplinary	 enterprise	 that	 evolves	 with	 new	technologies,	new	methods,	new	aircraft,	and	new	trends	and	it	is	why	refresher	
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training	 is	 essential.	 Figure	 18	 illustrates	 that	 this	 recurrent	 training	 is	 not	undertaken	consistently	amongst	investigators.		
	
Figure	18:	Percentage	of	investigators	having	received	No,	or	less	than	once	every	5	years,	refresher	
training	
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conducted	by	the	author	and	discussed	in	chapter	I,	it	was	clear	that	there	was	a	need	for	more	training	in	human	factors,	adapted	to	the	investigators’	needs	but	also	 to	 their	 role.	 This	 section	 aimed	 therefore	 at	 identifying	 whether	 that	recommendation	could	apply	to	other	organisations.	Virtually	 all	 respondents	 thought	 that	 it	 was	 important	 to	 investigate	 human	factors	as	part	of	an	investigation.	Overall,	98%	of	respondents	believed	that	it	is	“very	important”	or	“extremely	important”	(see	figure	19).			In	terms	of	the	quality	of	training	they	receive,	79%	of	respondents	felt	that	the	training	they	received	in	human	factors	was	 ‘useful’,	whereas	17%	preferred	to	stay	neutral	on	the	matter.	Only	3.5%	of	the	sample	believed	that	their	training	was	 ‘useless’	 (see	 figure	 20).	 This	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 generally	 a	 positive	attitude	towards	human	factors	and	the	training	they	receive.	Furthermore,	84%	of	 respondents	 claimed	 that	 they	 “would	 like	 to	 receive	 more	 human	 factors	
training”,	which	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 generally	 a	 desire	 from	 investigators	 to	extend	and	develop	their	knowledge	on	the	topic.	Of	the	minority	of	respondents	who	replied	that	they	did	not	wish	to	have	more	HF	training,	5	were	‘engineers’	(21.7%	 of	 the	 engineering	 investigators	 who	 took	 the	 questionnaire),	 4	 were	‘operations’	(12.1%),	4	were	identified	as	‘others’	(16%)	and	only	1	was	‘human	factors’.	 This	 could	mean	 that	 engineers	 are	 the	more	 reluctant	 to	 know	more	about	human	factors,	although	it	was	not	possible	to	determine	this	conclusively	from	the	survey	alone.	Figure	21	illustrates	these	results.		
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Figure	19:	Percentage	of	respondents	“	How	important	is	it	to	investigate	human	factors?”	
	
Figure	20:	"How	useful	was	your	human	factors	training?"	percentage	of	respondents	
		
Figure	21:	Number	of	respondents	"Would	you	like	to	receive	more	human	factors	training?"	
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Human	factors	 is	an	umbrella	 term	that	regroups	a	 lot	of	 topics,	particularly	 in	investigation,	as	identified	in	section	II.	In	order	to	identify	what	was	the	content	of	 human	 factors	 training,	 different	 categories	 were	 identified	 from	 ICAO’s	Human	 factors	 digest	 n°7	 (1993)	 and	 the	 Human	 Factors	 training	 manual	(1998).	These	categories	were	selected	because	they	were	the	most	relevant	to	human	 factors	 air	 accident	 investigation	 and	 are	 the	 following:	 interview	techniques,	 what	 is	 human	 factors,	 tools	 and	 techniques,	 data	 that	 should	 be	collected,	use	of	HF	specialists,	HF	 in	engineering	and	maintenance,	HF	 in	ATC,	HF	 in	 flight	 operations,	 human	 performance	 and	 error,	 cultural	 and	organisational	factors,	basics	in	aviation	medicine.	Figure	22	shows	the	different	categories	that	were	approached	during	the	participants’	human	factors	training.	It	 excludes	 the	 2%	 (1	 ‘engineer’	 and	 1	 ‘operation’)	 of	 respondents	who	 ticked	“Not	applicable”,	suggesting	that	they	never	received	human	factors	training.			
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Figure	22:	Human	factors	topics	covered	during	training	
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most	of	the	investigations,	since	most	accidents	involve	human	error	(Wiegmann	and	Shappell,	2001,	2006,	2009)	and	organisational	issues	(Reason,	1990).			Other	areas	were	found	to	be	taught	 less	often.	 	Significantly,	 it	was	 found	that	only	58%	of	 investigators	 received	 training	on	 the	 type	of	 data	 that	 should	be	collected.	This	implies	that	42%	of	invetstigators	were	not	taught	what	data	they	should	collect,	which	is	an	issue	considering	the	nature	of	investigation	and	the	gathering	of	evidence.	Similarly,	 for	27%	of	 respondents,	 their	 training	did	not	approach	‘tools	and	methods’,	which	is	an	essential	part	of	accident	investigation	as	demonstrated	 in	section	II.	Moreover,	36%	of	 the	participants	were	not	 told	how	to	make	the	best	use	of	HF	specialists	and	for	40%,	‘HF	in	engineering	and	maintenance’	was	not	approached	during	their	HF	training.	The	latter	category,	which	 by	 its	 name	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 relevant	 for	 engineering	 investigators	 and	general	 investigators,	 was	 not	 part	 of	 their	 training	 for	 30%	 and	 50%	 of	 the	sample,	 respectively.	 Amongst	 the	 ‘engineering’	 investigators	 who	 did	 not	receive	 ‘HF	 in	 engineering	 and	 maintenance’	 as	 part	 of	 their	 HF	 training,	 a	majority	 (57%)	 did	 not	 receive	 training	 on	 ‘use	 of	 HF	 specialist’.	 Although	 it	could	be	argued	that	‘engineering’	investigators	do	not	need	to	be	trained	in	HF	because	it	 is	not	their	specialism,	it	may	be	useful	to	consider	training	them	on	the	 ‘use	of	HF	specialist’,	 i.e.	who	 to	 refer	 to.	As	highlighted	 in	 the	preliminary	study	in	chapter	I,	identifying	the	adequate	expertise	might	not	be	obvious.	This	could	 enable	 the	 involvement	 of	 suitable	 expertise.	 In	 addition,	 amongst	 the	‘operations’	 investigators	who	were	not	 taught	 on	 ‘HF	 in	 flight	 operations’,	 for	nearly	78%	of	them,	their	training	did	not	approach	‘use	of	HF	specialist’.	 	This	
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emphasizes	 another	 weakness	 in	 the	 HF	 training	 provided	 to	 accident	investigators.	As	mentioned	 earlier	 in	 the	 chapter,	 it	 was	 considered	 important	 to	 assess	 to	what	extent	the	approach	to	human	factors	varied	by	organisation.	For	example,	Australia	 (the	ATSB)	was	 one	 of	 the	 first	 countries	 to	 integrate	 human	 factors	within	their	investigation	by	the	creation	of	their	very	own	human	factors	team.	Some	organisations	however,	still	do	not	have	dedicated	in-house	expertise	(i.e.	no	HF	specialist)	 and	do	not	always	know	who	 to	 refer	 to,	 as	presented	 in	 the	author’s	 preliminary	 study	 in	 Chapter	 I.	 	 There,	 it	was	 felt	 that	 this	may	 have	been	reflected	in	terms	of	attitudes	towards	factors	such	as	the	use	of	specialists	or	not,	the	integration	of	a	human	factors	report	within	the	investigation,	the	use	of	specific	methodology,	the	training	of	their	investigators.	Consequently,	cross-tabulations	between	the	areas	covered	during	HF	training	and	the	location	of	the	respondents	are	presented	in	figure	23.			
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Figure	23:	Human	factors	areas	covered	during	training	by	location	
Figure	23	suggests	that	the	respondents	who	were	located	in	Oceania	do	receive	a	more	complete	training.	On	the	other	hand,	the	Europeans’	training	appears	to	be	 the	 least	 complete.	This	 could	be	attributed	 to	 the	difference	 in	 culture	and	approach	 to	 human	 factors.	 For	 example,	 every	 ATSB	 accident	 reports	 does	contain	 a	 human	 factors	 section.	 Besides,	 all	 ATSB	 investigators	 need	 to	undertake	 the	worldwide-recognised	 ATSB	 human	 factors	 course	 (undertaken	by	 investigators	 from	all	over	 the	world)	as	part	of	 their	 training.	For	100%	of	the	 Australian	 respondents,	 ‘HF	 tools	 and	methods’	was	 part	 of	 their	 training.	This	seems	consistent	since	the	ATSB	is	using	their	own	adaptation	of	Reason’s	model	 as	 a	 methodology	 to	 run	 an	 investigation.	 Every	 investigator	 would	therefore	need	to	be	familiar	with	it.	The	 ‘HF	data	that	should	be	collected’	has	also	been	taught	to	the	majority	of	the	Australians	(93.7%)	but	only	few	(29.7%)	of	the	Europeans	who	answered	the	questionnaire.		
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The	next	question	regarding	human	factors	training	was	“	how	confident	do	you	
feel	in	practicing	these	human	factors	areas?”	The	purpose	of	this	question	was	to	identify	whether	the	investigators	who	undertook	training	in	a	specific	area	feel	more	confident	than	the	others.	As	illustrated	on	figure	24,	overall,	amongst	the	investigators	who	received	training	in	the	different	areas,	under	10%	(except	for	‘HF	 in	ATC’)	of	 them	ticked	 ‘do	not	 feel	confident’	 in	applying	their	knowledge.	‘Interview	 techniques’	 is	 the	 topic	 where	 the	 most	 of	 them	 feel	 confident.	However,	 it	 is	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 for	 most	 areas,	 a	 third	 of	 those	 who	received	training	do	not	 feel	confident	enough	to	 tick	 ‘confident’!	A	 lot	of	 them	answered	‘Neutral’.	This	is	particularly	obvious	for	 ‘Tools	and	methods’	(44.6%	of	the	participants),	‘engineering	and	maintenance’	(35.8%	of	them),	and	‘human	performance	and	error’	(31%).		It	could	suggest	a	lack	of	confidence	but	also	the	fact	that	they	are	actually	unsure	about	their	level.	This	could	also	be	attributed	to	 deficiency	 in	 training	 or	 the	 lack	 of	 refresher	 courses.	 Skill	 fade	 does	 occur	when	 one	 does	 not	 use	 one’s	 knowledge	 often	 enough.	 On	 the	 contrary,	when	practised	 regularly	 a	 skill	 is	 developed.	 This	 could	 therefore	 also	 explain	why	interview	techniques	scored	the	highest	in	this	question.				
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Figure	24:	Level	of	confidence	if	received	training	in	the	different	human	factors	areas	
	The	 next	 step	 was	 therefore	 to	 look	 at	 the	 level	 of	 confidence	 of	 those	 who	received	the	training	in	the	different	HF	areas,	depending	on	their	role.	Figure	25	shows	the	percentage	of	investigators	who	feel	sufficiently	confident	to	apply	the	knowledge	 they	 have	 acquired	 during	 the	 training	 of	 the	 different	 HF	 topics.	‘Interview	techniques’	is	the	topic	where	the	most	of	them	feel	confident,	as	also	shown	on	figure	24.	‘Tools	and	methods’	and	‘human	performance	and	error’	are	the	topics	where	the	fewer	investigators	feel	confident,	despite	the	fact	that	they	did	 receive	 training.	 Only	 57%	 of	 the	 ‘operations’	 investigators,	 46.7%	 of	 the	‘general’	 and	 31.3%	 of	 the	 ‘engineering’	 feel	 confident	 in	 using	 ‘Tools	 and	
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methods’,	 only	 47%	 of	 the	 ‘engineering’	 and	 28%	 of	 the	 ‘general’	 regarding	‘human	performance	 and	 error’.	 Figure	25	 shows	 clearly	 that	 on	 the	one	hand	the	 human	 factors	 investigators	 feel	 confident	 in	 all	 the	 areas.	 Since	 it	 is	 their	role	 to	 run	 the	HF	 component	 of	 an	 investigation,	 it	 shows	 their	 assurance	 in	applying	their	knowledge	and	expertise.		On	the	other	hand,	the	engineering	investigators	are	the	type	who	feel	the	least	confident	 to	 practice	 HF.	 They	 also	 were	 the	 most	 (22%)	 who	 replied	 NO	 to	receiving	more	HF	training	(see	figure	21).	This	could	be	explained	by	the	lack	of	practice	but	also	by	the	inadequacy	of	their	training.	The	majority	(78%)	of	the	engineering	 investigators	 of	 the	 sample	 were	 nonetheless	 willing	 to	 receiving	more	 HF	 training.	 Considering	 the	 operations	 investigators	 background	 too,	former	pilots,	they	would	all	have	received	some	sort	of	CRM.	CRM	approaches	a	lot	 of	 human	 factors	 issues,	which	 could	 be	why	 ops	 investigators	 overall	 feel	confident	 in	 practising	 most	 of	 the	 HF	 areas	 during	 an	 investigation.	 These	results	 suggest	 that	 the	 more	 HF	 knowledge	 investigators	 acquired	 during	background	 experience	 and/or	 training,	 the	 more	 receptive	 they	 are	 to	 it,	although	this	may	not	be	a	causal	relationship.		
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Figure	25:	Percentage	of	investigators	who	feel	confident	in	applying	the	different	HF	areas	
	Finally,	 the	 last	 question	 regarding	 human	 factors	 was	 “Do	 you	 think	 human	
factors	 is	 investigated	 deeply	 enough	 in	 your	 organisation?”	 Its	 goal	 was	 to	measure	the	satisfaction	of	the	investigators	regarding	the	way	HF	is	integrated	during	investigation	in	their	organisation.	Overall,	40%	of	the	respondents	said	YES,	 27%	 said	 NO	 and	 the	 other	 34%	 stayed	 NEUTRAL.	 The	 results	 per	investigator	type	are	shown	on	figure	26	and	per	location	on	figure	27.		
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Figure	26:	Satisfaction	by	type	of	investigator		
		
	
Figure	27:	Satisfaction	by	location		
	Apart	from	the	HF	investigators,	less	than	50%	of	each	category	replied	YES.	The	‘others’	category	seems	particularly	unsatisfied,	however	since	they	are	different	type	 of	 investigators,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 interpret	 this	 result.	 There	 is	 a	 high	percentage	of	NEUTRAL	responses,	which	would	suggest	 that	 the	 investigators	
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are	 not	 completely	 satisfied	 nor	 disatisfied	 with	 the	 way	 human	 factors	 is	investigated	 in	 their	 organisation.	 It	 is	 particularly	 visible	 for	 the	 ‘operations’	and	 ‘general’	 investigators,	 with	 40%	 of	 ‘Neutral’	 for	 both	 and	 36%	 and	 40%	respectively	of	 ‘Yes’.	After	 the	 ‘HF’,	 the	 ‘engineering’	 investigators	are	 the	ones	who	replied	the	most	 ‘Yes’	(44%).	Looking	at	the	different	 locations	(see	figure	27),	Oceania	 (Australia)	has	 the	higest	percentage	of	YES	 (75%).	This	could	be	due	to	the	fact	that	they	do	have	their	own	team	of	HF	investigators	within	the	organisation,	a	compulsory	week	long	human	factors	course	and	a	methodology	based	on	Reason’s	model.	Overall,	Asian	investigators,	do	not	feel	satisfied	with	the	way	HF	 is	 considered	 in	 their	 organisations	 evidenced	by	50%	of	 ‘No’	 and	Europeans’	point	of	view	is	equally	split	between	YES	(30%)	and	NO	(30%).			
V-	4	Discussion	and	conclusion		The	results	presented	in	this	questionnaire	regarding	the	content	and	relevance	of	the	training	provided	to	air	accident	investigators	are	extremely	valuable	and	noteworthy,	despite	the	 limitations	brought	by	the	small	sample	size	and	small	number	 in	 each	 category.	 They	 fulfilled	 the	 survey’s	 objective	 to	 evaluate	 the	relevance	 and	 efficiency	 of	 human	 factors	 training	 provision	 for	 air	 accident	investigators.	 Whether	 it	 relates	 to	 initial	 training,	 specialist	 courses	 or	 more	specifically	human	factors	training,	the	courses	that	the	investigators	undertook	show	 inconsistency.	Within	one	organisation,	 or	 one	 country,	 the	 investigators	did	not	receive	the	same	training,	nor	in	the	same	depth.	This	could	be	explained	by	 the	different	 levels	of	experience	within	 the	sample,	 i.e.	 training	received	at	
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different	times.	While	refresher	training	might	overcome	this	potential	issue,	this	was	 not	 specifically	 included	 in	 the	 questionnaire	 because	 this	 had	 not	previously	been	highlighted	in	the	literature.		The	 results	 show	 a	 lack	 of	 standardisation,	 which	 could	 imply	 the	 absence	 of	accreditation	 and	 the	 need	 for	 it	 as	 emphasized	 by	 Braithwaite	 (2004).	 The	limitations	of	training	adequacy	is	also	obvious,	since	the	fact	that	‘Relation	with	families’,	 although	 highlighted	 as	 one	 of	 the	 biggest	 challenges	 for	 accident	investigators	by	Tench	(1985),	Smart	(2004)	and	Stoop	and	Dekker	(2012),	was	part	of	their	training	syllabus	(initial,	advanced	courses	and	refresher)	for	only	a	very	few	(see	figures	16,	17	and	18).		Regarding	human	factors	training,	this	questionnaire	has	highlighted	its	limited	relevance,	 since	 despite	 training,	 investigators	 do	 not	 often	 feel	 confident	 in	applying	 their	 knowledge.	 It	 also	 lacks	 potentially	 important	 topics	 such	 as	‘Tools	and	Methods’	and	‘Data	to	be	collected’.			Moreover,	 the	 training	 could	 be	 more	 adapted	 to	 the	 investigators	 role:	engineering	 investigators’	 training	 could	 focus	 more	 on	 engineering	 and	maintenance	 issues	 and	 equally,	 operations	 investigators’	 training	 could	concentrate	 more	 on	 flight	 operations	 issues.	 This	 could	 potentially	 develop	their	understanding	of	 the	specific	 issues	related	to	 their	discipline.	 If	however	the	 organisations’	 goal	 was	 to	 train	 the	 investigators	 with	 a	 more	 generalist	approach	to	HF,	each	topic	could	be	approached	to	a	similar	depth.	These	results	are	 consistent	 with	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 author’s	 previous	 research	 (see	Chapter	 I).	 The	 lack	 of	 confidence	 in	 investigating	 organisational	 issues	 also	emphasizes,	in	part,	the	weaknesses	of	their	training.	This	could	certainly	be	one	
	 127	
of	the	reasons	why	investigators	fail	to	address	the	‘why’	properly	and	stop	too	soon	(Kletz,	2006).		Finally,	the	questionnaire	has	highlighted	that	where	integrating	human	factors	in	 an	 investigation	 can	 be	 an	 on-going	 challenge	 for	 many	 organisations,	introducing	 the	 investigators	 to	 the	 HF	 expertise	 available	 (internally	 or	externally)	could	be	a	relevant	area	of	 improvement.	Human	 factors	specialists	are	subject	matter	experts	and	the	results	of	this	survey	show	that	they	do	feel	confident	 in	 accomplishing	 their	 role.	 Their	 presence	 is	 essential	 to	 run	 a	thorough	investigation	(Baker,	2010).	Nevertheless,	their	integration	within	the	investigation	team	and	their	role	is	questioned	by	the	fact	that	only	few	of	them,	compared	 with	 other	 investigators,	 received	 deep	 training	 in	 investigation	management	 or	management	 of	 a	 large	 site.	 It	would	 therefore	 be	 relevant	 to	obtain	a	more	detailed	point	of	 view	on	 their	 involvement	and	 their	 approach.	Their	background	would	also	be	important	to	understand.		Who	would	the	ideal	expert,	who	understands	the	organisation’s	needs,	be?		The	researcher	also	identified	this	challenging	question	after	running	interviews	within	 the	 organisation	mentioned	 in	 the	 preliminary	 study	 in	 Chapter	 I.	 This	explains	 why	 the	 next	 step	 of	 this	 research	 was	 to	 interview	 human	 factors	experts	who	are	involved	in	air	accident	investigation	and	therefore	get	to	work	with	accident	investigators.	Getting	a	subject	matter	expert	point	of	view	would	help	 in	 defining	 the	 extent	 to	which	 investigators	 should	 be	 trained	 in	 human	factors.	
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Chapter	VI	–	Human	factors	experts	interviews	
	
VI-	1	Introduction		The	 initial	 research	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 I,	 the	 review	 of	 the	 literature	 in	Chapter	II,	the	analysis	of	accident	reports	in	chapter	IV,	and	the	analysis	of	the	questionnaire	 survey	 in	 Chapter	 V	 identified	 two	main	 challenges	 for	 accident	investigators;	deficiencies	in	their	HF	training,	such	as	inconsistency	and	lack	of	refresher	training,	and	the	perception	that	there	is	room	for	improvement	with	regards	 to	 involving	 a	 human	 factors	 expert	 in	 accident	 investigation.	 These	issues,	 which	 are	 of	 prime	 relevance	 for	 conducting	 a	 TNA,	 are	 systematically	assessed	 in	 in	 this	 chapter	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 selected	 human	 factors	specialists.	To	this	end,	the	chapter	presents	the	findings	from	a	series	of	semi-structured	interviews	conducted	with	HF	investigators.		‘HF	investigator’,	refers	to	 a	 HF	 specialist	 that	 gets	 involved	 in	 accident	 investigation	 for	 his/her	expertise	in	HF	and	as	such	investigating	the	HF	element	of	the	investigation.			In	turn,	the	analysis	presented	in	this	chapter	forms	the	first	part	of	a	two-part	triangulation	 approach,	 which	 adopts	 both	 qualitative	 elements	 (this	 chapter)	and	 quantitative	 methods	 (addressed	 in	 the	 following	 chapter)	 in	 order	 to	‘triangulate’	 the	 various	 findings	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 a	 common	 consensus.	Together,	these	fulfil	the	fourth	research	objective,	which	is	to	assess	the	training	needs	of	air	accident	investigators.		
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	The	purpose	of	this	study	is	to	obtain	their	specialist	opinion	and	experience	on	the	provision	of	human	 factors	 training	 for	accident	 investigators,	 i.e.	 to	assess	the	 training	 needs	 of	 air	 accident	 investigators.	 Their	 involvement	 within	 an	investigation	 and	 their	 role	within	 the	 organisations	were	 also	 investigated	 in	order	 to	 identify	 potential	 solutions	 to	 more	 thorough	 HF	 integration	 in	investigation	reports.	Thus	it	partly	fulfils	the	fourth	objective	of	this	thesis	(see	Chapter	III).		The	 following	 section	 introduces	 the	 concept	 of	 triangulation,	 why	 it	 was	selected	and	how	it	applies	to	the	research.	This	is	followed	by	a	description	of	the	 method	 employed	 for	 conducting	 the	 interviews,	 with	 the	 subsequent	analysis	of	these	in	section	4.			
VI-	2	Triangulation	
	As	a	 term,	 triangulation	 takes	 its	origin	 from	engineering	and	surveying.	Using	measurements	 of	 angles	 and	 distances,	 surveyors	 were	 able	 to	 determine	 the	exact	 position	 of	 a	 point	 when	 knowing	 the	 location	 of	 two	 others	 (Richards,	2009).	 Similarly,	 navigators	 have	 long	 used	 the	 principle	 of	 triangulation	 to	locate	 an	 accurate	 geographical	 position	when	 two	 or	more	 other	 coordinates	were	already	known	(Denscombe,	2003).		From	 a	 methodological	 standpoint	 in	 social	 research,	 triangulation	 involves	looking	at	similar	issues,	challenges,	or	research	questions	from	different	points	
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of	 view	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	 accuracy	 of	 any	 findings	 generated	 (Neuman,	2006).	In	qualitative	research,	validity	can	be	threatened	by	various	sources	such	as	 respondent’s	 bias	 (e.g.	 withholding	 information),	 researcher’s	 bias	 (e.g.	assumptions)	and	by	reactivity	(effect	of	the	researcher	on	people’s	behaviour)	(Lincoln	and	Guba,	1985).	Triangulation	can	 therefore	be	used	 to	 reduce	 these	problems	by	asking	the	same	questions	a	different	way,	and	thus	help	to	improve	the	validity	of	findings	(Richards,	2009).	From	a	practical	standpoint,	conducting	a	 triangulation	 means	 using	 different	 types	 of	 data	 gathering	 methods	 or	different	 methods	 of	 handling	 data	 (analysis	 methods)	 to	 answer	 the	 same	research	question.	For	Oppermann	(2000),	triangulation	should	be	used	as	a	way	to	verify	the	results	and	eliminate	investigator	bias	or	shortcomings.			Flick	(2004)	recognises	three	broad	categories	of	application	for	triangulation:	a	validation	strategy,	a	generalisation	approach	and	a	way	to	get	more	knowledge	on	 the	 research	problem.	 In	 turn,	 there	 are	 four	 specific	 types	of	 triangulation	(Denzin,	1988	in	Robson,	2002;	Neuman,	2006;	Silverman,	2006):		 1. Data	triangulation,	which	involves	the	use	of	multiple	sources	of	data	(e.g.	documentation,	observation,	interviews)	2. Methodological	triangulation	that	involves	the	use	of	both	qualitative	and	quantitative	methods	3. Observer	triangulation	that	involves	several	observers	in	the	study	4. Theory	triangulation	is	used	when	the	researcher	has	multiples	theories	or	perspectives.		
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The	 benefits	 of	 using	 a	 triangulation	 approach	 are	 variously	 supported	 in	 the	literature.	For	example,	for	Creswell	and	Miller	(2000),	triangulation	is	a	validity	procedure	 where	 the	 researcher	 relies	 on	 multiple	 sources	 of	 evidence	 to	corroborate	 his/her	 findings.	 In	 other	 words,	 looking	 at	 a	 phenomenon	 from	different	 perspectives	 is	 better	 than	 looking	 in	 only	 one	way	 (Neuman,	 2006).		Robson	(2002)	describes	triangulation	as	a	valuable	strategy	to	reduce	threats	to	validity	but	nevertheless	points	out	the	possibility	of	contradictions	between	the	different	sources.	Denscombe	(2003,	p133)	believes	that	using	different	methods	can	enhance	the	validity	of	the	data:			“Seeing	 things	 from	 different	 perspective	 and	 the	 opportunity	 to	 corroborate	
findings	can	enhance	the	validity	of	the	data.	They	do	not	prove	that	the	researcher	
has	got	it	right,	but	do	give	some	confidence	that	the	meaning	of	the	data	has	some	
consistency	across	methods	and	that	the	findings	are	not	too	closely	tied	up	with	a	
particular	method	used	to	collect	the	data.”		 Denscombe,	2003,	p133.		While	triangulation	can	be	a	valuable	research	tool,	there	remains	some	debate	regarding	 its	 potential	 limitations	 and,	 in	 particular,	 whether	 triangulation	reduces	validity	of	the	finding	in	qualitative	research	(Ritchie,	2003;	Denscombe,	2003).	For	example,	although	largely	in	support	of	triangulation	as	an	approach,	Denscombe	(2003)	also	warns	against	taking	the	analogy	of	triangulation	too	far,	and	to	avoid	assuming	that	triangulation	‘proves’	that	the	analysis	is	absolutely	correct.	Similarly,	Silverman	(2006)	believes	that	triangulation	has	only	 limited	use	 as	 a	 method	 of	 validation	 in	 qualitative	 research	 because	 it	 ignores	 the	
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consequences	of	 individual	contexts.	However,	 in	the	same	text	Silverman	does	acknowledge	that	triangulation	is	a	valuable	means	to	add	a	rigour	and	richness	to	research,	a	view	also	shared	by	Denzin	and	Lincoln	(2000).		Other	possible	limitations	of	triangulation	include	the	increase	in	time	needed	to	undertake	 two	 or	 more	 studies	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 researcher	 not	 being	proficient	 in	both	 types	of	method	 (qualitative	and	quantitative)	and	 therefore	jeopardizing	 the	 whole	 research	 quality	 (Thurmond,	 2001).	 Regarding	methodological	triangulation,	as	used	in	this	research,	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	 strengths	 of	 one	 method	 may	 not	 compensate	 for	 the	 weaknesses	 of	 the	other	(Fielding	and	Fielding,	1986).			To	summarise,	triangulation	can	provide	security	to	the	researcher	by	extending	the	understanding,	 and	 adding	 greater	depth	 to	 the	 analysis.	 It	 can	 also	 give	 a	broader	picture	of	what	is	being	researched	(Ritchie,	2003)	by	investigating	the	convergence	and	divergence	of	 findings,	 although	 for	Flick	 (2004)	 it	 should	be	used	 more	 to	 elucidate	 divergence	 than	 trying	 to	 obtain	 confirmation	(convergence)	of	previous	findings.		Considering	 the	 worldview	 within	 which	 this	 research	 is	 conducted	 and	 its	mixed-methods	approach,	a	validation	triangulation	is	the	strategy	employed	in	this	 study.	 Its	 purpose	 is	 to	 reduce	 the	 researcher’s	 bias	 when	 analysing	 the	transcripts	 from	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews	 and	 obtain	 more	 in-depth	findings	regarding	the	issues	being	addressed,	which	are	human	factors	training	provision	and	involvement	of	human	factors	expertise.			
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With	 this	 in	 mind,	 both	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	 methods	 were	 used	sequentially	 in	 this	 thesis	 (Robson,	 2002;	 Neuman,	 2006).	 This	 way,	 the	triangulation	will	 enable	 the	 enhancement	 of	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 interviews	with	the	human	factors	experts.	The	findings	from	the	questionnaire	presented	in	Chapter	VII	will	 therefore	be	quantitative	evidence	to	support	and/or	clarify	the	findings	from	chapter	VI	in	order	to	limit	subjectivity.			
	
VI-	3	Method	for	conducting	the	interviews		
VI-	3-	1	Semi	structured,	face-to-face	and	one-to-one	interviews		The	process	of	interviewing	was	chosen	because	it	would	provide	the	researcher	with	 greater	 in-depth	 insight	 into	 the	 topics	 of	 human	 factors	 training	 and	investigation	 than	a	questionnaire	alone	 (Denscombe,	2003).	One	advantage	of	interviewing	 as	 a	 qualitative	 research	 tool	 is	 that	 it	 requires	 relatively	 few	technical	skills	on	the	part	of	the	researcher,	although	it	is	essential	that	they	are	a	 good	 listener,	 sensitive	 to	 respondents	 and	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 use	 probes,	prompts	 and	 tolerate	 silences	 (Denscombe,	 2003).	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	interviewing	is	an	easy	task,	but	it	predominantly	involves	the	researcher	aiming	to	 understand	 and	 record	 the	 interviewee’s	 experiences	 (Silverman,	 2006).	Moreover,	 according	 to	 Rowley	 (2012),	 interviews	 are	 useful	 when	 trying	 to	understand	experiences	and	opinions,	which	suit	the	purpose	of	this	study	well.	Interviews	 were	 ultimately	 selected	 over	 competing	 approaches,	 such	 as	observation,	because	the	issues	approached	during	this	study	are	not	amenable	
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to	 observation	 (Bryman,	 2012).	 Indeed,	 for	 the	 researcher	 to	 observe	 human	factors	 investigation,	 training	 and	 expertise	would	be	highly	 impractical,	 if	 not	impossible.	 It	 would	 also	 likely	 be	 extremely	 time-consuming	 and	 potentially	invasive	 for	 the	 investigators.	 Moreover,	 observation	 does	 not	 give	 access	 to	previous	 experience	 and	 is	 also	 limited	 by	 the	 variety	 of	 persons	 that	 can	 be	approached	within	one	organisation.			Three	 types	of	 interviews	 exist:	 Structured,	 Semi-structured	 and	Unstructured.	Each	have	their	specific	attributes	and	advantages	as	detailed	in	table	5.		
	 Structured	interview	 Semi-structured	interview	 Unstructured	interview	Interviewer	and	questions	 Predicted	questions,	no	prompting,	no	probing	
Clear	list	of	issues	and	questions	to	be	answered:	interview	guide,	some	probing	
Aide	memoire,	single	question	to	start	the	interview.	Active	listening	Interviewee	and	answers	 Close	ended	answers,	more	like	a	questionnaire	 Open	ended,	develop	ideas	and	speak	widely	on	topics	approached	
Open	ended,	interviewee	develop	their	own	thoughts	Advantages	 Standardisation,	pre-coded	answers,	easy	analysis	 Flexible	in	terms	of	questions	order	 Flexible	process	Disadvantages	 No	flexibility	 Time	consuming,	can	be	expensive	 Time	consuming,	can	be	expensive	
	
Table	5:	Types	of	interviews	(Adapted	from	Denscombe,	2003;	Silverman,	2006;	Bryman,	2012)	
	Structured	interviews,	as	their	name	suggests,	follow	a	rigid	framework	and	can	produce	quantitative	data	in	a	similar	fashion	to	a	questionnaire.	The	researcher	conducting	 a	 structured	 interview	 has	 a	 list	 of	 pre-determined	 questions	 and	
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pre-coded	answers	and	needs	to	follow	the	same	order	from	one	interviewee	to	another.	 	 This	 can	 be	 useful	 when	 the	 same	 interview	 must	 be	 replicated	 a	number	of	times	(for	example,	when	there	are	a	number	of	different	researchers	conducting	 the	 interview)	 in	 order	 to	 aid	 comparison	 between	 different	respondents,	or	when	the	topic	is	very	clearly	defined	and	only	a	few	questions	are	of	interest	to	the	researcher.				Alternatively,	 there	 are	 also	 semi-structured	 interviews	 and	 unstructured	interviews.	 They	 are	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘in-depth	 interviews’	 or	 ‘qualitative	interviews’	(Denscombe,	2003;	Bryman,	2012).	Both	of	these	methods	are	more	flexible	 than	 the	structured	 type	 in	 terms	of	questioning	and	answering.	 In	 the	semi-structured	format,	the	researcher	has	a	clear	and	defined	idea	of	the	topics	he/she	wants	to	approach	whereas	in	the	unstructured	type,	the	researcher	has	more	of	a	general	notion	of	wanting	to	research	a	topic.	The	main	benefits	of	a	semi-structured	approach	is	that	it	essentially	represents	a	compromise	between	the	 rigour	 and	 replicability	 of	 the	 structured	 approach,	 but	 also	 allows	 the	flexibility	to	ask	follow	up	questions,	probe	and	explore	other	topics	if	necessary.	Here,	the	researcher	started	this	study	with	a	relatively	clear	focus	on	the	topics	to	be	approached	during	the	interviews,	so	the	semi-structured	format	was	the	most	appropriate,	compared	with	the	unstructured	format.			To	structure	the	interviews,	the	researcher	developed	an	interview	guide,	listing	the	topics	to	be	approached	during	the	interview	(Kvale	and	Brinkmann,	2009;	Bryman,	2012),	but	with	no	specific	order	or	detailed	questions.	The	 interview	guide	was	used	as	an	aide	memoire	to	guide	the	topic	areas	to	be	covered	during	
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each	 interview.	 The	wording	 of	 the	 questions	was	 similar	 from	 interviewee	 to	interviewee,	 but	 questions	 not	 originally	 in	 the	 interview	 guide	 were	 also	sometimes	 asked	 after	 the	 researcher	 picked	 up	 on	 certain	 things	 said	 by	 the	interviewee	(Bryman,	2012).	It	was	considered	important	for	the	interviewer	to	listen	 to	 the	 interviewee	 and	 ask	 questions	 depending	 on	 the	 participants’	answers	to	previous	questions	so	that	 the	 interview	was	more	 in	 the	 form	of	a	conversation	(Kvale	and	Brinkmann,	2009).	This	helps	to	put	the	interviewee	at	ease	 and	 build	 rapport,	 which	 are	 other	 benefits	 of	 the	 semi-structured	approach.	 A	 semi-structured	 interview	 such	 as	 this	 enables	 the	 researcher	 to	access	 attitudes	 and	 values	 that	 cannot	 be	 observed	with	 a	 questionnaire	 or	 a	structured	 interview	 (Silverman,	 2006).	 Finally,	 semi-structured	 interview	provides	 leeway	 to	 the	 interviewee	 in	 the	 way	 he/she	 answers	 the	 questions	which	helps	them	feel	more	comfortable	and	reduce	the	interviewer’s	bias.		There	are	three	ways	that	interviews	can	be	conducted:	over	the	phone,	face-to-face	and	a	much	newer	method	using	internet	media	such	as	Skype	or	Facetime.	Table	6	compares	these	three	formats.								
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All	 the	 interviews	 conducted	 for	 this	 study	were	 face-to-face.	 This	 format	was	chosen	 over	 phone	 interviews	 because	 the	 latter,	 although	much	 cheaper,	 are	generally	 considered	 to	 be	 more	 appropriate	 for	 structured	 interviews	 or	questionnaires	(Fontana	and	Frey,	1994;	Neuman,	2006;	Bryman,	2012).	In	fact,	relatively	 few	modern	 qualitative	 research	 studies	 employ	 phone	 interviewing	(Sturges	 and	 Hanrahan,	 2004).	 One	 of	 the	 major	 limitations	 of	 a	 telephone	interview	is	that	the	researcher	will	 inevitably	not	be	able	to	assess	potentially	important	visual	cues	or	other	factors	such	as	participants’	body	language.			Although	Holt	(2010)	believes	that	telephone	interviews	should	be	preferred	for	some	 interviews,	 depending	 on	 the	 groups	 of	 participants,	 face-to-face	interviews	are	often	considered	as	the	 ‘Gold	standard’	of	 interviewing	(McCoyd	and	 Kerson,	 2006).	 	 However,	 online	 interviews	 are	 acknowledged	 as	 an	alternative	 approach	 when	 it	 is	 not	 feasible	 to	 interview	 the	 participant	 in	person	(Deakin	and	Wakefield,	2014).	The	literature	provides	different	views	on	the	 use	 of	 videoconference	 tools,	 such	 as	 Skype,	 as	 substitutes	 for	 face-to-face	
Table	6:	Advantages	and	disadvantages	of	interview	formats	(adapted	from	Sturges	and	Hanrahan,	
2004;	Neuman,	2006;	Bryman,	2012;	Deakin	and	Wakefield,	2014)	
	 Phone	interview	 Face-to-face	interview	 	Skype	interviews	Advantages	 Low/moderate	cost	Quick	to	administer	Perception	of	anonymity	for	interviewees	
High	response	rate	Longer	interviews	Interviewer	can	observe	reactions	and	surroundings	Rapport	development	possible	Written	consent	
Low	cost,	worldwide	access	Visual	(non	verbal)	cues	available	
Disadvantages	 Small	number	of	questions	More	difficult	to	address	sensitive	topics		
High	cost	Interviewer’s	bias	 Participants	may	feel	embarrassed	being	filmed	(and	recorded)	Can	be	difficult	to	avoid	any	external	distraction	(at	work	or	at	home)	Time	lag		
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interviews.	 For	 example,	 Weinmann	 et	 al	 (2012)	 state	 that	 telephone	interviewing	remains	a	better	approach	than	Skype	because	the	former	generally	produces	a	higher	response	rate.	On	the	contrary,	Deakin	and	Wakefield	(2014)	found	that	participants	who	claimed	not	to	have	time	for	face-to-face	interviews	were	 often	 more	 willing	 to	 participate	 when	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 use	Skype.	 Hanna	 (2012)	 claims	 that	 Skype	 interviews	 are	 a	 good	 compromise	between	 phone	 interviews	 and	 face-to-face	 interviews	 because	 they	 retain	 the	important	 visual	 element	 while	 still	 respecting	 the	 private	 space	 of	 both	 the	interviewer	and	the	participant.		While	face-to-face	interviews	are	not	always	the	most	appropriate	method	for	a	study	 and	 do	 not	 necessarily	 always	 produce	 the	 best	 data	 (Sturges	 and	Hanrahan,	2004;	Novick,	2008),	they	were	preferred	for	this	study	for	a	number	of	 methodological	 and	 logistical	 reasons.	 Aside	 from	 not	 wanting	 to	 miss	 any	important	visual	cues	during	the	interviews	(as	previously	discussed),	during	the	initial	process	of	contacting	potential	interview	participants	it	was	apparent	that	in	some	cases	it	was	going	to	be	beneficial	to	share	relevant	documentation,	such	as	 training	 plans	 or	 investigation	 tools	 to	 help	 illustrate	 points	 or	 particular	questions.	 This	 would	 have	 been	 impossible	 to	 conduct	 over	 the	 phone	 and	impractical	during	a	Skype	conversation.			Furthermore,	for	the	majority	of	the	interviews	the	researcher	organised	a	visit	to	 the	 organisation	 on	 a	 specific	 day	 and	 interviewed	 all	 the	 human	 factors	experts	present	who	were	available	and	willing	to	be	interviewed.	This	approach	proved	 to	 be	 extremely	 time	 and	 resource	 efficient	 in	 terms	of	 conducting	 the	
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required	number	of	 interviews.	An	additional	benefit	of	 this	approach	 that	had	not	been	anticipated	by	the	researcher	was	the	 increased	flexibility	 it	afforded.	While	the	organisation	of	Skype	interviews	required	strict	prior	organisation	of	a	time	and	date	to	conduct	the	interview	with	each	participant,	by	being	available	‘all	 day’	 at	 the	 interviewees’	 place	 of	 business,	 each	 participant	 could	 conduct	their	interview	as	and	when	they	were	available,	and	to	some	extent	allowed	the	participants	 to	 organise	 this	 schedule	 amongst	 themselves.	 Given	 the	unpredictable	nature	of	 the	participant’s	work,	 this	 increased	 flexibility	 on	 the	part	 of	 the	 researcher	 is	 thought	 to	 have	 resulted	 in	more	 positive	 responses	from	participants	than	if	a	Skype	interview	had	been	proposed.				Most	 of	 the	 experts	 were	 interviewed	 on	 a	 one-to-one	 basis.	 However,	 two	participants	 requested	 that	 they	 were	 interviewed	 together	 because	 they	believed	they	shared	similar	experiences	and	opinions	on	the	topics	approached	during	the	interviews.		The	 one-to-one	 format	 was	 also	 chosen	 over	 focus	 group	 because	 it	 presents	numerous	 advantages.	 As	 a	 researcher,	 one-to-one	 interviews	 are	 generally	easier	to	organise	and	control	than	focus	groups	as	the	researcher	only	has	one	person	at	a	time	to	meet	with,	interview,	and	listen	to	(Denscombe,	2003).	Given	that	some	issues	raised	in	the	interviews	may	have	been	of	a	potentially	sensitive	nature	 (for	 example,	 their	 organisation’s	 current	 practices)	 it	 was	 felt	 that	interviewees	 may	 have	 been	 more	 willing	 to	 ‘open	 up’	 than	 in	 a	 group	environment.			
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During	the	interview	each	interview	was	recorded	on	a	voice	recorder,	after	the	participant	 had	 given	 their	 permission	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 researcher	 took	 notes	throughout	the	interview	in	order	to	record	what	was	said	but	also	to	note	down	important	 issues	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 developed	 further	 by,	 for	 example,	 using	probing	questions.		Notes	were	also	taken	to	log	non-verbal	cues	such	as	looks	or	when	 the	 interviewee	 used	 sarcasm	 or	 deliberately	 ironic	 tones	 (Denscombe,	2003).			All	 but	 one	 interview	 was	 fully	 transcribed	 after	 the	 interview	 process	 was	complete.	This	was	due	to	the	poor	sound	quality	of	one	specific	recording.	Each	interviewee	was	given	an	interviewee	guide	(see	Appendix	C)	providing	a	short	summary	 of	 the	 research	 and	 the	 topics	 approached	 during	 the	 interview,	 the	researcher’s	 contact	 details,	 information	 on	 the	 complete	 anonymity	 of	 the	interview	and	the	fact	that	it	was	recorded	for	analysis	purposes,	and	a	right	of	withdrawal.	They	were	asked	to	give	written	consent	to	conduct	the	interview	by	signing	 two	 identical	 consent	 forms,	 one	 of	which	was	 kept	 by	 the	 researcher	while	the	other	was	kept	by	the	participant.	When	required	by	the	organisation	the	 researcher	 sent	 the	 interviewee	 guide	 in	 advance.	 This	 happened	 on	 two	occasions.		
VI-	3-	2	Interview	sample	
	A	 total	 of	 eighteen	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 nineteen	 human	 factors	experts	involved	in	accident	investigation	in	November	2014	(see	table	7).	Prior	
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to	that,	a	pilot	interview	was	conducted	to	test	the	interview	schedule	(see	VI-	3-	3),	but	it	does	not	appear	on	table	7	because	it	was	not	analysed.			While	a	total	of	eighteen	interviews	were	conducted,	only	seventeen	interviews	were	analysed	as	one	of	them	could	not	be	transcribed	due	to	the	poor	quality	of	the	sound	recording	(as	mentioned	previously).		Of	 the	 remaining	 participants,	 two	were	 from	 the	 UK	 and	 the	 rest	 were	 from	Australia.	Australia	was	targeted	because	of	its	strong	human	factors	culture,	its	renowned	human	factors	course	and	methodology	for	accident	investigators	and	for	 the	 HF	 team	 present	 within	 the	 ATSB.	 It	 would	 enable	 the	 researcher	 to	obtain	 several	 interviews	 in	 a	 shorter	 amount	 of	 time.	 The	AAIB,	 for	 example,	does	not	have	such	a	team.	The	two	experts	from	the	UK	were	contacted	due	to	their	strong	involvement	with	the	military	accident	investigation	organisation.		
Interview	Number	 Type	organisation	 Participant’s	role	 Involvement	as	IIC	 Country	1		 Airline	 HF	expert	-	investigation	support	 No	 Australia	2	–	3	-	4	 Airlines	 HF	investigators	 No	 Australia	5	–	6	-	7	 National	 Investigation	Agency	 HF	investigators	–	management	position	 Yes	 Australia	8	–	9	–	10	–	11		 National	 Investigation	Agency	 HF	investigators	 Yes	 Australia	12	 Air	Traffic	Control	 HF	investigator	 No	 Australia	13	 Civil	Aviation	organisation	 HF	expert	–	investigation	support	 No	 Australia	14	-	15	(2	participants)	 Consultancy	 HF	investigation	support	 No	 Australia	16	 Military	organisation	 HF	investigator	 No	 Australia	17	–	18	 Military	organisation	 HF	investigators	 No	 UK	
Table	7:	Human	Factors	experts	interviewed	
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All	the	HF	investigators	interviewed	from	the	ATSB	are	involved	in	investigation	as	 IIC	 whereas	 it	 was	 not	 the	 case	 for	 all	 the	 other	 experts.	 Of	 the	 seven	participants	from	the	ATSB,	three	of	them	were	holding	management	position	as	well	as	being	involved	in	investigations.		Fourteen	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	 the	 participants’	 workplace,	 after	agreeing	on	a	convenient	date	and	place.	Three	interviews	were	conducted	in	an	improvised	area	during	a	conference	and	one	at	the	interviewee’s	home.		Given	the	desire	 to	conduct	 the	 interviews	 face-to-face	rather	 than	by	Skype,	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 travel	 to	 Australia	 to	 facilitate	 this.	 This	 was	 arranged	 by	making	contact	with	potential	participants	(most	of	whom	worked	for	the	ATSB)	by	 e-mail.	 Seven	 interviews	 were	 subsequently	 held	 in	 the	 Canberra	 and	Brisbane	 offices	 of	 the	 ATSB	 in	 November	 2014.	 Some	 interviewees	 also	suggested	 contacting	 additional	 participants	 based	 at	 other	 institutions.	Subsequently,	 ten	 further	 interviews	 were	 arranged	 with	 participants	 from	Sydney,	Brisbane,	Canberra	and	Melbourne.		
VI-	3-	3	Interview	schedule	and	conducting	the	interviews			An	 interview	schedule	 is	a	 list	of	questions	or	topics	that	are	to	be	approached	during	each	 interview.	 In	 the	case	of	semi-structured	 interviews,	 following	 this	schedule	can	be	done	in	a	flexible	way.	Here,	the	interview	schedule	was	based	on	 topics	 from	 findings	 from	 previously	 conducted	 research	 (presented	 in	Chapter	I),	the	challenges	and	issues	identified	in	the	literature	review	(Chapter	
	 143	
II)	 and	 the	 reports	 analysis	 (Chapter	 IV)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 findings	 from	 the	questionnaire	 in	 Chapter	 V.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 interviews	 was	 to	 obtain	 a	greater	 insight	 on	 human	 factors	 investigation,	 the	 human	 factors	 knowledge	and	 training	 of	 investigators	 and	 understand	 the	 experts’	 role	 during	 an	investigation,	thus	fulfilling,	in	part,	the	fourth	research	objective.		Before	conducting	 the	 interviews,	a	practice	or	 ‘pilot’	 interview	was	conducted	with	an	HF	consultant	based	at	a	well-known	multi-national	consulting	firm.	The	purpose	of	this	was	so	that	the	interview	could	be	tested	‘in	the	field’	in	order	to	practice	the	order	and	wording	of	the	questions	as	well	as	logistical	issues	such	as	 using	 the	 audio	 recorder	 and	 keeping	 the	 interview	 to	 time.	 Following	 the	pilot	 interview,	a	number	of	 small	 adjustments	 to	 the	 interview	schedule	were	made.	These	minor	changes	included	shortening	the	wording	of	some	questions	so	 that	 they	 were	 more	 succinct	 and	 sounded	 less	 formal	 when	 they	 were	delivered.	 From	 a	 technical	 standpoint,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 the	 recording	 was	clearer	when	the	sensitivity	on	the	audio	recorder	was	increased.			To	start	 the	 interview,	 the	researcher	 introduced	herself,	asked	 the	participant	whether	 the	 interviews	 could	 be	 recorded	 for	 analysis	 purposes	 and	 gave	 the	interview	guide	 to	 the	participant.	The	 first	question	 in	 each	 interview	was	an	introductory	question,	requesting	information	on	the	participant’s	background:		‘Could	you	tell	me	about	your	background	and	how	you	arrived	in	your	position?’	The	purpose	 of	 this	 question	was	 to	make	 the	 participant	 and	 the	 interviewer	comfortable	 and	 at	 ease,	 because	 it	 is	 easy	 to	 answer	 and	 covers	 familiar	territory,	 whilst	 also	 providing	 valuable	 information	 for	 the	 researcher	(Denscombe,	2003).	This	type	of	non-threatening	question	is	commonly	used	in	
	 144	
qualitative	 interviewing	as	 a	 ‘warm-up’	question	 (Robson,	2002).	The	question	led	 to	 developed	 and	 rich	 answers	 from	 the	 interviewees	 regarding	 their	experiences	in	accident	investigation	but	also	their	academic	background.			While	 some	 investigators	 spontaneously	 elaborated	 on	 their	 role	 within	 their	organisation,	 others	where	 specifically	 asked	 the	 following	 question:	 	 ‘Can	you	
tell	me	about	your	role	within	your	organisation?’.	The	objective	of	 this	question	was	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 role	 of	 human	 factors	 investigators	within	 their	organisation,	 and	 the	 process	 of	 a	 human	 factors	 investigation	 generally.	 The	questionnaire	in	Chapter	V	highlighted	that	human	factors	experts	tended	not	to	receive	 training	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 ‘management	 of	 large	 site’	 or	 ‘dealing	 with	inquest,	 legal	skills’	so	this	question	also	gave	relevant	 information	on	whether	or	 not	 they	 were	 deployed	 on	 site,	 at	 what	 point	 they	 were	 involved	 in	 an	investigation,	and	the	sort	of	responsibilities	they	were	given.			From	 that	 point,	 the	 researcher	 entered	 the	 ‘main	body	of	 interview’	 (Robson,	2002,	p277).	The	 following	question,	 if	not	raised	naturally	by	the	 interviewee,	regarded	 the	 methodology	 employed	 during	 an	 investigation.	 ‘Regarding	 data	
gathering	and	analysis,	do	you	use	any	sort	of	tool	or	methodology?’	The	literature	review	 (Chapter	 II)	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 accident	 investigation	methodology,	whereas	the	analysis	of	accident	reports	(Chapter	IV)	highlighted	that	not	all	investigations	involve	the	use	of	such	methodology,	or	at	least	that	it	is	not	specified	 in	 the	reports.	The	purpose	of	 this	question	was	 to	understand	the	 benefits	 and	 drawbacks	 of	 employing	 methodological	 tools	 during	 an	investigation,	from	a	human	factors	perspective.	
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Considering	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 questionnaire	 in	 Chapter	 V,	 regarding	 the	human	factors	 training	deficiencies	 for	accident	 investigators,	and	the	different	levels	 of	 human	 factors	 element	 in	 accident	 reports	 identified	 in	 the	 literature	and	in	the	reports	analysis,	an	important	question	was	then	‘How	is	your	human	
factors	 input	 received	 by	 the	 other	 accident	 investigators?’	 This	 question	 often	naturally	 led	 to	 the	 interviewees	mentioning	 the	 training	 of	 the	 investigators.	They	 were	 then	 asked	 to	 describe	 the	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	 of	 such	training.		Another	 question	 was	 ‘Do	 you	 think	 HF	 consideration	 in	 accident	 investigation	
could	be	improved?’	The	purpose	of	this	question	was	to	understand	what	could	be	done	to	achieve	more	thorough	the	accident	investigation	process.	A	common	follow	 up	 question	 to	 this	 was,	 for	 example	 ‘What	 do	 you	 think	 are	 the	 other	
challenges	of	human	factors	investigation?’			Another	 topic	 approached	 during	 the	 interviews	 was	 ‘understanding	 and	
training	at	management	level’.	 The	purpose	of	 this	question	was	 to	understand	the	 influence	of	 the	management’s	understanding	of	human	 factors	on	 the	way	human	factors	is	investigated	in	an	organisation.		The	 following	 topic	 approached	 during	 the	 interview	was	 the	 value	 of	 human	factors	 and	 dedicated	 human	 factors	 expertise.	 One	 of	 the	main	 findings	 from	analysis	 in	Chapter	I	was	the	need	for	a	dedicated	expert	who	understands	the	needs	of	 the	organisation.	Moreover,	 the	 literature	 (Chapter	 II)	highlighted	 the	necessity	to	involve	a	human	factors	specialist	during	an	investigation.	With	this	in	mind,	the	question	‘What	do	you	think	is	the	value	of	human	factors	integration	
in	accident	investigation?’	was	included,	 followed	by	 ‘What	do	you	think	makes	a	
good	human	factors	expert?’	The	purpose	 of	 these	 questions	was	 to	 get	 human	
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factors	investigators’	point	of	view	on	the	impact	of	the	involvement	of	a	human	factors	specialist	 in	an	 investigation,	and	 to	 identify	 the	attributes	 that	a	 ‘good’	human	factors	specialist	involved	in	accident	investigation	should	possess.			Another	 key	 challenge	 identified	 in	 Chapter	 I	 is	 the	 depth	 of	 human	 factors	element	within	the	context	of	a	full	air	accident	investigation.	Therefore	it	was	a	significant	 topic	 for	 this	 part	 of	 the	 interview.	 In	 order	 to	 gather	 the	 human	factors	 specialists’	 perspective	 on	 such	 an	 issue,	 questions	were:	 ‘How	deep	do	
you	go	into	human	factors?’,	 ‘When	do	you	know	when	to	stop	looking?’,	and	‘How	
to	 address	 the	 balance	 between	 technical	 and	 human	 factors	 during	 an	
investigation?’.	Subsequently,	another	question	for	this	theme,	influenced	by	the	findings	 from	 the	 questionnaire	 about	 the	 deficiencies	 in	 training	 regarding	organisational	 issues	 investigation	 was	 ‘How	 do	 you	 address	 organisational	
issues’.		Finally,	 the	interviewees	were	asked	whether	they	had	any	other	comments	on	the	 topics	 approached	 during	 the	 interview.	 They	were	 then	 thanked	 and	 the	recorder	was	switched	off.		
	
VI-	4	Thematic	analysis	and	coding	process		Each	 interview	was	audio	recorded	for	analysis	purposes.	The	recordings	were	fully	 transcribed	 by	 the	 researcher	 so	 as	 not	 to	 lose	 any	 information.	 Analysis	was	 then	 conducted	 on	 the	 transcripts	 of	 these	 interviews	 and	 taking	 into	account	the	researcher’s	notes	taken	during	the	interviews.		
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	There	 are	 various	 different	 approaches	 to	 qualitative	 analysis.	 Robson	 (2002)	lists	four	of	the	most	commonly	used	approaches	(see	table	4	in	Chapter	IV).	The	first	 one,	 quasi-statistical	 approaches,	 relies	 on	 the	 transformation	 of	 the	 data	from	 qualitative	 format	 into	 quantitative	 format.	 A	 typical	 quasi-statistical	approach	 is	 content	analysis,	 as	 is	used	 in	Chapter	 IV.	The	 second	approach	 to	qualitative	 analysis	 is	 immersion	 approaches.	 These	 are	 generally	 very	unstructured	and	 interpretive	and	emphasize	 the	 researcher’s	observation	and	judgement.	 Editing	 approaches,	 the	 third	 main	 type	 of	 approach,	 are	 less	interpretive.	Grounded	 theory	 is	 commonly	 considered	 as	 a	 form	of	 an	 editing	approach,	and	does	not	involve	any	form	of	a	priori	coding	but	instead	relies	on	generating	 codes	 from	 the	 data	 (Strauss	 and	 Corbin,	 1990).	 The	 fourth	 main	approach	 to	 analysing	 qualitative	 data	 is	 called	 template	 approaches.	 This	includes	methods	such	as	matrix	analysis	or	thematic	analysis.	These	rely	on	key	codes	 being	 determined	 prior	 to	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 interviews	 from	 previous	research	 or	 theory	 (deductively),	 or	 after	 initial	 reading	 of	 the	 raw	 data	(inductively)	(Boyatzis,	1998).			In	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	 interviews	 the	 researcher	 conducted	 a	 template	approach,	called	thematic	analysis,	as	it	is	more	structured,	less	interpretive	and	therefore	more	objective	in	nature	than	editing	approaches	like	grounded	theory	(Robson,	2002).	Having	said	this,	thematic	analysis	still	provides	some	flexibility	in	the	fact	that	the	template,	or	themes,	can	evolve	or	change	as	the	analysis	goes	on	 (Robson,	 2002;	 Braun	 and	 Clarke,	 2006).	 The	 process	 of	 thematic	 analysis	involves	 the	 identification	 of	 themes	 (the	 ‘code’),	 or	 patterns,	 within	 the	 data	
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(interview	 transcripts),	 and	 their	 analysis	 (Boyatzis,	 1998;	 Braun	 and	 Clarke,	2006).			One	 of	 the	 strengths	 of	 thematic	 analysis	 is	 that	 it	 can	 be	 adapted	 under	 any	worldview	 (Boyatzis,	 1998;	 Braun	 and	 Clarke,	 2006)	 as	 long	 as	 it	 is	 made	explicit.	 This	 research’s	 paradigm	 has	 been	 developed	 in	 Chapter	 III	 and	 it	 is	therefore	possible	to	tackle	thematic	analysis	considering	the	assumptions	made	as	part	of	the	research	design.	In	 order	 to	 conduct	 thematic	 analysis,	 several	 abilities	 are	 required	 from	 the	analyst	 (Robson,	 2002;	 Boyatzis,	 1998).	 One	 essential	 skill	 is	 having	 relevant	knowledge	 in	 the	 area	 under	 enquiry	 in	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 identify	 what	 is	important	 and	 give	 it	 meaning.	 This	 is	 what	 Strauss	 and	 Corbin	 (1990,	 in	Boyatzis	p8)	refer	to	as	 ‘theoretical	sensitivity’.	Another	 important	competency	necessary	to	the	analysts	is	the	ability	to	identify	themes	and	patterns	(codable	moments)	and	do	it	reliably	(Boyatzis,	1998).			Braun	 and	 Clarke	 (2006)	 list	 several	 decisions	 that	 need	 to	 be	made	 prior	 to	starting	 thematic	 analysis.	 Amongst	 those	 choices	 is	 the	 clarification	 on	 what	counts	 as	 a	 theme	 within	 the	 data.	 A	 theme	 is	 an	 important	 section	 of	 the	transcript	 that	 addresses	 the	 research	 question.	 The	 researcher	 identified	 the	themes	depending	on	their	importance	within	each	individual	interview	as	well	as	in	the	whole	set	of	data,	that	is	to	say	if	it	was	approached	by	at	least	half	of	the	participants.		
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Another	 important	 decision	 that	 needed	 to	 be	made,	 as	 noted	 by	 Braune	 and	Clarke	 (2006),	 was	 whether	 the	 analysis	 was	 to	 be	 inductive	 or	 deductive	 in	nature.	Here	 a	 compromise	was	 agreed	upon	 that	 included	both	 inductive	 and	deductive	elements.	The	initial	codes	on	which	this	thematic	analysis	was	based	were	developed	from	theories	derived	from	previous	research	in	this	thesis	and	the	 literature.	 Here,	 the	 thematic	 analysis	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 theoretical	thematic	analysis	(Boyatzis,	1998).	However,	the	researcher	kept	an	open	mind	about	discovering	more	relevant	 themes	as	 the	analysis	progressed.	Consistent	with	the	flexible	nature	of	thematic	analysis,	and	considering	the	mixed-methods	research	 approach	 of	 this	 project,	 new	 themes	 were	 then	 created	 inductively	from	the	data	itself	during	the	analysis.			The	process	followed	to	conduct	the	thematic	analysis	was	the	six-phase	process	described	by	Bran	and	Clarke	(2006),	detailed	in	table	8.	
Phase	 Description	of	the	process	1.	Familiarising	yourself	with	the	data	 Transcribing	data,	reading	and	re-reading,	noting	down	initial	ideas	2.	Generating	initial	codes	 Coding	interesting	features	of	the	data	in	a	systematic	fashion	across	the	entire	data	set,	collating	data	relevant	to	each	code	3.	Searching	for	themes	 Collating	codes	into	potential	themes,	gathering	all	data	relevant	to	each	potential	theme	4.	Reviewing	themes	 Checking	if	the	themes	work	in	relation	to	the	coded	extracts	and	the	entire	data	set,	generating	a	thematic	map	of	the	analysis	5.	Defining	and	naming	themes	 On	going	analysis	to	refine	the	specifics	of	each	theme,	and	the	overall	story	the	analysis	tells,	generating	clear	definitions	and	names	for	each	theme	6.	Producing	the	report	 Final	opportunity	for	analysis.	Selection	of	vivid,	compelling	extract	examples,	final	analysis	of	selected	extracts,	relating	it	to	the	research	question	and	producing	a	concluding	report	
	
Table	8:	Phases	of	thematic	analysis	(from	Braun	and	Clarke,	2006,	p87)	
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	The	initial	code	(Phase	1,	see	table	8)	consisted	of	the	following	themes:	human	factors	 training	 for	 accident	 investigators,	 human	 factors	 integration	 in	 an	investigation	 (depth	 of	 HF	 element	 and	 methodology)	 and	 the	 importance	 of	dedicated	human	 factors	expertise.	As	mentioned,	 this	was	generated	 from	 the	literature	review,	the	findings	from	the	researcher’s	previous	study,	the	findings	from	 the	 review	 of	 accident	 reports	 and	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 questionnaire	amongst	accident	investigators.	The	interview	transcripts	were	then	coded	using	these	 themes	 (phases	 2	 and	 3,	 see	 table	 8).	 In	 practice,	 this	 meant	 that	 each	section	 of	 the	 text	 that	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 relevant	 was	 ‘labelled’	 with	 the	appropriate	 theme.	 This	 sort	 of	 coding	 is	 also	 called	 ‘topic	 coding’	 (Richards,	2009).		After	going	through	each	interview,	the	initial	coding	frame	evolved	into	a	more	developed,	 accurate	 and	meaningful	 set	 of	 themes	 (Phase	4	 and	5).	 This	 latter	stage	 of	 the	 coding	 exercise,	 also	 called	 ‘analytical	 coding’	 (Richards,	 2006),	 is	commonly	used	where	 the	 true	value	of	 the	analysis	 is	 realised.	 It	 involves	 the	reflection	on	the	meanings	of	what	the	interviewees	are	saying	and	explains	why	a	specific	section	of	the	text,	or	theme,	is	interesting	and	relevant	to	the	research.		
VI-	5		Interview	Findings			The	 analysis	 of	 the	 interviews,	 using	 thematic	 analysis,	 resulted	 in	 the	identification	 of	 eleven	 themes	 overall,	 which	 were	 arranged	 as	 seven	 main	
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themes	 and	 four	 subthemes.	 Based	 on	 interpretation	 of	 the	 findings	 from	 the	interviews,	they	were	related	in	the	following	way:	see	figure	28		The	main	themes	are	credibility,	managerial	culture,	HF	training,	team	dynamics,	HF	integration,	accident	report	and	HF	expert	attributes.	They	were	classified	as	main	 themes	 because	 investigators	 mentioned	 them	 on	 several	 occasions,	elaborating	and	going	into	great	detail	by	providing	examples.	It	was	interpreted	that	 these	 main	 themes	 were	 also	 the	 participants’	 main	 challenges	 and	therefore	 were	 of	 high	 importance	 concerning	 the	 research	 objective.	 The	subthemes	identified	in	the	interviews	were	investigators	acceptance	(of	HF),	HF	input	(evidence	based),	the	scope	of	the	HF	investigation,	and	the	necessity	of	a	thorough	analysis.	These	subthemes,	although	important,	were	only	approached	by	 the	 participants	 and	 were	 not	 always	 developed	 further.	 They	 were	nevertheless	 identified	as	key	elements	to	this	analysis	because	of	 their	 impact	and	influence	on	the	main	theme.	They	are	required	in	the	process	of	a	thorough	human	 factors	 investigation.	 It	 was	 decided	 to	 represent	 this	 process	 and	influences	by	arrows	(see	figure	28)	because	in	some	cases,	themes	were	equally	affecting	each	other.	For	example,	 the	managerial	culture	(or	management)	has	influence	on	 the	 recruitment	process	of	 the	HF	 specialist.	 In	 turn,	 if	 the	expert	contributing	 to	 an	 investigation	 produces	 high	 quality	 and	 evidence-based	reports,	the	management	is	more	likely	to	acknowledge	the	value	of	HF.	
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Figure	28:	Coding	result	(themes	and	subthemes)	
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The	first	theme	that	encompasses	everything	is	credibility.		This	theme,	recurrent	in	 all	 the	 interviews	 was	 seen	 as	 ‘the	 biggest	 challenge’	 for	 human	 factors	investigators	as	well	as	for	the	whole	organisation.	One	investigator	for	example	insisted	 “In	 this	 job,	 credibility	 is	 everything.	 If	we	don’t	get	 it	 right	 (the	 report)	
that	 credibility	 goes.	 And	 this	 place	 is	 built	 on	 credibility”	 The	 credibility	 of	 an	organisation	 or	 department	 running	 investigations	 relies	 highly	 on	 the	production	 of	 thorough,	 valid	 and	 evidence	 based	 reports,	 integrating	 human	factors.	Credibility	was	also	one	of	the	main	themes	discovered	after	analysis	of	interviews	within	an	organisation	without	human	factors	specialists	(see	chapter	I).	 Credibility	 is	 therefore	 of	 primary	 importance,	 hence	 the	 necessity	 to	 base	report	findings	and	conclusions	only	on	evidence	and	not	the	other	way	around,	which	 is	 trying	 to	 fit	 the	 evidence	 to	 match	 speculations.	 Credibility	 was	determined	 as	 being	 essential	 to	 the	 other	 themes,	 and	 particularly	 for	 the	management,	and	therefore	the	managerial	culture,	which	is	responsible	for	any	published	report.	
Managerial	culture	was	identified	as	the	key	factor	for	human	factors	integration	in	accident	investigation.	If	the	management	does	not	believe	HF	to	be	relevant	then	it	will	not	be	pushed	in	the	accident	 investigation	process,	nor	will	 it	be	a	priority	topic	in	the	investigators	training.	Moreover,	some	HF	experts	specified	the	importance	of	educating	the	management	in	order	to	have	a	‘top	to	bottom’	effect	 on	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 organisation.	 For	 example,	 one	 participant	 said,	 “we’ll	
send	 the	 lead	 investigator	 to	advocate	and	 convince	 the	management	 that	 that’s	[human	 factors]	worth	pursuing”.	 This	 identifies	 the	necessity	 for	 investigators	and	 management	 to	 understand	 HF.	 Other	 HF	 experts	 interviewed	 were	themselves	in	a	management	position,	and	felt	that	educating	senior	or	top	level		
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management	was	necessary,	although	they	acknowledged	that	this	would	likely	be	extremely	challenging	in	reality.	The	participants	who	currently	worked	with	‘HF	 managers’	 all	 highlighted	 the	 positive	 impact	 it	 had	 on	 the	 integration	 of	human	factors	in	their	company.	For	example,	before	a	report	is	published,	it	is	proof	read	and	peer	reviewed	by	a	manager	or	team	leader	to	make	sure	nothing	has	 been	missed	 and	 each	 argument	 is	 justified	with	 reliable	 evidence.	 It	 was	argued	 that	 if	 the	 person	 conducting	 the	 review	 does	 not	 understand	 human	factors	properly	then	valuable	information	could	be	missed	during	this	process.	One	 investigator	 mentioned	 a	 good	 example	 of	 the	 change	 brought	 by	 a	 HF	manager:	 “I	think	it	changed	with	my	previous	boss.	She	came	in	and	said	 ‘That’s	
not	good	enough;	you	are	not	qualified	to	assess	if	there’s	human	factors	or	not.’”	This	also	illustrates	the	necessity	for	qualified	HF	expertise.	Experts	 from	the	airlines	particularly	emphasized	the	 level	of	understanding	of	HF	 from	 the	 management.	 As	 in-house	 specialists	 they	 felt	 that	 approaching	organisational	 issues	 was	 only	 possible	 with	 a	 receptive	 and	 HF-educated	managerial	culture.		Thus,	 managerial	 culture	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 HF	 training	 delivered	 in	 the	organisation,	the	team	dynamics,	the	way	HF	is	integrated	and	the	quality	of	the	accident	 reports.	 It	 also	 has	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 HF	 specialists	because	 management	 inevitably	 has	 decision-making	 power	 over	 the	recruitment	process.			The	next	main	theme	that	came	from	the	interviews	is	HF	training.	It	was	found	that	 not	 only	 is	 it	 necessary	 for	 accident	 investigators	 to	 get	 human	 factors	training,	 but	 that	 they	 should	 also	 regularly	 undertake	 targeted	 and	 relevant	
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refresher	training,	according	to	the	HF	specialists	interviewed	in	this	study.	The	HF	 experts	 interviewed	 all	 felt	 the	 positive	 impact	 of	 the	 training	 provided	 to	investigators.	 The	 investigators	 were	 described	 as	 being	 more	 receptive	 and	respectful	 of	 the	 specialist’s	 input.	 The	 participants	 also	 emphasized	 that	 after	receiving	such	training,	the	investigators	were	more	likely	to	consult	with	them	when	a	human	factors	issue	arose.	This	is	how	HF	training	directly	influences	the	investigators	HF	acceptance,	which	is	one	of	the	subthemes.	Training	 was	 also	 addressed	 when	 the	 participants	 were	 answering	 the	questions	 ‘What	 are	 the	 challenges	 for	 HF	 accident	 investigation?’	 Answers	varied,	 but	 all	 the	 interviewees	 mentioned	 ‘education’	 as	 one	 solution.	 From	there,	 some	 HF	 experts	 differentiated	 between	 investigators	 who	 received	human	factors	training	from	the	beginning	of	their	career	and/or	training	as	an	investigator	(i.e.	 the	 ‘new	generation’),	with	 investigators	who	only	received	HF	training	 later	 in	 their	 career	as	 investigators,	 sometimes	 referred	 to	as	 ‘the	old	
school	 investigators’.	 This	 suggests	 it	 may	 be	 beneficial	 to	 integrate	 human	factors	as	early	as	possible	in	the	accident	investigators’	training.		While	 the	 interviewees	did	not	detail	 the	specific	 content	of	 refresher	 training,	they	did	mention	the	issues	that	they	believed	should	be	addressed	more	in	such	training,	or	where	understanding	was	lacking.	For	example,	one	HF	expert	in	an	airline	 said:	 “I	 need	 them	 to	know	when	 to	 involve	human	 factors”	 and	 “If	 it’s	 a	
case	 of	 refreshing	 the	basic	modules	 each	 year	 I	 don’t	 think	 they’d	 really	 need	 it	
because	they	are	doing	it	every	day.	But	if	 it’s	a	case	of	here	is	new	incidents	and	
things	and	 concepts	 that	have	 come	up,	 that	 I	 think	would	be	actually	 relevant.”	Most	 investigators	 agreed	 with	 this	 view	 that	 investigators	 should	 receive	training	 to	 remain	 aware	 of	 the	 recent	 trends	 and	 research	 in	HF	but	 that	 the	
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objective	of	this	training	should	be	to	enable	them	to	identify	the	point	where	an	expertise	 is	 needed	and	not	 to	 encourage	 them	 to	do	 it	 themselves.	 It	was	 felt	that	 there	 was	 a	 danger	 in	 ‘over	 training’	 the	 investigators.	 The	 HF	 experts	recognised	that	when	investigators	were	trying	to	develop	the	HF	element	of	an	investigation	it	was	often	too	weak	and	therefore	increased	the	risk	of	involving	expertise	 too	 late	 in	 the	 process.	 A	 HF	 investigator	 from	 the	 ATSB	 said	 for	example:		“I’m	always	a	 little	concerned	that	you	know,	 for	me,	my	personal	approach	with	
HF	course,	when	we	teach	a	HF	course,	 it’s	to	get	our	investigators	to	understand	
that	human	factors	is	a	real	thing	and	then	to	understand	that	not	everybody	can	
do	it.	So	give	them	just	enough	information	to	convince	them,	to	realise	that	it	is	a	
specialisation	and	they	need	to	actually	talk	to	some	specialists	rather	than	to	do	it	
all	themselves.”	This	highlights	that	‘training’	is	not	to	be	considered	in	isolation	and	 that	 the	 balance	 between	 being	 an	 expert	 and	 a	 person	 who	 received	training	is	complex.		
Team	dynamics,	which	was	already	mentioned	as	being	influenced	by	managerial	culture,	directly	affects	the	way	HF	is	integrated	in	the	investigation	and	relies	on	a	qualified	HF	specialist.	Although	no	question	directly	approached	this	issue,	it	was	developed	as	a	main	theme	because	several	interviewees	believed	that	being	part	of	the	investigation	team	would	benefit	the	quality	of	the	investigation.	The	participants	 however	 also	 defined	 this	 key	 point	 as	 being	 one	 of	 their	 main	challenges.	They	felt	 the	need	to	always	have	to	demonstrate	the	value	of	 their	work	and	input	before	being	considered	as	an	equal	member	of	the	team	which,	they	 felt,	 was	 not	 required	 by	 more	 technical	 investigators	 because	 their	
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disciplines	are	already	acknowledged	fully.	Regarding	how	an	 investigator	sees	the	acknowledgement	of	 the	HF	discipline	 in	her	organisation,	one	 interviewee	noted:			“We’ve	always	sent	HF	out	in	the	field,	so	I’ve	done	two	IIC	jobs	in	the	field,	two	in	
nine	months.	I	think	this	helps	as	well	because	when	you’re	deployed	with	a	group	
and	you	do	get	to	know	them	a	little	better	and	they	feel	happy	coming	to	see	you,	
and	 you’re	 not	 one	 of	 these	 people	 that	 sit	 in	 their	 office…	 You	 can	 be	 a	 proper	
investigator	too.	That	kind	of	integration	helps.”			Thus	it	appears	that	being	part	of	the	investigation	encourages	the	acceptance	of	HF	 from	 the	 other	 investigators.	 Extensive	 discussions,	 team	 meeting	 and	brainstorming	 are	 involved	 in	 investigations,	 particularly	 during	 the	 analysis	phase	where	any	bias	should	be	avoided.	It	was	felt	by	the	interviewees	that	the	integration	 of	 a	 HF	 expert	 at	 every	 stage,	 from	 the	 evidence	 gathering	 to	 the	writing	of	the	report,	enables	a	true	integration	of	HF	within	the	investigation.		One	of	the	interviewees	said,	“I	don’t	see	why	human	factors	investigator	can’t	be	
IIC”.	With	the	exception	of	the	ATSB,	where	some	HF	investigators	currently	hold	management	 positions,	 in	 the	majority	 of	 organisations	 HF	 investigators	were	not	fulfilling	the	role	of	IIC.	This	was	surprising,	given	that	one	of	the	main	skills	required	 of	 an	 IIC	was	 defined	 as	 having	 good	 project	management	 skills	 (i.e.	attributes	closely	associated	with	HF	investigators),	in	addition	to	understanding	the	various	disciplines	that	take	part	in	an	investigation.	However,	as	highlighted	
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here,	 there	 was	 a	 general	 feeling	 amongst	 interviewees	 that	 HF	 investigators	could	fulfil	the	role	just	as	well	as	those	from	other	disciplines.			Moreover,	the	literature	emphasised	the	need	to	consider	HF	as	a	specialist	area	and	therefore	the	necessity	to	involve	an	expert.	This	expert	could	be	‘in-house’	or	external	 to	 the	organisation,	which	raised	an	 interesting	discussion	with	the	interviewees.	Both	the	pros	and	the	cons	of	this	situation	were	identified	by	the	interviewees.	It	was	felt	that	one	of	the	main	advantages	of	the	in-house	expert	is	that	 they	 are	 considered	 part	 of	 team,	 which	 should	 lead	 to	 better	 team	dynamics,	which	in	turn	produces	better	quality	reports.	Moreover,	an	in-house	specialist	may	be	able	to	acquire	the	background	knowledge	and	understand	the	needs	of	the	organisation,	which	was	a	challenge	identified	in	Chapter	I.		The	possible	disadvantages	of	an	in-house	expert,	particularly	in	the	industry	(as	opposed	 to	NIAs)	 is	 that	 they	may,	 to	 some	extent,	 be	biased.	This	 can	be	 less	likely	when	using	an	external	specialist.	However,	an	external	expert	may	not	get	the	 whole	 picture	 and	 is	 often	 called	 later,	 which	 could	 compromise	 valuable	evidence	such	as	interviewing.			Overall,	it	was	felt	that	having	an	in-house	expert	present	during	the	interviews	was	 very	 beneficial	 as	 he/she	 has	 limited	 technical	 bias	 and	 can	 ask	 the	more	obvious	 questions,	 for	 example	 the	 role	 of	 a	 specific	 autopilot	 function	 or		determining	 whether	 the	 pilots	 understand	 it	 correctly.	 It	 also	 removes	 any	hierarchy	 (military,	 pilot	 rank)	 issues.	 HF	 experts	 permanently	 part	 of	 an	organisation	 can	 also	 accomplish	 other	 tasks	 such	 as	 safety	 study,	 training	adapted	to	the	needs	of	the	organisation,	or	development	of	analysis	tools.		While	
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this	is	not	to	say	that	HF	experts	should	undertake	the	interviews	on	their	own,	a	technical	subject	matter	expert	is	also	necessary	to	understand	the	task	in	detail,	their	presence	was	viewed	as	a	benefit	overall.	This	 is	 another	example	where	good	team	dynamics	is	essential.			The	 integration	of	HF	can	mean	a	number	of	 things.	For	example,	 investigators	can	 refer	 to	 their	 HF	 peers	 whenever	 they	 feel	 the	 need.	 It	 also	 means	considering	 HF	 at	 an	 early	 stage,	 and	 therefore	 involving	 an	 expert	 when	necessary.	 Interviewing	 is	 a	 key	 source	 of	 evidence	 in	 an	 investigation,	 and	particularly	in	HF.	HF	specialists	are	often	proficient	at	conducting	interviewing	due	 to	 the	 very	nature	of	 the	discipline	or	 even	 the	psychology	background	of	some	of	the	experts	 interviewed.	The	interviewees	 insisted	that	HF	should	also	be	embedded	in	the	analysis	phase	through	the	use	of	a	tool	or	methodology.	The	analysis	 of	 accident	 reports	 presented	 in	 chapter	 IV	 demonstrated	 that	 such	tools	provided	structure	to	a	report,	but	it	was	not	always	made	explicit	whether	such	tools	had	been	employed.			The	 introductory	 question	 meant	 that	 the	 interviewer	 was	 able	 to	 gather	interesting	 information	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 academic	 background	 to	 human	factors	 investigators.	 In	 fact,	 all	 the	 respondents	had	undertaken	an	MSc	and	a	majority	 of	 them	 a	 PhD	 in	 psychology	 or	 human	 factors.	 For	 six	 of	 them,	 that	postgraduate	 degree	 was	 obtained	 after	 working	 for	 a	 period	 of	 time	 in	 the	industry,	 for	example	as	cabin	crew,	pilots	or	engineers.	 It	was	recognised	that	the	knowledge	and	skills	developed	as	part	of	 this	 further	academic	 study	 (for	example,	handling	of	large	data	sets	or	writing	their	thesis)	had	better	prepared	
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them	 for	 their	 role	 as	 an	 investigator	 than	 had	 they	 not	 undertaken	 this	qualification.	 It	was	 felt	 that	 this	was	most	 evident	 in	 terms	of	 their	 improved	analytical	 and	 writing	 skills,	 which	 perhaps	 were	 not	 so	 developed	 among	investigators	who	do	not	undertake	these	qualifications.			d	Organisations	 employing	HF-based	 tools	 and	methodology,	 particularly	 for	 the	analysis	 of	 the	 evidence	 saw	 the	 positive	 impact	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 accident	reports,	 according	 to	 the	 interviewees.	 Such	 tools	 enable	 the	 natural	consideration	 and	 therefore	 integration	 of	 HF	 and	 above	 all	 provides	 a	standardisation	among	the	organisation.	This	tool,	often	used	as	a	framework	or	guidance,	 also	 enables	 other	 investigators	 to	 understand	 the	 logical	 process	 of	the	 investigation	 if	 looking	at	 the	report	years	 later,	although	it	was	noted	that	only	 the	 ATSB	 and	 the	 UK	 experts	 were	 using	 such	 a	 tool	 accurately.	 These	organisations	were	 also	 the	 ones	where	 the	 experts	 seem	 to	 get	 the	 strongest	and	 most	 influential	 involvement,	 which	 seems	 logical	 since	 an	 organisation	willing	to	 fund	a	tool	 is	more	 likely	to	be	supportive	and	have	an	awareness	of	the	value	of	HF.			The	 scope	 of	 the	 investigation,	 and	more	 specifically	 the	HF	 element,	was	 also	highlighted	as	essential	to	a	HF	investigation.	This	scope	is	the	depth	into	which	investigators	dig	to	find	answers,	the	extent	of	the	human	factors	investigation.	This	 theme	 was	 approached	 by	 the	 interviewees	 when	 asking	 the	 questions	regarding	the	balance	between	the	technical	and	HF	elements	in	an	investigation.	These	questions	received	positive	interest	from	the	interviewees,	who	noted	that	defining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 HF	 element	 in	 an	 investigation	 was	 a	 perpetual	
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challenge.	 As	 one	 interviewee	 noted,	 this	 particular	 challenge	 “is	 the	 million-
dollar	question’!			An	example	of	this	scoping	process	is	described	by	one	investigator,	who	noted	that	“You	only	have	to	go	as	far	as	the	evidence	lets	you”.	Someone	else	described	a	more	systemic	approach	to	scoping	and	making	sure	they	did	not	go	too	deeply	into	human	factors:	“We	try	to	focus	on	the	accident.	We	go	back	into	some	of	the	
systemic	stuff	in	the	organisation	but	when	it	starts	getting	too	far	out,	away	from	
the	 actual	 accident	 sequence,	 where	 it’s	 really	 difficult	 to	 link	 it	 back	 to	 the	
accident	 I	 think	 that’s	 where	 we	 stop”.	 Scoping	 the	 area	 of	 research	 was	 the	solution	 provided	 by	 the	 participants	 to	 the	 challenge	 identified	 in	 Chapter	 I	regarding	the	depth	and	balance	of	HF	in	an	investigation.	A	well-defined	scope	also	 enables	 a	 thorough	 evidence-based	 analysis.	 It	 is	 also	 the	 product	 of	effective	 team	 dynamics	 as	 illustrated	 by	 another	 investigator	 who	 was	describing	an	example	where	safety	culture	was	involved:	“at	the	meeting	we	talk	
about	what	are	the	human	factors	involved	here	and	where,	how	far	would	we	go	
based	on	what	we	know	at	the	moment.	And	so	 in	this	 investigation	we	would	be	
looking	at	its	safety	culture	and	its	commitment	to	safety”.		Another	 main	 theme	 refers	 to	 the	 accident	 reports.	The	 final	 report	 has	 been	identified	 as	 being	 a	 key	 concern	 for	 human	 factors	 experts.	 It	 needs	 to	 be	evidence-based	and	objective,	consider	all	 the	 issues,	and	not	apportion	blame,	which	are	the	characteristics	of	a	safety	investigation(see	chapter	II).	A	report	is	also	what	puts	the	organisation’s	credibility	at	stake.	The	management	will	have	a	last	say	on	the	content	of	the	report	and	this	is	why	it	is	essential	for	them	to	be	
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educated	in	HF	and	acknowledge	its	importance.	The	report	needs	to	consider	all	the	 disciplines	 and	 when	 the	 IIC	 is	 not	 an	 HF	 expert,	 he	 or	 she	 needs	 some	understanding	 of	 HF	 to	 be	 able	 to	 integrate	 the	 HF	 element	within	 the	whole	investigation	and	link	it	with	other	evidence.	Another	challenge	raised	regarding	the	final	report	is	that	it	needs	to	be	accessible	to	the	general	public,	for	the	NIAs,	or	 at	 least	 understandable	 by	 the	 non-experts	 (higher	 management	 or	 co-investigators)	 for	 the	 other	 organisations,	 so	 they	 can	 understand	 it	 and	 take	actions	 if	 required.	The	quality	of	 the	 report	 relies	highly	on	 the	quality	of	 the	
analysis	 (subtheme)	 and	 is	 also	 a	 product	 of	 team	 dynamics:	 “Always	multiple	
people	 involved	 in	 analysis	 and	 so	 then	 we	 have	 what	 we	 call	 team	 consensus.	
When	the	report	has	to	go	through	the	whole	team	before	it	goes	up	to	peer	review	
or	management”.		Finally,	 the	 other	 major	 theme	 that	 appeared	 during	 these	 interviews	 is	 the	attributes	of	the	HF	expert	involved	in	the	accident	investigations.	It	will	impact	on	the	team	dynamics	and	the	investigators	acceptance	of	HF	(subtheme),	and	the	HF	input,	by	the	nature	of	their	role.	This	input	(subtheme)	should	be	evidence-based,	 which	 can	 sometimes	 seem	 difficult,	 considering	 the	 nature	 of	 HF	 (see	Chapter	II).	Additional	essential	attributes	identified	were	the	capacity	to	stay	up	to	date	with	 the	 literature,	 proficiency	 at	 interviewing	 and	being	 able	 to	 apply	theoretical	 knowledge	 to	 an	 investigation,	 as	 discussed	 by	 one	 interviewee:	 “I	
think	 you	need	 to	have	 experience,	 I	 think	 the	 reality	 is	 you	 can	get	a	wonderful	
education	 but	 until	 you	 actually	 start	 applying	 it	 and	 understanding	 it…	 that	 is	
actually	being	part	of	the	investigation	team”.			
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The	HF	integration	was	also	indirectly	linked	to	the	quality	of	the	HF	specialist.	A	recurrent	 issue	 appeared	 regarding	 investigators	 having	 previous	 negative	experience	with	HF	experts	(subjective	input)	and	therefore	made	them	sceptical	about	the	value	of	the	discipline.			One	 participant	 said:	 “As	 part	 of	 the	 explaining	 of	 what	 happened,	 I	 did	 the	
research	 on	 that.	 So	 looking	 into	 all	 the	 papers	 and	 literature	 on	 unintentional	
blindness,	distraction,	interaction…”	Another	one	said	“We	do	go	out	[to	the	crash	site]	but	it’s	our	ability	to	pinpoint	the	right	people	to	go	to,	from	knowledge	that	
we	 originally	 have.”	 This	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 knowing	 one’s	 own	limitations	 and	 requesting	 help	 from	 other	 experts.	 This	 also	 emphasises	 the	importance	 of	 critical	 thinking	 in	 order	 to	 know	 where	 to	 look	 and	 who	 to	contact	 in	 such	 a	 situation.	 One	 important	 way	 that	 critical	 thinking	 can	 be	developed	 is	 through	 research,	 although	 it	 is	 by	 no	 means	 the	 only	 way.	 The	technical	 knowledge	 of	 the	 investigator	was	 also	 a	 source	 of	 discussion	 in	 the	interviews.	Especially,	 opinions	of	 the	participants	 varied	as	 to	whether	 it	was	essential	 for	 the	 HF	 person	 to	 have	 some	 industry	 experience	 in	 aviation	 or	whether	this	could	be	acquired	‘on-the-job’.			
VI-	4	Conclusions		Semi-structured	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 HF	 experts	 involved	 in	 air	accident	 investigations.	 A	 thematic	 analysis	 was	 conducted	 leading	 to	development	of	 themes.	The	main	 themes	were	 credibility,	managerial	 culture,	
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human	 factors	 training,	 team	 dynamics,	 human	 factors	 integration,	 accident	report	and	human	 factors	experts’	attributes.	The	subthemes	 identified	are	 the	acceptance	 of	 human	 factors	 by	 accident	 investigators,	 the	 evidence-based	human	 factors	 input,	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 human	 factors	 investigation	 and	 the	through	analysis.	Those	themes	were	also	found	to	have	an	impact	and	influence	on	each	other.	This	 chapter	 partly	 fulfilled	 the	 objective	 to	 assess	 the	 training	 needs	 of	 air	accident	 investigation.	 It	 reports	 experts’	 opinion	 on	 human	 factors	 training	provision	 for	 accident	 investigators	both	 in	 terms	of	 its	 importance,	 as	well	 as	the	benefits	of	refresher	training	in	order	to	keep	investigators	aware	of	current	issues	 and	 new	 developments	 in	 the	 discipline.	 This	 supports	 what	 was	identified	in	the	literature	regarding	the	facts	that	keeping	up	to	date	and	quality	of	investigators	are	key	to	the	credibility	of	the	investigation.	It	also	emphasised	the	need	for	this	training	to	accentuate	the	fact	that	HF	is	a	specialist	discipline	and	non-specialists	therefore	should	not	try	to	tackle	 it	 themselves.	 It	confirms	Baker’s	view	(2010)	that	the	presence	of	an	HF	expert	enables	the	elimination	of	biases	 or	 preconceived	 ideas.	 These	 findings	 therefore	 confirmed	 the	 previous	results	 found	 in	 this	research	and	develop	them	further.	They	are	however	 the	product	 of	 human	 factors	 experts’	 opinion	 so	 the	 objectivity	 on	 the	 role	 and	importance	of	the	expertise	is	to	be	treated	cautiously.	A	new	key	finding	resulted	from	this	study	is	that	training	the	management	in	HF	is	 a	 key	 factor	 to	 a	 better	 integration	 of	 HF	 in	 accident	 reports.	 This	 set	 of	interviews	 also	 revealed	 important	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 importance	 of	 excellent	team	dynamics	to	run	an	effective	investigation	and	for	the	human	factors	expert	to	be	integrated	within	that	team.	
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	At	this	point	in	the	research	some	initial	conclusions	can	be	drawn	regarding	the	aim	 of	 this	 thesis,	 which	 is	 to	 examine	 the	 training	 needs	 of	 air	 accident	investigators	in	order	to	develop	more	thorough	integration	of	human	factors	in	accident	 investigations.	 Training	 investigators	 in	 HF	 is	 indeed	 a	 solution,	however	not	the	solution.	It	needs	to	be	supported	by	the	integration	of	HF	at	all	stages	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 is	 only	 possible	with	 the	 input	 from	 actual	 HF	experts,	who	are	capable	of	applying	their	knowledge	to	accident	 investigation.	In	order	 to	provide	valid	recommendations	on	 the	content	of	 that	 training	and	suggest	 skills	 and	 attributes	 that	 such	 an	HF	 specialist	 should	 possess,	 further	investigation	is	necessary.	All	the	different	training	topics	and	expert’s	attributes	mentioned	 during	 the	 interviews,	 were	 gathered	 between	 the	 whole	 set	 of	interviews	 and	 will	 be	 validated	 through	 the	 use	 of	 a	 questionnaire.	 This	questionnaire	was	sent	to	the	same	sample	of	specialists,	and	is	presented	in	the	following	chapter,	Chapter	VII.		 	
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Chapter	VII	–	Human	factors	experts	consensus	
	
VII-	1	Introduction	
	Before	 drawing	 conclusions	 on	 the	 use	 of	 TNA	 in	 this	 research	 project	 it	 was	necessary	 to	 validate	 and	 further	 investigate	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews,	which	were	 undertaken	with	 human	 factors	 experts,	 as	presented	in	Chapter	VI.	To	this	end,	the	chapter	presents	the	findings	from	an	online	questionnaire	survey,	which	was	sent	to	the	human	factors	investigators	interviewed	in	the	previous	part	of	the	research.	Consequently,	it	represents	the	second	and	final	phase	of	the	triangulation	process	detailed	in	section	VI-	2.		The	purpose	of	the	survey	was	to	obtain	greater	detail	 into	the	type	of	training	and	content	that	accident	investigators	and	managers	should	receive.		Moreover,	 considering	 previous	 findings	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 the	involvement	 of	 a	 human	 factors	 specialist	 during	 an	 investigation,	 the	questionnaire	 also	 approached	 the	 skills	 and	 attributes	 that	 such	 an	 expert	should	 possess.	 Thus,	 together	 with	 Chapter	 VI,	 the	 chapter	 fulfils	 the	 fourth	research	objective.	The	 following	 section,	 section	VII-	 2,	 covers	 the	 questions	 asked	 in	 this	 online	survey	 and	 section	 VII-	 3	 presents	 the	 findings.	 Finally,	 a	 discussion	 and	conclusions	will	be	detailed	in	the	final	section.		
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VII-	2	Method	for	conducting	the	survey		In	order	to	remain	consistent	with	the	principle	of	triangulation,	the	survey	was	aimed	 at	 the	17	 interviewees	who	 took	part	 in	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews	(see	previous	 chapter).	One	 interviewee,	whose	 semi-structured	 interview	was	not	 analysed	 due	 to	 the	 poor	 sound	 recording,	 was	 not	 sent	 an	 invitation	 to	complete	the	questionnaire.		The	 survey	 took	 the	 shape	 of	 an	 online	 questionnaire,	 since	 it	 presents	 the	advantages	of	being	a	 straightforward	and	simple	approach	 to	 studying	beliefs	(Robson,	2002).	This	approach	also	had	a	number	of	practical	benefits.	Namely,	that	 the	majority	of	 the	participants	were	based	 in	Australia	and	 it	would	have	been	impractical	to	have	spoken	to	them	all	again	face-to-face.	This	also	allowed	the	 respondents	 to	 complete	 the	 questionnaire	 in	 their	 own	 time.	 Besides,	considering	 that	 the	number	of	 topics	 to	be	approached	was	only	small,	 a	 self-completion	questionnaire	was	preferred	over	a	further	round	of	interviews.			The	 building	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 was	 inspired	 from	 the	 process	 of	 a	 Delphi	study.	 The	 purpose	 of	 such	 a	 study	 is	 to	 reach	 a	 consensus	 between	 subject	matter	 experts.	 (Hasson	 et	 al,	 2000;	 Keeney	 et	 al,	 2001;	 Okoli	 and	 Pawlowski,	2004;	Hsu	and	Sandford,	2007).	The	process	involves	several	 iterative	 ‘rounds’,	the	 first	 of	which	 involves	 sending	 an	 open-ended	questionnaire.	 The	 answers	from	all	the	participants	are	then	gathered,	analysed	and	converted	into	a	well-structured	questionnaire.	The	participants	are	asked	to	review	each	response,	by	filling	 the	 second	 questionnaire.	 The	 next	 rounds	 are	 built	 upon	 the	 answers	
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from	 the	 previous	 round.	 The	 ultimate	 goal	 is	 to	 obtain	 an	 agreement,	 or	consensus,	between	the	experts,	on	what	is	being	researched.		As	with	the	first	questionnaire	in	this	thesis,	the	questionnaire	was	administered	using	 the	 Software	 ‘Qualtrics’,	 and	 SPSS	 was	 employed	 to	 analyse	 the	 survey	findings.	Invitations	were	also	sent	from	a	cranfield.ac.uk	email	address	limiting	the	 risk	of	 it	being	 taken	 for	 junk	mail.	As	a	pilot	 study,	 the	questionnaire	was	sent	to	three	investigators	who	have	strong	interest	 in	Human	Factors	in	order	to	 identify	any	 flaws	 in	question	wording,	 survey	 structure	and	check	whether	the	answers	were	going	to	be	relevant	to	the	research.	Following	several	minor	adjustments,	 the	 survey	was	 then	made	 live	 and	 the	 link	was	 accessible	 for	 a	total	of	six	weeks,	between	March	and	April	2016.		One	reminder	e-mail	was	sent	to	 respondents	 after	 the	 first	 two	 weeks	 to	 the	 participants	 who	 had	 yet	 to	complete	 the	 questionnaire.	 13	 completed	 questionnaires	 were	 received	 back	after	the	six-week	period.		
VII-	2-	1	Survey	structure		The	 first	 two	questions	of	 the	 survey	were:	 “What	type	of	accident	 investigator	
are	you?”	and	“What	mode	of	transportation	are	you	the	most	involved	in?”.	They	served	 as	 filter	 questions	 to	make	 sure	 the	 respondents	 were	 who	 they	 were	supposed	to	be	(providing	that	they	responded	truthfully)	(Oppenheim,	1992).		
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The	 remainder	 of	 the	 survey	 was	 split	 in	 three	 main	 sections,	 and	 mainly	featured	 closed-ended	 questions	 (following	 the	 Delphi	 process).	 In	 total,	 the	survey	 included	 26	 questions	 (see	 Appendix	 D).	 The	 choice	 of	 closed-ended	questions	 was	 used	 to	 increase	 the	 comparability	 between	 answers	 and	respondents	 and	 to	 make	 it	 easier	 to	 record	 and	 process	 the	 survey	 findings	(Bryman,	2012).			The	 first	 section	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 focused	 on	 ‘human	 factors	 awareness	
training’,	 that	 is	 to	 say	 the	 initial	 training	 received	 by	 investigators	 and/or	management,	making	them	aware	of	the	value	of	human	factors.	The	purpose	of	this	section	was	to	obtain	expert	opinions	on	the	training	that	investigators	and	managers	 should	 receive,	 in	 terms	of	 its	 length,	 format	 and	 content.	Questions	included,	 for	 example:	 ‘Ideally,	 how	 long	 do	 you	 think	 this	 awareness	 training	
should	 last?’	 and	 ‘To	 what	 extent	 do	 you	 agree	 or	 disagree	 that	 the	 following	
should	be	included	in	that	awareness	training?’	The	last	two	questions	of	the	first	section	were	“Do	accident	investigators	receive	HF	training	in	your	organisation?”	and	 “Do	 managers	 receive	 HF	 training	 in	 your	 organisation?”	 In	 each	 case,	respondents	 were	 then	 asked	 follow	 up	 questions	 relating	 to	 the	 value,	 or	expected	value,	of	this	training.			The	second	section	of	the	questionnaire	was	related	to	recurrent	HF	training	for	accident	 investigators	 and	managers,	 and	 sought	 to	 identify	 the	 ideal	 content,	frequency	and	format	of	human	factors	training	according	to	HF	experts	involved	in	investigations.	Example	questions	in	this	part	of	the	survey	included	‘What	do	
you	think	should	be	approached	during	this	refresher	training?’	and	‘How	often	do	
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you	 think	 the	 following	 persons	 should	 ideally	 undertake	 refresher/recurrent	
training?’.		Both	in	the	set	of	 interviews	mentioned	in	Chapter	I	and	the	one	of	Chapter	VI,	investigators	 mentioned	 resources	 (time	 and	 budget)	 as	 limitation	 to	 more	human	 factors	 training.	 Therefore,	 the	 following	 question	 was	 also	 included,	‘Considering	workload	and	budget,	how	often	do	you	 think	 the	 following	persons	
should	realistically	undertake	refresher/recurrent	training?’	The	purpose	of	these	two	questions	was	to	identify	whether	there	would	be	a	difference	between	what	the	HF	 experts	 thought	would	 be	 the	 ideal	 frequency	 of	 refresher	 training	 for	investigators	 and	 managers,	 and	 what	 is	 actually	 realistic	 considering	 the	context.	 An	 open-ended	 question	 concluded	 this	 section,	 ‘Please	 add	 any	
comments	regarding	HF	training	for	accident	investigators	and/or	managers	that	
you	believe	is	relevant’.			The	 third	and	 final	 section	of	 the	survey	was	 focused	on	 the	dedicated	experts	involved	 in	accident	 investigations.	As	highlighted	 in	Chapter	VI,	HF	specialists	who	 are	 involved	 in	 accident	 investigation	 need	 to	 have	 specific	 skills	 and	attributes	 in	 order	 to	 be	 a	 full	 member	 of	 the	 team	 and	 add	 value	 to	 an	investigation.	The	purpose	of	this	final	part	of	the	questionnaire	was	therefore	to	explore	 these	 challenges	 in	 greater	 depth.	 Questions	 in	 this	 section	 included	those	 asking	 whether	 having	 an	 academic	 background	 was	 important	 for	 HF	specialist	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 investigation,	with	 a	 follow	 up	 question	 asking	 for	justification	for	their	response.	Respondents	were	also	asked	if	it	was	important	to	 have	 knowledge	 of	 the	 mode	 of	 transportation	 under	 investigation.	
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Respondents	were	then	asked	their	opinions	regarding	the	best	way	to	gain	this	knowledge.		A	 key	 question	 in	 this	 section	 asked	 respondents	 to	 list	 the	 importance	 of	different	 skills	 and	 attributes	 to	 human	 factors	 investigators.	 Examples	 of	attributes	 listed	were	 ‘Leadership’,	 ‘Assertiveness’	 and	 ‘Analytical’.	 To	 conclude,	respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 list	 any	 additional	 skills	 or	 attributes	 that	 they	thought	were	important	but	had	not	been	included.				
VII-	2-	2	Respondents		A	 total	 of	 13	 questionnaires	 were	 completed	 and	 collected.	 	 This	 represented	nearly	three	quarters	(72%)	of	the	sample	of	human	factors	experts	involved	in	air	accident	 investigation	who	were	 interviewed	as	part	of	 the	study	presented	previously.	 All	 13	 of	 the	 respondents	 were	 HF	 investigators	 or	 HF	 specialists	involved	 in	 accident	 investigation.	 In	 terms	 of	 their	 area	 of	 specialisation,	 12	respondents	 stated	 that	 they	 were	 mainly	 involved	 in	 aviation,	 while	 one	respondent	 was	 involved	 predominantly	 in	 rail	 investigations.	 	 However,	 this	respondent	 noted	 that	 they	 still	 had	 a	 strong	 aviation	 background	 and	 were	regularly	 involved	 in	 air	 accident	 investigations.	 While	 some	 respondents	inevitably	 originated	 from	 the	 same	 organisation,	 it	 was	 still	 considered	important	to	examine	whether	investigators	and	managers	received	HF	training	within	 these	 organisations.	 Findings	 from	 the	 surveys	 are	 presented	 in	 the	following	section.		
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VII-	3	Findings		As	 discussed	 previously,	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 establish	 initially	 the	 extent	 to	which	 non-HF	 investigators	 and	 managers	 receive	 human	 factors	 training	 in	their	organisation.		As	shown	in	figure	29,	for	the	vast	majority	of	respondents	(respectively	12	and	10	 out	 of	 13),	 non-HF	 investigators	 and	 managers	 receive	 some	 form	 of	 HF	training	 in	 their	 organisation.	 The	 findings	will	 be	 presented	 in	 three	 sections	relating	to	the	respective	section	in	the	questionnaire;	awareness	of	HF	training,	refresher/recurrent	 training	 and	 human	 factors	 experts	 in	 accident	investigation.			
	 	
Figure	29:	Number	of	respondents	whom	organisations	require	non-HF	investigators	and	managers	
to	receive	HF	training	
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VII-	3-	1	Awareness	HF	training		The	first	part	of	the	questionnaire	focused	on	‘awareness	HF	training’.	The	first	questions	 was:	 “How	 important	 do	 you	 think	 it	 is	 for	 the	 following	 persons	 to	
receive	 initial	 awareness	human	 factors	 training?”	 (very	 important	 to	 not	 at	 all	important).	 The	 sample	 all	 agreed	 that	 such	 training	 was	 ‘very	 important’	 or	‘moderately	 important’	 for	 both	 categories	 of	 persons,	 i.e.	 the	 non-HF	investigators	and	the	managers.	The	majority	of	the	sample	(9	out	of	13)	also	felt	that	training	should	be	both	general	to	all	investigators	and	specific	to	their	role	(see	figure	30).	No	members	of	the	sample	felt	that	this	training	should	only	be	specific	 to	 the	 investigators’	 role.	This	means	 that	 for	 the	HF	experts,	 the	 ideal	awareness	 training	would	need	to	have	a	part	 that	should	be	general	 to	all	 the	investigators	 and	 a	 part	 that	 should	 be	 more	 specific	 to	 the	 investigators	 or	manager’s	role.		 	
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Figure	30:	Preferred	type	of	awareness	training	content	
	The	 following	 questions	 asked	 respondents	 to	 provide	more	 specific	 opinions	regarding	 their	preferred	design	of	 the	awareness	 training	 in	 terms	of	 its	 ideal	format,	length	and	content.		The	 latter	 characteristic	was	approached	 in	 the	 form	of	a	 likert	question,	 as	 to	whether	 or	 not	 the	 topics	 listed	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 awareness	 training.	The	 results	 show	 the	 majority	 of	 respondents	 ‘strongly	 agreed’	 or	 ‘somewhat	agreed’	 that	 each	 topic	 listed	 in	 the	 questionnaire	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	awareness	 training	 (see	 figure	 31).	While	 it	was	 expected	 to	 some	 extent	 that	respondents	would	 favour	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	majority	 of	 these	 topics,	 it	was	necessary	 to	 identify	which	 topics	were	 considered	 to	 be	 the	most	 important.		For	example,	 all	 respondents	 ‘strongly	agreed’	 that	 the	 topic	 ‘Importance	of	HF	
investigation’	 should	 be	 in	 the	 awareness	 training.	 The	 topics	 ‘sources	 of	
evidence’,	 ‘value	 of	 HF	 investigation’,	 ‘importance	 of	 HF	 expertise	 involvement’,	‘errors/error	mechanism’,	 ‘decision	making’	 and	 ‘situation	awareness’	 were	 also	
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‘strongly	 agreed’	or	 ‘somewhat	 agreed’	by	all	 of	 the	 respondents.	 ‘Methods	and	
tools	available’,	‘attention’,	‘workload’,	‘stress’	and	‘biases’	were	HF	topics	that	12	out	 of	 13	 respondents	 ‘strongly	 agreed’	 or	 ‘somewhat	 agreed’	 they	 should	 be	taught	during	the	awareness	course.	Only	1	participant	ticked	‘Neutral’	for	these	categories.	 Similarly,	 ‘interview	 techniques’	 received	 12	 ‘strongly	 agree’	 or	‘somewhat	agree’	and	1	‘neutral’.				The	 topic	 ‘Cue	 recognition’	 received	 more	 ‘neutral’	 responses	 than	 the	 other	topics	(2),	although	the	vast	majority	of	respondents	(11)	still	 ‘strongly	agreed’	or	‘somewhat	agreed’	with	the	inclusion	of	the	aspect.	The	only	training	area	that	received	 ‘somewhat	 disagree’	 responses	 (2)	 and	 a	 split	 opinion	 between	‘strongly	 agree’	 or	 ‘somewhat	 agree’	 and	 neutral,	 with	 7	 and	 4	 out	 of	 13	respectively	was	 ‘How	to	use/apply	those	methods’.	Both	 ‘Methods	and	tools’	and	‘How	to	use	these	methods’	were	the	topics	that	received	the	less	‘strongly	agree’	(only	3).	
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Figure	31:	Agreement	on	different	topics	to	be	covered	during	awareness	training	
Overall,	findings	from	the	survey	indicated	a	strong	level	of	agreement	amongst	respondents	 that	 each	 of	 the	 topics	 listed	 should	 be	 included	 as	 part	 of	 the	awareness	 of	 the	 training	 process.	 While	 the	 strength	 of	 preference	 for	 the	inclusion	 of	 two	 topics	 appeared	 marginally	 less	 strong,	 namely	 the	‘Methods/Tools	 available’	 and	 ‘How	 to	 use/apply	 those	methods’	 topics,	 in	 both	cases	 the	 ‘strongly	 agree’	 or	 ‘somewhat	 agree’	 responses	 still	 collectively	accounted	for	over	half	of	the	respondents	surveyed.		
	Eight	 participants	 also	 listed	 additional	 topics	 that	 they	 thought	 should	 be	covered	 during	 the	 initial	 awareness	 HF	 training.	 These	 additional	 areas	included	 ‘communication’,	 which	 includes	 team	 resource	 management,	 and	‘culture’,	including	safety	culture	and	just	culture.	Three	investigators	added	this	particular	 topic	 area.	 Two	 respondents	 mentioned	 ‘organisational	 influences’,	
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‘non-compliance	 /	 violation’	 and	 ‘investigating	 SMS’.	 The	 latter	 could	 be	associated	 with	 investigating	 safety	 culture,	 as	 mentioned	 previously.	 Other	suggested	topic	areas	also	included	‘Physiology,	e.g.	somatogravic	illusion’,	‘Team	
resource	 management’,	 which	 could	 be	 related	 to	 SMS,	 ‘ergonomics	 /	
anthropometrics	 /	 design’,	 ‘information	 processing’,	 ‘performance	 in	 abnormal	
situation’	and	finally	‘medical	/	pathology’.		Regarding	 the	 length	 and	 the	 most	 appropriate	 form	 of	 teaching	 for	 this	awareness	training,	participants	predominantly	(7	of	them)	believed	that	5	days	(equivalent	to	a	working	week)	would	be	the	ideal	length	for	such	a	course	(see	figure	32).	3	participants	thought	that	the	course	should	be	longer	than	5	days.		
	
Figure	32:	Ideal	length	of	the	awareness	training	
Regarding	 the	 way	 the	 awareness	 course	 should	 be	 delivered	 (see	 figure	 33),	opinions	also	appeared	to	be	divided.	However,	most	HF	specialists	(8	out	of	13)	believed	 that	 a	 mix	 of	 the	 methods	 listed	 (lecture	 room,	 online	 courses	 and	workshop)	would	be	the	best	way	to	teach	the	course.	The	next	preference	goes	to	the	more	traditional	 ‘lecture	room’,	with	3	of	them	preferring	this	method	to	the	other	ones.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	note	here	 that	 the	 respondents	 thought	 that	
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solely	online	courses	were	not	appropriate,	with	no	respondents	selecting	this	as	their	preferred	option.		
	 	
Figure	33:	Preferred	teaching	methods	for	the	awareness	course	
	As	 shown	 in	 figure	 29,	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 respondents,	 non-HF	investigators	 and	managers	 received	HF	 training	 in	 their	 organisation.	 The	HF	specialists	whose	organisation	trained	investigators	in	HF	described	the	impact	of	 such	 training	 as	mainly	 positive,	 enabling	 the	 investigators	 to	 acknowledge	and	 identify	 HF	 issues,	 and	 communicate	 better	 with	 added	 expertise.	 For	example,	 one	 respondent	 noted	 that	 the	 training	 “supplies	 an	 understanding	
amongst	non-HF	investigators	that	there	is	more	to	accidents	than	purely	technical	
explanations”.	 Another	 respondent	 made	 particular	 reference	 to	 how	 it	 helps	improve	 communication,	 noting	 that	 the	 training	 made	 for	 “easier	
communication	with	other	HF	investigators”	and	that	there	was	“more	awareness	
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		An	 interesting	counter	argument	 to	 this	was	put	 forward	by	 two	respondents,	who	cautioned	that	increased	training	could	have	negative	effects	in	that	it	may	cause	investigators	to	feel	that	they	can	investigate	HF	on	their	own	without	the	need	 to	call	on	HF	specialists.	The	answers,	 “Good	awareness	but	can	lead	some	
investigators	 to	 think	 they	 can	 do	 complex	 HF	 analysis	 without	 the	 help	 of	 HF	
specialists”	and	“The	positive	is	that	they	understand	there	can	be	more	to	it	than	a	
broken	component	and	realise	that	humans	and	organisational	factors	can	play	a	
part	in	the	accident	sequence.	Negatives	can	be	they	think	they	can	do	HF	on	their	
own	without	specialist	HF	 input.	That's	never	ended	well”	 illustrate	 this	 point	 of	view	well.	Where	the	latter	comment	perhaps	also	exposes	a	misconception	that	engineering	investigators	don’t	know	how	to	do	systemic	investigations,	this	was	not	the	overall	opinion	of	the	panel	of	experts.			Figure	 29	 also	 showed	 that	 for	 10	 of	 the	 participants,	 the	 managers	 in	 their	organisation	were	 receiving	 HF	 training.	 For	 these	 respondents,	 the	 impact	 of	human	factors	training	was	universally	seen	as	being	beneficial	and	“imperative”	to	 the	organisation	and	 to	 the	 investigations	 it	 conducted.	Various	examples	of	benefits	were	given,	 including	 “understanding	short	falls	of	investigation	reports	
during	 review”,	 and	 “It	 [the	 training]	 is	 crucial	 for	 them	 [the	 managers]	 to	
understand	the	principles	of	our	investigation	work	[i.e.	 an	HF	approach]	so	that	
they	can	ensure	those	principles	apply	to	everything	we	do”.	Specific	reference	was	also	 made	 to	 the	 way	 training	 can	 help	 improve	 the	 safety	 culture	 of	 the	organisation;	 “Managers	with	human	factors	training	are	more	likely	to	embrace	
just	 culture	 principles	when	 understanding	 behaviours	 and	managing	 employees	
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post	 event.	 They	are	also	 better	 able	 to	 identify	when	an	HF	 specialist	 should	be	
involved	and	are	less	likely	to	accept	an	investigation	that	has	not	had	sufficient	HF	
consideration	or	 specialist	 involvement.”	 Of	 the	 remaining	 respondents,	 they	 all	felt	that	the	impact	of	training	managers	would	be	positive,	and	would	encourage	managers	to	actually	question	HF	and	push	the	 investigators	to	acknowledge	 it	and	integrate	it	within	their	investigations.		
VII-	3-	2	Refresher/recurrent	training		Regarding	 refresher/recurrent	 training,	 the	majority	of	 respondents	 (11	out	of	13)	 believed	 that	 it	 should	 be	 undertaken	 (see	 figure	 34)	 by	 both	 non-HF	investigators	and	managers.	Although	it	is	still	a	vast	majority	it	is	less	than	for	the	 awareness	 course	 (for	 which	 all	 the	 participants	 thought	 non-HF	investigators	 and	managers	 should	undertake	 it)	Regarding	 the	 design	 of	 such	training,	 the	 participants	 who	 believed	 that	 they	 should	 undertake	 it,	 the	majority	felt	that	it	should	contain	both	general	 information	and	more	targeted	content	depending	on	the	investigators’	role	(see	figure	35).	The	same	was	found	for	the	awareness	training.	
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Figure	34:	People	who	should	receive	HF	refresher	training,	according	to	the	participants	
	
Figure	35:	Preferred	training	content	for	the	refresher/recurrent	training	
	In	terms	of	the	specific	content	of	the	training	(see	figure	36),	7	(out	of	11)	of	the	same	respondents	believed	that	that	“value	of	previous	HF	investigations”	should	be	 taught,	6	of	 them	 for	 “Trends	highlighted”,	9	 for	 “New	issues	published	in	the	
literature”	and	only	4	thought	that	both	“the	same	issues	as	the	ones	approached	
in	initial	training”	and	 “use	of	analysis	methodology”	 should	be	approached.	For	
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the	2	who	ticked	“Other”,	one	respondent	specified	that	such	training	should	be	focused	on	 the	application	of	knowledge	 rather	 than	be	 limited	 to	 theory.	This	shows	that	predominantly,	the	refresher	training	should	focus	on	actual	trends,	the	 value	 of	 previous	 HF	 investigation	 within	 the	 organisation	 and	 the	 new	issues	published	in	the	literature.	In	other	words,	it	should	enable	the	managers	and	non-HF	investigators	to	stay	up-to-date	with	the	current	issues	and	not	just	re-learn	what	they	were	already	taught.	
	
	
Figure	36:	Content	of	refresher/recurrent	training	according	to	the	participants	
	With	regards	to	the	frequency	with	which	such	training	should	be	conducted,	the	respondents	 had	 different	 opinions	 (see	 figure	 37).	 Amongst	 those	 who	 think	investigators	 should	 receive	 refresher	 training,	 the	 ideal	 frequency	 of	 such	training	was	considered	 to	be	 ‘every	2	years’	 for	 the	majority	of	 them	(8	out	of	11).	However,	considering	workload	and	budget,	a	more	realistic	frequency	was	
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thought	 to	 be	 ‘every	 2	 years’	 for	 4	 of	 them	 and	 ‘every	 3	 years’	 for	 the	 same	number	of	participants.		Amongst	 the	 investigators	 who	 thought	 managers	 should	 receive	 recurrent	training,	 opinion	 also	 appeared	 to	 be	 split.	 While	 5	 of	 them	 thought	 training	should	occur	‘every	2	years’,	4	people	thought	that	this	should	be	‘every	3	years’.	When	considering	workload	and	budget,	4	 respondents	 thought	 that	managers	should	receive	recurrent	training	‘every	4	years’,	3	believed	it	should	occur	‘every	
2	years’,	and	3	of	them	replied	‘every	3	years’.		Findings	indicate	that,	according	to	the	participants,	workload	and	budget	would	have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	 refresher	 training.	 This	 confirms	 the	findings	from	the	preliminary	study	presented	in	chapter	I,	showing	that	where	regular	refresher	training	may	contribute	to	better	HF	integration,	it	would	have	to	be	realistic	in	terms	of	its	frequency	considering	their	availability	constraints.	.		
	
	
Figure	37:	Preferred	frequency	of	refresher/recurrent	training	
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	When	 asked	 to	 comment	 generally	 about	 HF	 training,	 both	 for	 awareness	training	and	recurrent	training,	a	number	of	participants	expressed	very	strong	convictions	on	the	fact	that	it	should	be	mandatory	and	maintained	regularly,	for	the	benefits	of	the	organisation	and	the	quality	of	the	investigations.	For	example	one	 respondent	 commented,	 “It	 should	 be	 non-negotiable.	 It's	 astounding	 that	
people	 believe	 it's	 not	 necessary”.	 Another	 respondent	 commented	 that	 HF	training	was	“absolutely	fundamental	to	the	work	of	investigators	and	managers”	and	one	participant	added	“Ideally	the	organisation	would	have	a	general	level	of	
training	 for	 all	 and	 deeper	 expertise	within	 organisation	 plus	 external	 support”.	Finally,	 one	 participant	 commented	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 refreshing	 the	knowledge,	“This	is	a	perishable	skill	and	I	think	it	is	important	not	to	have	a	long	
interval	between	refresher	training	so	that	the	skills	stay	sharp.”		This	 section	 highlighted	 the	 need	 for	 managers	 and	 non-HF	 investigators	 to	remain	up	to	date	in	HF	and	therefore	regularly	undertake	HF	refresher	training.	And	 although	 workload	 and	 financial	 resources	 might	 come	 as	 a	 limitation,	 a	frequency	of	every	2	or	3	years	for	non-HF	investigators	and	every	3-4	years	for	the	managers	would	seem	realistic.			
VII-	3-	3	Human	Factors	experts	in	accident	investigation		The	 final	 part	 of	 the	 questionnaire	was	 focused	 on	 the	 dedicated	HF	 expertise	involved	 in	 investigation.	 As	 expected,	 all	 the	 respondents	 believed	 that	 it	 is	either	‘extremely	important’	or	‘important’	for	those	experts	to	have	an	academic	
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background	 (MSc,	 PhD).	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 here	 that	 all	 the	 specialists	interviewed	 in	 Chapter	 VI	 (and	 therefore	 also	 those	 who	 undertook	 this	questionnaire)	were	awarded	such	degree	in	their	career.	The	reasons	that	were	given	 for	 this	 included	 the	depth	of	 knowledge	 such	degrees	bring	 in	 terms	of	methods,	 literature	and	research	skills,	as	well	as	broader	skills	 like	 the	 logical	mind	it	builds	through	the	application	of	methods	to	analyse	data.		Regarding	 knowledge/context	 knowledge,	 such	 as	 having	 a	 good	 aviation	operations	understanding,	11	of	them	thought	that	is	it	‘extremely	important’	or	‘important’	 to	 develop	 such	 knowledge.	 The	 2	 remaining	 participants	 stayed	‘neutral’	on	the	matter	(see	figure	38).		
	
	
Figure	38:	Importance	of	having	context/background	knowledge	
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Figure	39:	Ways	of	gaining	that	context/background	knowledge	for	HF	investigators	
	The	 respondents’	 opinions	 on	 the	 way	 such	 knowledge	 should	 be	 acquired	 is	illustrated	 on	 figure	 39.	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 ‘industry	 experience’	 is	 the	 way	preferred	 by	 a	majority	 of	 participants	 (5	 out	 of	 13).	 The	 category	 ‘other’	was	selected	by	5	respondents	whereas	 ‘on-the-job’	knowledge	acquisition	was	only	preferred	 by	 around	 a	 quarter	 of	 participants.	 The	 specialists	 who	 selected	‘other’	specified	that	the	best	way	to	achieve	this	was	through	a	mix	of	methods,	i.e.	 some	 industrial	 experience	 or	 applied	 research,	 associated	with	 on-the-job	experience.		Based	on	the	information	collected	in	the	interview	transcripts	the	next	question	asked	how	important	it	was	for	human	factors	investigators	to	have	certain	skills	and	 attributes.	 These	 attributes	 were	 writing	 communication,	 oral	communication,	analytical	skills,	being	logical,	leadership,	assertiveness,	being	a	team	 player,	 having	 a	 network	 of	 other	 experts	 and	 good	 interviewing	 skills.	
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Most	 of	 sample	 of	 specialists	 who	 took	 the	 questionnaire	 agreed	 that	 all	 the	qualities	listed	were	‘very	important’,	or	‘important’	for	an	HF	expert	involved	in	accident	investigations	(see	figure	40).		
	
Figure	40:	Skills	and	attributes	that	are	very	important	and	important	for	HF	investigators	
	Of	 all	 these	 topics,	 ‘oral	 communication’,	 ‘analytical	 skills’,	 ‘team	 player’	 and	‘interview	 skills’	 were	 all	 judged	 very	 important	 or	 important	 by	 all	 the	respondents.	 12	 of	 them	 ticked	 very	 important	 or	 important	 for	 ‘writing	
communication’	and	‘logical	mind’.			
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Of	all	the	attributes,	only	‘Leadership’	was	considered	to	be	‘not	really	important’,	and	 this	was	 only	 the	 case	 for	 one	 respondent.	 It	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 view	shared	 by	 other	 respondents	 in	 the	 survey,	 as	 10	 of	 them	 believed	 that	leadership	was	‘important’	or	‘very	important’.	As	well	as	for	‘assertiveness’	and	‘network	of	other	experts’,	2	stayed	‘neutral’.	1	participant	also	remained	neutral	on	the	importance	of	‘writing	communication’	and	being	‘logical’.		Respondents	 were	 also	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 provide	 additional	 skills	 and	attributes	 that	 they	 believed	were	 necessary	 for	HF	 investigators.	 Examples	 of	these	 included	 both	 technical	 skills,	 such	 as	 	 ‘research	skills’	 and	 ‘being	able	 to	
apply	 investigation	 methodologies’,	 as	 well	 personal	 qualities	 such	 as	 ‘passion	
about	HF’,	‘attention	to	details’,	and	‘resilience’.			The	next	section	will	discuss	the	findings	from	the	survey	while	also	taking	into	account		the	previous	findings	from	the	interviews	in	Chapter	VI	
	
VII-	5	Discussion		While	 acknowledging	 that	 the	 findings	 were	 drawn	 from	 a	 relatively	 small	sample,	the	questionnaire	provided	a	valuable	opportunity	to	further	investigate	HF	training	for	non-HF	investigators	and	managers	and	the	skills	and	attributes	of	HF	 specialists	 involved	 in	 air	 accident	 investigations.	Moreover,	 considering	that	this	questionnaire	was	designed	as	the	second	and	final	part	of	a	validation	
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triangulation,	 the	 size	 of	 the	 sample	 is	 satisfactory	 (13	 out	 of	 18	 interviewees	undertook	the	survey).		As	 suggested	 in	 the	 interviews	 and	 illustrated	 in	 this	 questionnaire,	 it	 would	seem	 extremely	 beneficial	 (if	 not	 essential)	 that	 both	 managers	 and	 non-HF	investigators	 receive	HF	 training,	 as	well	 as	 refresher	 training.	 It	 is	 likely	 that	this	 would	 benefit	 both	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	 the	 whole	organisation,	 as	 well	 as	 having	 indirect	 benefits	 to	 the	 safety	 of	 aviation	operations.	 As	 HF	 is	 investigated	 in	 greater	 depth	 over	 time,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	continual	 improvements	will	 be	made	 to	 practice,	 theory	 and	 application,	 and	ultimately	aviation	will	become	safer	as	a	result.			Providing	 non-HF	 investigators	with	 a	 robust	 awareness	 of	 HF	 training	would	likely	 enable	 them	 to	 identify	 HF	 issues	 as	 well	 as	 know	 when	 they	 should	contact	 an	 expert.	 It	 would	 also	 enable	 them	 to	 discuss	 HF	 issues	 with	 the	specialists	 in	order	 to	 integrate	 it	within	 the	report,	 thus	 increasing	 teamwork.	This	would	 seem	 to	 be	 qualities	 that	 lead	 to	 improved	 accident	 investigations.	Team	work	being	such	an	important	factor	in	an	investigation,	as	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter.		The	 questionnaire	 also	 confirmed	 how	 important	 it	 is	 HF	 training	 at	 a	management	 level.	 For	 non-independent	 organisations,	 for	 example	 airlines	 or	manufacturers,	 having	 HF-trained	 managers	 may	 result	 in	 a	 wide	 range	 of	benefits,	including	the	increased	likelihood	of	operating	a	just	culture.	Managers	who	 acknowledge	 HF	 and	 understand	 its	 value	 should	 in	 turn	 also	 be	 more	
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receptive	to	 its	wider	 integration	in	the	investigation	process	at	all	 levels,	 from	the	operator	level	to	the	organisational	levels.			The	awareness	and	refresher	training	should	contain	both	a	general	element	for	all	 participants	 and	 a	 more	 specific	 element	 tailored	 to	 the	 role	 of	 the	investigators	 or	 managers	 in	 question.	 For	 example,	 it	 might	 be	 more	appropriate	 to	 give	 investigators	 focus	 on	 operational	 issues	 to	 increase	 their	knowledge	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 pilot	 behaviour,	 pilot	 fatigue	 or	 non-compliance.	Alternatively,	 engineers	 may	 focus	 on	 improving	 maintenance-related	 human	factors	 issues,	 whereas	 managers	 training	 could	 emphasise	 the	 value	 of	investigating	 organisational	 issues	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 humans	 error	 is	 often	 the	symptom	of	a	system,	as	identified	in	the	literature	(Chapter	II).		The	 ideal	 length	 for	 the	 initial	awareness	 training	was	believed	 to	be	around	a	working	week	(5	days),	with	refresher	training	to	happen	every	2	to	3	years	for	the	investigators	and	every	3	to	4	years	for	managers.	Regarding	the	content	of	the	training,	there	was	broad	agreement	that	the	topics	listed	 should	 be	 taught	 on	 the	 proposed	 training	 courses,	 as	 well	 as	 other	relevant	HF	areas	such	as	communication	and	SMS.	However,	topics	around	HF	methods	received	a	 less	strong	response	than	others.	 Indeed,	 this	was	the	only	topic	to	receive	any		‘somewhat	disagree’	responses	in	relation	to	its	inclusion	in	the	training	programme.			Interestingly,	while	one	might	expect	 that	 the	 inclusion	of	a	greater	number	of	topic	 areas	 would	 continually	 benefit	 investigations,	 a	 small	 number	 of	
	 191	
investigators	cautioned	that	this	might	actually	have	a	negative	effect.	 	Namely,	that	the	increased	training	in	HF	may	cause	investigators	to	feel	that	they	could	‘do	it	alone’,	and	that	they	no	longer	needed	to	ever	engage	with	human	factors	experts	in	the	future.	While	it	is	impossible	to	predict	whether	this	would	in	fact	be	the	case	or	not,	it	highlights	the	importance	of		trying	to	anticipate	unintended	negative	consequences	from	any	changes	that	are	made.	As	a	minimum,	it	would	seem	 important	 to	 emphasise	 during	 any	 course	 the	 fact	 that	 undertaking	 HF	and	refresher	training	will	not	alone	make	them	experts	in	this	area.			Moreover,	according	to	the	sample,	it	is	important	to	adapt	the	refresher	training	so	 it	 remains	up	 to	date	with	current	best	practices	as	opposed	 to	 just	being	a	reminder	 of	what	 has	 already	 been	 taught	 in	 previous	 years.	 New	 discoveries	from	the	literature,	current	trends	in	the	industry,	avoiding	common	pitfalls,	and	the	proven	value	of	HF	to	the	organisation	are	all	 topics	that	refresher	training	could	 approach	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 fresh	 and	 relevant.	 By	 its	 very	 nature,	 it	 is	important	that	refresher	training	occurs	at	relatively	frequent	intervals	and	that	the	 content	 of	 these	 sessions	 evolves	 in	 response	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 the	investigators	and	the	industry	as	whole.			There	 were	 also	 mixed	 views	 in	 the	 sample	 about	 how	 best	 to	 deliver	 HF	courses.	Although	more	than	half	of	respondents	thought	a	mix	of	methods	was	the	most	appropriate,	a	significant	minority	still	claimed	that	they	would	prefer	the	 classic	 ‘lecture’	 method.	 Lecture	 rooms	 do	 enable	 discussion	 and	 debate,	questions	 as	 well	 as	 the	 application	 of	 knowledge	 through	 exercises	 or	workshops.	 However,	 as	 highlighted	 previously,	 team	 work	 is	 essential	 to	
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accident	investigation	therefore	HF	courses	in	lecture	room	or	workshop	would	facilitate	this	sort	of	interaction.			While	there	were	no	participants	who	favoured	a	purely	online	format	for	their	training,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 online	 elements	 could	 still	 be	 used	 successfully	 to	complement	 other	 approaches	 (for	 example,	 as	 part	 of	 a	 mixed	 methods	approach	also	involving	a	mix	of	lectures	and	workshops).	This	could	provide	the	possibility	 of	 refreshing	 and	 updating	 theoretical	 knowledge	 online	 and	 then	applying	 it	 in	 face-to-face	 workshops.	 Online	 components	 may	 also	 be	 better	suited	 to	 certain	 topic	 areas	 than	 more	 traditional	 approaches.	 For	 example,	looking	at	the	current	issues	in	the	literature	might	be	better	suited	to	an	online	environment	 than	 a	 classroom.	 Ultimately,	 the	 choice	 of	 method	 should	 be	driven	by	the	needs	of	the	topic	area	and	that	of	the	audience.		The	second	key	point	emphasised	 in	chapter	VI	and	VII	 is	 the	necessity	 for	 the	organisation	 undertaking	 investigation	 to	 consider	 the	 use	 of	 an	HF	 specialist.	Whether	in-house	or	external,	such	an	expert	may	be	able	to	reduce	biases	that	former	pilots	or	engineers	might	have	regarding	the	behaviour	of	operators,	as	well	as	bringing	their	expertise	to	investigate	the	relevant	issues.			The	 negative	 reputation	 that	HF	 can	 sometimes	 have	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 evidence	based	 and	 ‘fuzzy’.	 A	 good	 expert	 should	 be	 able	 to	 prove	 otherwise,	 basing	statements	 and	analysis	on	 the	 literature	or	previous	 research	as	 identified	by	the	 content	 analysis	 of	 the	 reports	 in	 chapter	 IV	 and	 through	 the	 interviews.	According	to	respondents	in	the	sample,	these	experts	should	have	an	academic	
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background	for	the	logical	and	analytical	mind	it	develops.	Other	benefits	of	this	include	 a	 greater	 depth	 of	 knowledge,	 which	 would	 be	 harder	 to	 acquire	otherwise.			It	is	also	important	for	the	expert	involved	in	the	investigation	to	understand	the	context	he	or	she	is	investigating	(i.e.	in	this	case,	aviation).	For	example,	for	an	aviation	accident	the	HF	specialist	should	be	able	to	understand	the	task	of	flying	an	aircraft	and	how	the	aviation	industry	works	in	order	to	work	effectively	as	a	team	with	 the	other	 investigators.	This	 idea	was	 illustrated	by	 the	 response	of	one	of	the	questionnaire	participants	who	noted:			“I	think	it	is	equally	important	to	have	general	investigators	with	high	level	of	HF	
knowledge	and	specialists	with	an	academic	background	 in	particular	disciplines	
of	 HF.	 This	 is	 the	 ideal	 scenario	 in	my	 view,	 providing	 investigative	 context	 and	
flexible	specialism	tailored	to	the	needs	of	a	particular	investigation.”			Other	 key	 attributes	 for	 HF	 specialists	 involved	 in	 investigation	 were	 good	communication,	 being	 a	 team	 player,	 and	 having	 a	 good	 network	 of	 contacts.	This	 network	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 important	 when	 reaching	 the	 limits	 of	 one’s	knowledge.	As	mentioned	in	the	interviews,	an	expert	needs	to	know	the	limit	of	their	expertise	and	seek	advice	from	relevant	people	when	required.	A	good	HF	expert	knows	where	 to	 look	 for	 this,	whether	 it	 is	 in	 the	 literature	or	amongst	their	peers.		
	 194	
VII-	4	Conclusions		An	 online	 survey	 was	 designed	 as	 the	 second	 part	 of	 a	 triangulation	methodology.	The	first	part	of	this	was	the	semi-structured	interviews	presented	in	Chapter	VI.	The	 survey	presented	 in	 this	 chapter	was	 then	sent	 to	 the	 same	participants	 as	 the	 interviews,	 and	 was	 subsequently	 completed	 by	 13	respondents.		The	 results	 from	 the	questionnaire	 confirmed	 and	 validated	 the	 importance	 of	training	 managers	 and	 non-HF	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 better	 HF	investigation.	Thus,	together	with	chapter	VI,	it	fulfils	the	fourth	objective	of	this	thesis.	 It	 also	 confirmed	 the	 need	 to	 involve	 an	 expert	 when	 HF	 issues	 are	present	 in	an	 investigation,	which	according	to	the	 literature,	should	be	for	the	majority	 of	 the	 accidents	 or	 incidents.	 The	 questionnaire	 also	 investigated	 the	format	 and	 content	 of	 the	 training	 investigators	 should	 undertake,	 as	 well	 as	giving	 more	 specific	 information	 on	 what	 makes	 a	 ‘good’	 and	 reliable	 HF	investigator.	Consistently	with	the	findings	from	Chapter	VI,	teamwork	was	also	emphasised	as	being	a	key	factor	in	accident	investigation.			The	 findings	 from	 the	 triangulation	 process	 need	 to	 be	 added	 and	 discussed	together	 with	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 different	 studies	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis.	This	will	enable	the	researcher	to	draw	conclusions	on	the	process	of	TNA	and	provide	 recommendations	on	 the	 issues	 approached	 in	 this	 research.	The	next	chapter,	chapter	VIII,	will	develop	these	conclusions	and	recommendations	and	will	be	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis.	 	
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Chapter	VIII	–	Discussion	and	conclusion	
	
VIII-	1	Introduction		This	research	has	used	the	principle	of	TNA	to	examine	the	training	needs	for	air	accident	 investigators	 in	order	to	develop	more	thorough	integration	of	human	factors	 in	accident	 investigations	 to	help	 improve	safety.	This	process	 involved	gathering	data	from	a	variety	of	different	sources	to	help	establish	the	extent	to	which	the	current	state	of	HF	integration	in	accident	investigation	was	due	to	the	lack	of	training	or	the	influence	of	other	factors.		Analysis	was	conducted	 in	 four	 stages:	 a	 literature	 review,	analysis	of	 accident	reports,	 an	 online	 questionnaire	 of	 practitioners,	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	 HF	 specialists	 involved	 in	 investigation	 and	 triangulation	 questionnaire.	From	 this	 emerged	 a	 number	 of	 key	 points	 and	 important	 issues	 that	 require	further	 discussion.	 Based	 on	 this,	 a	 number	 of	 recommendations	 for	investigation	organisations	are	made.	These	are	covered	in	the	following	section.	Following	this,	the	key	findings	from	the	research	are	summarised,	followed	by	a	section	 highlighting	 the	 potential	 research	 limitations.	 The	 fourth	 and	 last	section	of	the	chapter	provides	guidance	on	possible	further	research	that	could	be	conducted	in	light	of	the	research.				
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VIII-	2	Discussion	and	recommendations	
	Through	 the	 process	 of	 conducting	 the	 research,	 a	 range	 of	 important	 issues	emerged.	In	some	cases	these	were	interrelated	and/or	complex	in	nature,	with	a	degree	of	specificity	to	certain	regions	or	 investigation	organisations.	However,	several	 key	 issues	 were	 also	 identified	 that	 were	 much	 broader	 in	 their	application,	both	in	terms	of	their	relevance	to	different	organisations	and	their	implications	for	policy	and	practice.	These	warrant	further	discussion	in	order	to	understand	their	possible	implications.			In	 the	 preliminary	 research,	 it	 was	 found	 that	 some	 investigators	 from	 the	organisation	in	question	felt	they	were	lacking	HF	training.	In	particular,	adapted	and	 practical	 training	 was	 identified	 as	 one	 area	 that	 could	 be	 improved.	 	 As	acknowledged	in	the	literature	(for	example	(Marinho	de	Bastos,	2004)),	training	is	a	vital	part	of	an	investigators’	career,	and	their	capacity	to	remain	up-to-date	with	current	best	practice	determines	not	only	their	own	individual	capabilities	as	an	investigator,	but	by	association	the	credibility	of	their	organisation.			It	was	therefore	surprising	that	the	training	for	accident	investigators,	 in	terms	of	human	 factors,	did	not	appear	 to	adequately	 reflect	 the	 importance	of	 these	issues.	 Indeed,	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 questionnaire	 highlighted	 the	 lack	 of	consistency	and	standardisation	in	terms	of	HF	training	amongst	the	investigator	community.	 While	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 aviation	 safety	 as	 a	 whole	 has	benefitted	 significantly	 from	 much	 greater	 degrees	 of	 standardisation	 and	consistency	in	terms	of	safety	standards	and	protocols	in	recent	times,	this	does	
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not	 appear	 to	 necessarily	 always	 be	 the	 case	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 training	provision	for	air	accident	investigators.			Perhaps	as	a	result	of	this,	there	also	did	not	appear	to	be	any	real	adapted	and	specific	training	on	offer	to	investigators.	A	general	lack	of	HF	refresher	training	was	also	emphasized.	This	situation	did	not	appear	to	be	the	result	of	a	 lack	of	recognition	or	motivation	on	the	part	of	the	investigators	since	the	vast	majority	of	 them	 acknowledged	 and	 valued	 the	 importance	 of	 HF	 training.	 Instead	 it	 is	likely	attributed	 to	other	 factors.	These	 factors,	as	suggested	by	 the	 findings	of	this	research,	appear	to	be	a	lack	of	accurate	and	detailed	guidance	on	the	matter	of	training	provision,	the	lack	of	specific	requirements	and	the	lack	of	accredited	training	 or	 official	 qualification	 processes.	 In	 this	 sense,	 findings	 from	 the	research	support	the	literature	review	(for	example,	see	Braithwaite,	2002).		While	recognising	that	there	is	considerable	diversity	existing	between	different	investigation	organisations	 in	 terms	of	 their	 structure,	 it	makes	 intuitive	 sense	that	 across	 member	 states	 they	 should	 adopt	 a	 more	 concerted,	 systematic	approach	to	enrolling	their	investigators	in	mandatory	HF	training	programs.	As	part	 of	 this,	 it	 is	 important,	 indeed	 vital,	 that	 these	 programs	 include	appropriately-timed	 refresher	 programs	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 investigators’	 skills	remain	 up-to-date.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 could	 also	 help	 develop	 greater	 levels	 of	consistency	 and	 standardisation	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 type/quantity	 of	 training	provided	 to	 investigators	 and	 as	 a	 result	 increase	 collaboration	 between	investigators	and	specialists	and	likely	improve	the	quality	of	the	reports.	
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Although	 it	will	most	 likely	remain	up	to	the	organisation	 in	question	as	 to	the	length	 and	 timing	 of	 such	 training,	 the	 opinion	 of	 HF	 investigators,	 perhaps	unsurprisingly,	lends	support	to	the	importance	of	HF.	Indeed,	when	asked	their	preference	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 desired	 length	 and	 duration	 of	 any	 possible	 future	training	 schemes,	 the	 majority	 of	 specialists	 favoured	 a	 five-day	 programme	refreshed	every	two	to	three	years.	Even	if	 the	realisation	of	such	a	program	is	not	 feasible	 in	 reality,	 it	 nonetheless	 demonstrates	 the	 importance	with	which	they	view	 the	provision	of	HF	 training	 for	accident	 investigators.	Furthermore,	the	 questionnaire	 sent	 to	 the	 large	 sample	 of	 investigators	 highlighted	 their	desire	to	receive	more	HF	training.		As	with	any	training,	it	is	important	that	the	content	is	targeted	and	relevant	to	those	undertaking	it.	This	would	certainly	appear	to	be	relevant	in	an	HF	context.	While	 it	 remains	 important	 that	 general	 ‘core’	 issues	 such	 as	 ‘importance	 and	value	 of	 HF	 investigation’,	 ‘importance	 of	 HF	 expertise’,	 ‘fatigue’,	 ‘stress’	 and	‘cognitive	 biases’	 (amongst	 others),	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 training	 of	 all	investigators,	findings	from	the	research	suggest	that	there	may	be	considerable	benefits	 from	 offering	 some	more	 specific	 topics	 depending	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	investigator.	 For	 example,	 ‘HF	 in	 aviation	maintenance’	 could	 be	 included	 as	 a	more	 targeted	 element	 for	 engineering	 investigators.	 Such	 an	 approach	would	hopefully	 mean	 that	 investigators	 would	 receive	 both	 general	 training	 on	 key	concepts,	but	also	more	targeted	training	relevant	for	their	particular	role.			In	 terms	 of	 the	 content	 of	 the	 refresher	 training	 perhaps	 a	 slightly	 different	approach	 could	 be	 adopted.	 Rather	 than	 simply	 covering	 key	 concepts	 (which	
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the	investigator	should	theoretically	have	already	covered),	its	focus	could	be	on	more	practical,	applied	aspects	of	HF,	as	well	as	any	key	trends	or	current	issues	that	may	be	relevant	for	their	role,	and	thus	would	aim	to	keep	them	up	to	date.	Furthermore,	 both	 initial	 training	 and	 recurrent	 training	 should	 approach	human	factors	issues	related	to	human	performance,	but	also	touch	topics	such	as	‘organisational	issues’	and	‘investigating	SMS’.		It	is	also	apparent	that	there	is	not	always	a	clear	overlap	between	the	academic	side	 of	 the	 discipline	 and	 the	 applied	 ‘day-to-day’	 nature	 of	 conducting	 an	accident	 investigation,	 particularly	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	 accident	 analysis	methodology.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 training	 received	 by	 investigators	 did	 not	always	reflect	current	understanding	or	best	practice	identified	in	the	academic	research.	Equally,	 it	would	appear	 likely	 that	 the	same	can	be	said	of	academic	research	 in	 that	 it	 does	 not	 always	 accurately	 reflect	 the	 realities	 of	 an	investigation.	While	 this	 is	not	a	problem	confined	solely	 to	human	factors	and	air	 accident	 investigation,	 it	 would	 seem	 likely	 that	 closer	 collaboration	 could	benefit	both	parties	in	the	longer	term.	The	regular	use	of	refresher	training,	for	example	 approaching	 new	 issues	 developed	 in	 the	 literature,	 would	 seem	 to	represent	a	valuable	opportunity	to	develop	this	collaboration.		In	 terms	 of	 the	 format	 of	 future	 HF	 training,	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	 a	mix	 of	methods	 could	 be	 implemented.	 While	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 quintessential	‘classroom’	 experience	 are	 not	 disputed,	 it	 can	 be	 resource	 intensive	 to	implement	and	not	always	best	suited	to	the	required	topics.	Therefore,	while	it	is	recommended	that	initial	awareness	training,	workshops	and	case	studies	be	
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conducted	 on	 a	 face-to-face	 basis	 wherever	 possible,	 for	 aspects	 such	 as	identifying	 new	 issues	 from	 the	 literature,	 the	 possibility	 of	 providing	 online	training	 components	 could	 be	 explored.	 Whether	 conducted	 face-to-face	 or	online,	it	would	be	essential	to	that	a	specialist	was	available	should	the	trainees	have	any	questions	or	raise	any	issues	for	discussion.			The	preliminary	research	and	interviews	also	suggested	that	newer	generations	of	 investigators	were	more	 open	 to	 greater	 integration	 of	 HF.	 This	 is	 perhaps	understandable	 given	 that	 HF	 is	 now	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 pilots	 and	 engineers	training,	 so	 new	 investigators	 are	 perhaps	 more	 likely	 to	 acknowledge	 and	embrace	HF	within	the	context	of	their	role.		Thus,	it	is	suggested	that	the	earlier	HF	is	implemented	in	the	investigators	training,	the	more	impact	it	will	have	on	the	individual	and	the	organisation	as	a	whole.	As	well	as	involving	investigators	in	 dedicated	 HF	 programs	 it	 is	 recommended	 that	 a	 stronger	 HF	 element	 is	included	in	the	initial	training	program	so	that	investigators	consider	it	as	a	core	element	 of	 an	 investigation.	 Additionally,	 future	 training	 should	 help	investigators	 in	 identifying	 different	 HF	 issues	 so	 that	 they	 can	 refer	 to	 other	specialists	when	necessary,	and	enable	them	to	integrate	the	specialist’s	findings	into	the	final	report.	It	should	also	be	emphasised	that	undertaking	the	training	should	 not	 encourage	 them	 to	 tackle	 an	HF	 element	 of	 an	 investigation	which	exceeds	their	level	of	skill.		Beyond	 the	 training	 needs	 of	 investigators,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 compelling	 case	 for	recommending	HF	training	for	managers	too.	Such	an	approach	would	likely	not	only	benefit	the	HF	understanding	of	the	managers	but	would	lead	to	significant	
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benefits	in	terms	of	the	wider	integration	of	HF	in	the	culture	and	mindset	of	the	investigation	organisation	and	therefore	have	a	positive	impact	on	the	quality	of	the	accident	reports.	This	supports	Dul	and	Neumann	(2005),	who	believe	that	if	HF	 were	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 organisation’s	 strategy,	 and	 be	 phrased	 in	 the	‘language’	of	the	organisation,	managers	would	be	more	likely	to	accept	it	and	it	would	therefore	be	better	embedded	within	the	organisation.		Moving	 away	 from	 the	 issue	 of	 training,	 analysis	 of	 the	 accident	 investigation	reports	 highlighted	 the	 disparity	 existing	 between	 different	 organisations	 in	terms	 of	 how	 HF	 issues	 were	 treated.	 While	 in	 some	 cases	 HF	 issues	 were	investigated	very	thoroughly,	including	both	dedicated	expertise	and	using	clear	literature	references,	this	was	by	no	means	always	the	case.	Generally	speaking,	and	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	organisations	with	in-house	HF	specialist	tended	to	be	those	that	investigated	and	integrated	the	HF	element	more	consistently	and	thoroughly	than	organisations	without	a	dedicated	HF	expertise.			While	this	seems	self-evident,	it	raises	an	important	question.	Namely,	what	are	the	reasons	for	organisations	choosing	not	to	operate	an	in-house	HF	specialist,	given	that	HF	is	widely	viewed	as	a	valuable	component	of	an	investigation	and	a	number	 of	 organisations	 already	 have	 them?	 If	 these	 are	 predominantly	structural	barriers,	such	as	insufficient	funding,	 insufficiently	skilled	candidates	available,	or	problems	with	 recruiting	 investigators,	 then	 it	 could	be	 suggested	that	the	problem	could	be	addressed	by	changes	at	high	level	(governmental	or	regulatory	 for	 example).	 However,	 if	 as	 the	 literature	 suggests	 (Baker,	 2010),	there	 remains	 scepticism	 on	 the	 part	 of	 some	 investigation	 organisations	
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regarding	the	value	and	credibility	of	HF,	then	it	would	seem	that	these	problems	are	more	inherent	and	more	difficult	to	address.			The	findings	from	this	research,	however,	would	suggest	that	providing	training	to	 managers	 and	 investigators	 would	 increase	 their	 awareness	 and	acknowledgement	and	 therefore	 ‘convince’	 them	of	 the	value	of	HF.	This	 could	potentially	 resolve	 the	 scepticism	 issue	 regarding	 the	 ‘usefulness’	of	HF,	which	was	one	of	the	reasons	why	HF	failed	to	be	implemented	in	the	industry,	as	noted	by	Helander	(2000).			For	 example,	 when	 an	 accident	 report	 lists	 several	 human	 factors	 issues	 as	causal	and/or	contributory	factors,	as	did	a	number	of	the	accident	reports	that	were	analysed,	it	might	be	expected	that	these	issues	were	developed	thoroughly	in	 the	 report	 and	 that	 relevant	 expertise	would	 be	 consulted.	However,	 as	 the	analysis	has	shown,	this	was	not	always	the	case.		Indeed,	it	was	surprising	that	a	number	of	reports	did	not	investigate	HF	in	any	great	depth	and	failed	to	refer	to	HF	expertise.	This	situation	would	appear	to	be	inconsistent	with	the	importance	and	value	of	HF	emphasized	by	the	findings	from	this	research.	Further,	this	also	appears	to	go	against	much	of	the	related	literature,	which	similarly	supports	the	importance	 of	HF.	 	Nevertheless,	 it	 provides	 an	 illustration	 and	 justification	 of	the	 investigators’	 doubts	 regarding	 the	 way	 HF	 is	 investigated	 in	 their	organisation	(see	chapter	V).		Whether	conducted	by	a	dedicated	‘in-house’	expert	or	external	party,	the	issue	of	who	(if	anyone)	is	best	to	involve	in	an	investigation	remains	a	key	challenge.	
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Indeed,	this	was	highlighted	by	the	organisation	interviewed	in	the	preliminary	research	 (which	do	not	 currently	have	dedicated	 in-house	expertise)	 as	one	of	their	 key	 challenges.	 In	 some	 cases,	 investigators	were	unconvinced	 that	 there	was	 sufficient	 need	 or	workload	 to	 justify	 employing	 a	 full-time	HF	 specialist.	While	this	view	was	unexpected,	given	the	significant	role	of	HF	issues	and	the	extent	 to	 which	 they	 are	 involved	 in	 air	 accidents	 (Shappell	 and	 Wiegmann,	1997),	and	the	fact	that	HF	experts	could	also	play	the	role	of	IIC,	it	also	possibly	highlights	a	wider	issue.		Namely,	that	there	might	be	a	need	for	greater	efforts	in	communicating	 the	 value	 and	 importance	 of	 HF	 within	 investigation	organisations,	 especially	 to	 those	 that	 currently	 lack	 a	 culture	 and	 history	 of	engaging	with	HF	 or	 those	 that	 do	 not	 systematically	 involve	HF	 specialists	 in	investigations,	even	where	HF	issues	appear	to	be	heavily	involved.		In	this	case,	the	importance	of	training	managers	so	that	they	can	influence	the	organisation	in	integrating	HF	more	thoroughly	would	appear	to	have	significant	benefits.			There	is	also	a	need	for	HF	experts	and	practitioners	to	more	clearly	define	what	HF	 can,	 and	 cannot,	 offer	 an	 investigation,	 as	well	 as	 its	 benefits	 and	potential	limitations.	This	should	in	turn	help	to	eliminate	criticisms	of	HF,	such	as	it	being	a	‘fuzzy’	discipline	that	does	not	lend	itself	to	quantifiable	‘facts’,	and	that	it	can	be	hard	to	remain	objective	and	know	when	to	‘stop	digging’.	In	some	cases,	HF	specialists’	testimonies	clarified	that	the	negative	view	of	HF	was	often	the	result	of	‘bad	experiences’	with	HF,	where	an	HF	‘expert’	had	not	based	their	work	on	evidence	and	had	not	made	it	accessible	to	non-experts.	The	task	of	a	specialist	is	therefore	not	limited	to	investigating	the	HF	element	but	also	making	sure	his	or	her	 fellow	 investigators	 understand	 the	 value	 of	 it	 and	 how	 it	 fits	 in	 the	
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investigation.	Equally,	according	to	Peterson	et	al’s	(2011)	work	in	the	maritime	industry,	the	HF	specialist	should	also	understand	the	inquiring	character	of	the	engineering	 discipline.	 This	 again	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 context	knowledge	 and	 understanding	 for	 HF	 investigators	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 HF	integration.	 In	 this	 sense,	 wider	 communication	 and	 dissemination	 of	 the	importance	of	their	skills	and	expertise	should	therefore	represent	an	important	role	for	the	wider	HF	community.			Of	course,	in	order	to	build	greater	confidence	and	credibility	in	HF	it	is	crucial	that	HF	experts	possess	the	necessary	skills	and	attributes	to	conduct	robust	and	valid	investigations.	While	industry	experience,	like	almost	any	other	profession,	is	likely	to	help	develop	the	necessary	skills	to	become	a	better	HF	investigator	over	 time,	 the	 responses	 from	 the	 interviews	 imply	 that	 a	 solid	 research	background,	likely	brought	by	a	specialist	degree	such	as	an	MSc	or	a	PhD,	is	also	valuable.	 This	 suggests	 that	while	 knowledge	 of	 the	 context	 can	 be	 developed	through	experience	and	on-the-job	experience,	 fundamental	qualities	 such	as	a	logical,	analytical	mind,	assertiveness,	interpersonal	and	team	working	skills,	as	well	 as	 good	 oral	 and	 written	 communication	 can	 also	 be	 brought	 by	 a	 solid	research	and	academic	background.			Conducting	research	in	academia	can	be	similar	to	an	investigation	in	that	data	is	gathered,	analysed	using	only	the	evidence	available	and	conclusions	are	drawn	from	what	 is	 available.	 A	 research	 or	 academic	 background	 can	be	 valuable	 in	this	sense	precisely	because	it	develops	the	necessary	skills	early	in	one’s	career,	rather	 than	having	 to	build	 them	 ‘on	 the	 job’	 later	 on.	 Indeed,	 this	was	 a	 view	
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widely	 shared	 by	 the	 interviewees	 in	 the	 sample.	 Furthermore,	while	 in	 some	cases	respondents	felt	 that	having	a	 ‘title’,	such	as	MSc	or	Dr.,	could	potentially	increase	 one’s	 recognition	 and	 credibility	 (for	 example	 during	 an	 inquest),	ultimately	it	is	the	rigour	and	integrity	of	the	HF	investigator	himself	that	lends	credibility	and	recognition,	not	their	title.				Ultimately,	there	should	be	little	reason	preventing	a	HF	specialist	being	the	IIC	of	an	investigation.	In	the	same	way	that	an	academic	background	may	develop	key	 skills	 and	personal	 attributes	 for	 an	 investigator,	 it	may	 also	 help	 develop	essential	 project	 management	 skills	 that	 would	 be	 required	 for	 leading	 an	investigation.	The	benefits	of	 the	addition	of	a	qualified	HF	specialist	within	an	organisation	would	not	be	at	the	expense	of	other	disciplines	or	expertise	(such	as	operation	or	engineering).	 Instead,	 it	would	seek	 to	complement	and	add	 to	existing	skill	sets	to	obtain	a	wider	range	of	expertise	in	the	investigation	team.	Together	 with	 the	 subject	 matter	 expert,	 the	 information	 gathered,	 and	 the	report	as	a	whole,	would	 likely	benefit	as	a	result.	Moreover,	 the	presence	of	a	specialist	 within	 an	 organisation	 could	 potentially	 address	 the	 ‘academy-industry	collaboration’	issue.	Whether	‘in-house’	or	external,	the	expertise	would	likely	 need	 to	 be	 available	 from	 the	 very	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 investigation	 and	consistently	 along	 the	 process	 in	 order	 to	 potentially	 facilitate	 the	communication	between	investigators	and	specialist	and	as	a	result	improve	the	quality	of	the	HF	element	in	accident	reports.		The	need	for	greater	clarity	and	consistency	emerged	as	a	common	theme	from	the	analysis,	and	the	same	can	be	said	of	the	need	for	a	common	approach.	
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Despite	the	fact	that	analysis	methods	are	widely	spread	in	the	literature,	the	use	of	a	specific	tool	or	methodology	to	run	the	analysis	of	an	investigation	is	limited.	While	it	was	not	the	goal	of	this	research	to	compare	the	merits	of	different	tools	and	 methodologies,	 the	 benefits	 arising	 from	 using	 a	 common	 approach	(whatever	that	may	be)	are	potentially	significant.	Such	a	tool	or	method	could	bring	a	common	standardisation	within	an	organisation,	allowing	for	easier	data	classification	 and	 comparison	 through	 time.	 For	 example,	 if	 for	 any	 reason	 it	were	 necessary	 to	 examine	 an	 older	 report	 or	 one	 conducted	 by	 a	 different	organisation,	an	approved	methodology	would	allow	for	easier	interpretation	of	the	findings	and	comprehension	of	the	process.			In	 summary,	 recommendations	 from	 the	 research	 revolve	 around	 three	 key	interrelated	 aspects;	 training	 provision,	 the	 involvement	 (or	 not)	 of	 HF	specialists,	 and	 the	 adoption	 of	 an	 approved	 approach	 or	methodology.	While	progress	 in	either	one	of	 these	areas	may	be	beneficial,	 it	seems	 likely	 that	 the	most	 significant	 benefits	would	 be	 felt	when	 all	 these	 aspects	were	 addressed	simultaneously.	 Indeed,	 in	 such	 a	 scenario	 it	 could	 be	 envisaged	 that	 the	progress	in	one	area	could	lead	to	benefits	in	other	areas	and	vice	versa.				Clearly	this	is	no	simple	task,	and	while	the	scale	of	the	challenge	should	not	be	underestimated,	 it	 is	 by	 no	 means	 insurmountable	 either.	 Certainly,	 a	coordinated	approach	from	all	related	parties	is	important,	and	it	is	believed	that	organisations	such	as	ICAO	and	regulators	have	an	important	part	to	play	here	in	providing	 more	 accurate	 and	 up-to-date	 guidance	 and/or	 requirements	 with	regards	to	HF	integration	in	HF	investigation.		
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As	identified	in	the	literature,	integrating	human	factors	is	a	challenge	shared	by	other	 industries,	 particularly	 the	 challenge	 of	 improving	 HF	 acceptance	 by	managers	 (Perrow,	 1983;	Dul	 and	Neumann,	 2005,	 2009).	 In	 the	 rail	 industry,	steps	 towards	 training	 managers	 have	 already	 been	 taken	 (Rose,	 2009)	 and	Wilson	et	al	(2007)	report	the	increased	use	of	human	factors	integration	plans	both	 in	 the	 rail	 and	defence	 industry.	This	would	 suggest	 that	progress	 can	be	made	in	terms	of	human	factors	integration	within	organisations	and	that	NIAs	could	potentially	learn	from	these	other	industries.		Ultimately,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 objective	 of	 human	 factors	 investigation	 to	 remove	human	 error,	 and	 this	 is	 the	 message	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 spread.	 Humans	 will	continue	 to	 make	 mistakes,	 but	 by	 being	 proactive	 and	 understanding	 these	mistakes,	why	they	occur,	and	then	put	effective	mitigation	measures	in	place	to	minimise	negative	consequences,	further	accidents	can	be	avoided.	Through	this,	the	 prospect	 of	 shifting	 from	 a	 culture	 of	 reactive	 safety	 to	 a	 more	 proactive	safety	may	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 achievable	 target,	 rather	 than	 just	 an	 ambition	 to	aspire	to.				
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VIII-	3	Summary	of	research	findings		The	 aim	 of	 the	 research	 was	 to	 examine	 the	 training	 needs	 of	 air	 accident	investigators	in	order	to	develop	more	thorough	integration	of	human	factors	in	accident	 investigations.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 an	 adaptation	 of	 a	 Training	 Needs	Analysis	was	conducted	and	five	objectives	were	fulfilled.		The	 first	 objective	 was	 to	 identify	 the	 current	 role	 of,	 and	 key	 human	 factors	challenges	 for	 air	 accident	 investigators.	 The	 literature	 review	 presented	 in	chapter	 II	 fulfilled	 this	 objective	 by	 emphasising	 the	 importance	 of	 human	factors	 investigation	 in	 aviation	 safety,	 demonstrating	 the	 evolution	 of	HF	 and	highlighting	the	fact	that	despite	some	efforts	from	organisations	more	thorough	HF	 investigation	 is	 necessary.	 It	 also	 pointed	 out	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 real	 detailed	guidance	 is	 provided	 on	 how	 to	 enable	 NIAs	 to	 conduct	 relevant	 HF	investigations.		The	 second	 objective,	 fulfilled	 by	 the	 review	 of	 accident	 reports	 using	 content	analysis,	 was	 to	 analyse	 human	 factors	 integration	 in	 accident	 investigation	reports.	 It	was	 found	 that	 investigations	 that	 referred	 to	 a	 specialist	 produced	more	thorough	and	robust	HF	 investigations.	This	was	particularly	the	case	 for	organisations	with	existing	in	house	dedicated	HF	expertise,	where	the	greatest	consistency	in	terms	of	the	quality	of	the	reports	was	observed.			On	the	contrary,	it	 was	 also	 found	 that	 some	 reports	 still	 did	 not	 investigate	 HF	 issues	 deeply	enough	to	understand	the	so-called	‘why’	questions	associated	with	an	accident.	
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Here,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 specific	 methodology	 was	 believed	 to	 provide	 good	standardisation	between	the	different	reports	of	an	organisation.		The	third	objective	was	to	evaluate	the	relevance	and	efficiency	of	human	factors	training	provision	 for	air	accident	 investigators.	This	was	 fulfilled	by	analysing	the	 results	 of	 an	 online	 questionnaire	 of	 89	 air	 accident	 investigators	 from	around	the	world.	It	was	found	that	while	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	HF	is	an	important	 component	 of	 an	 investigation,	 current	 training	 lacks	 consistency,	depth	and	standardisation.	Moreover,	 the	 results	 suggested	 that	 in	many	cases	little	 or	 no	 HF	 refresher	 training	 was	 provided.	 Additionally,	 the	 analysis	emphasised	the	fact	that	the	training	did	not	seem	adapted	to	the	investigators’	needs.		The	 fourth	 objective	 was	 to	 assess	 the	 training	 needs	 of	 air	 accident	investigators.	 This	 was	 fulfilled	 by	 analysis	 of	 a	 series	 of	 semi-structured	interviews	conducted	with	HF	experts	involved	in	air	accident	investigation,	and	a	 subsequent	 follow	 up	 questionnaire.	 This	 part	 of	 the	 research	 provided	detailed	insight	into	what	the	training	and	refresher	content	and	format	should	be	 for	 accident	 investigators,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 highlighting	 the	 fact	 that	 managers	should	 also	 receive	 training	 and	 regular	 recurrent	 training.	 A	 key	 finding	 here	related	to	the	need	for	training	programs	to	enable	investigators	and	managers	to	 accurately	 identify	 HF	 issues	 in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 contact	 an	 expert	 when	necessary,	and	not	simply	try	to	tackle	the	issue	on	their	own.			
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Findings	also	focussed	on	the	skills	and	attributes	required	of	HF	experts.	It	was	suggested	 that	 academic	 and	 research	 background	 paired	 with	 a	 deep	understanding	 of	 the	 aviation	 context	would	be	 a	 starting	point	 for	 a	 good	HF	investigator.	 The	 presence	 of	 a	 HF	 specialist	 in	 an	 organisation	 was	 also	identified	 as	 being	 beneficial	 for	 the	 integration	 of	 HF,	 with	 the	 possibility	 of	having	HF	 experts	 in	 a	management	 or	 IIC	 position	 as	well	 as	 helping	 further	develop	training	and	methodology.			The	 fifth	 and	 final	 objective	 was	 to	 provide	 recommendations	 for	 developing	human	 factors	 integration	 in	 accident	 investigations.	While	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	TNA	 concluded	 that	 more	 adapted	 training	 was	 necessary,	 it	 was	 also	recommended	to	investigation	organisations	and	other	departments	conducting	investigations	to	consider	the	involvement	of	a	HF	specialist.	Additionally,	 it	 was	 recommended	 that	 organisations	 develop	 or	 use	 an	approved	 tool	 or	 methodology	 to	 conduct	 and	 report	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	investigations.	 It	 was	 felt	 that	 this	 would	 help	 increase	 the	 awareness	 of	 HF,	bring	standardisation	within	the	organisation	and	bring	wider	credibility	to	the	HF	element	of	an	investigation.		
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VIII-	4	Research	limitations			While	 every	 effort	 was	 made	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 design	 and	 execution	 of	 the	research	 was	 robust	 and	 valid,	 there	 are	 inevitably	 some	 possible	 limitations	that	need	to	be	acknowledged.			As	 specified	 in	 the	 analysis	 in	 chapter	 IV,	 a	 total	 of	 15	 accident	 investigation	reports	 were	 analysed.	 While	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	 this	 represents	 only	 a	relatively	 small	 proportion	 of	 the	 total	 number	 of	 accident	 reports	 available,	given	 the	 necessary	 time	 constraints	 associated	 with	 analysing	 lengthy	documents	in	considerable	detail,	it	was	believed	best	to	sacrifice	a	much	larger	sample	in	favour	of	a	smaller,	but	more	in-depth,	analysis	of	a	smaller	number	of	up	to	date	reports.	Moreover,	the	sample	of	the	accident	reports	was	selected	as	objectively	as	possible,	as	detailed	in	chapter	IV.		Another	limitation	was	that	the	researcher	was	the	only	person	coding	both	the	reports	 and	 the	 interview	 transcripts.	 Ideally	 a	 number	 of	 researchers	 would	have	 analysed	 the	 documents	 and	 transcripts	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 an	 agreed	coding	 scheme.	 However,	 the	 use	 of	 predetermined	 coding	 and	 triangulation	methodology	 enabled	 the	 researcher	 to	 compensate	 for	 these	 flaws	 and	minimise	researcher	bias	or	interpretation	in	these	steps	of	the	project.		As	 with	 any	 questionnaire	 survey,	 achieving	 a	 suitable	 sample	 size	 was	extremely	 important.	 Indeed,	where	 quantitative	 analysis	 of	 survey	 findings	 is	
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concerned,	 generally	 speaking,	 the	 larger	 the	 survey	 sample,	 the	better.	 In	 this	sense,	89	completed	questionnaires	(as	was	the	case	here)	does	not	appear	to	be	a	 particularly	 large	 sample.	 However,	 while	 perhaps	 modest	 in	 terms	 of	 total	number,	given	the	highly	specialised	nature	of	the	target	population	(i.e.	current	air	accident	investigators)	and	the	geographic	spread	of	respondents,	it	could	at	least	 be	 considered	 as	 representative.	 In	 fact,	 to	 the	 best	 of	 the	 researcher’s	knowledge,	no	other	published	studies	examining	the	views	of	investigators	have	achieved	a	larger	sample	size	(of	air	accident	investigators).	Similarly,	while	13	semi-structured	interviews	does	not	in	itself	represent	a	large	interview	sample,	this	represented	around	three	quarter	of	the	targeted	sample.	The	response	rate	was	therefore	considered	as	high	and	sufficient	to	run	descriptive	statistics.		Finally,	the	period	during	which	this	research	was	conducted	did	not	enable	the	researcher	 to	develop	and	conduct	 training,	allowing	 feedback	and	adjustment,	which	would	have	closed	the	systemic	cycle	of	training.			As	with	any	research	of	this	nature,	the	findings	of	the	research	to	some	extent	represent	 a	 snapshot	 in	 time.	 The	 aviation	 industry,	 and	 indeed	 the	 world	 in	which	 we	 currently	 inhabit,	 is	 subject	 to	 almost	 constant	 flux	 and	 on	 going	change.	This	is	to	say	that	while	the	findings	of	the	research	presented	here	are	valid	and	appropriate	for	the	present	context,	 it	would	be	naive	to	assume	that	this	 would	 always	 remain	 the	 case	 regardless	 of	 external	 factors	 affecting	 the	industry	in	the	future.			
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VIII-	5	Further	research		
	In	 light	of	 the	research	 findings	and	potential	 limitations,	a	number	of	possible	areas	for	future	research	can	be	identified.			
VIII-	5-	1	Development	and	Evaluation	of	Human	Factors	Integration	for	
investigator	training		It	 is	 foreseen	 that	 thorough	 and	 systematic	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	concepts	 and	 key	 issues	 into	 initial	 training	 regimes	 and	 follow	 on	 refresher	programmes,	 targeted	 specifically	 for	 air	 accident	 investigators,	 could	 yield	important	 benefits	 for	 the	 discipline.	 Namely,	 that	 investigators	 possessing	 a	firmer	 grounding	 and	 appreciation	 of	 human	 factors	 issues	will	 ultimately	 feel	more	empowered	and	able	to	routinely	identify	human	factors	issues	and	be	able	to	communicate	effectively	with	 the	HF	expert,	 should	 the	situation	demand	 it.	Over	 time	 it	 is	 seen	 that	 this	would	 benefit	 the	 breadth	 and	 depth	 of	 accident	reports	and,	ultimately,	improve	accident	safety	rates.		For	 such	 a	 scenario	 to	 become	 reality	 it	 would	 inevitably	 require	 close	collaboration	 with,	 and	 the	 active	 involvement	 of,	 key	 regulatory	 bodies	 and	policy	 makers	 throughout	 the	 integration	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 training	programme	 and	 the	 development	 of	 an	 accreditation	 system	 to	 recognise	 the	value	 of	 different	 courses	 on	 offer.	 In	 other	 words,	 without	 sufficient	commitment	 or	 ‘buy	 in’	 from	 bodies	 such	 as	 ICAO,	 there	 is	 little	 hope	 that	achieving	enhanced	integration	of	human	factors	in	training	regimes	will	occur.	
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Hence,	an	important	path	for	further	research	may	focus	on	examining	precisely	how,	and	when,	the	modification	of	investigator	training	programmes	should	be	changed	 to	 reflect	 the	 greater	 focus	 on	 human	 factors	 issues	 under	 existing	regulatory	frameworks.		
While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	thesis	to	try	and	outline	precisely	what	such	a	scheme	 might	 look	 like	 in	 practice,	 especially	 given	 the	 diverse	 nature	 of	different	 investigative	organisations	and	national	 regulatory	bodies	worldwide,	it	would	however	make	sense	that	such	plans	would	identify	strategic	tasks	and	targets	for	completion,	with	accompanying	milestones	for	the	delivery	of	these.		This	type	of	plan	is	commonly	referred	to	as	‘road-map’	or	policy	‘pathway’,	and	are	 commonplace	 in	an	aviation	 context.	 For	example,	 in	2009	 ICAO	published	their	 roadmap	 detailing	 the	 progressive	 transition	 from	 AIS	 (Aeronautical	Information	 Service)	 to	 AIM	 (Aeronautical	 Information	 Management),	 which	describes	 the	 dynamic,	 integrated	 management	 of	 aeronautical	 information	services	(ICAO,	2009).	In	the	roadmap,	the	implementation	of	the	new	operating	practices	and	protocols	 is	detailed,	broken	down	into	separate	 ‘phases’,	as	well	as	 outlining	 the	 affected	 stakeholders	 for	 each	 stage	 and	 the	 tools	 needed	 for	delivery.	 A	 similar	 approach	might	 be	 taken	 in	 this	 case	 for	 the	 integration	 of	human	 factors	 into	 accident	 investigation.	A	possible	 initial	 phase	would	be	 to	determine	a	way	to	embed	HF	in	initial	training	for	investigators,	via	the	use	of	accident	simulation	 involving	HF	 issues	 for	example,	and	to	determine	detailed	guidelines	 and	 requirements	 on	 specialist	 and	 recurrent	 HF	 trainings	investigators	should	undertake,	which	could	be	based	on	this	research’s	findings	and	 recommendations.	 Following	 phase	 could	 involve	 the	 identification	 of	 an	
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accreditation	 system	 for	 training	 organisations	 or	 specific	 HF	 courses.	 This	would	in	turn	guide	investigation	organisations	to	the	appropriate	courses	into	which	 they	 should	 enrol	 their	 investigators.	 Parallel	 regulatory	 steps	 could	include	 the	 development	 of	 guidelines	 on	 HF	 expert’s	 involvement	 and	recruitment.	
Once	 in	 operation,	 the	 ability	 to	 measure	 the	 effect	 of	 such	 training	 on	 the	subsequent	quality	of	accident	reports	over	longer	time	scales,	and	ultimately	on	the	 overall	 safety	 rate,	 would	 provide	 valuable	 contributions	 to	 this	 field.	However,	 it	 is	 recognised	 that	 this	 would	 likely	 represent	 a	 considerable	challenge	and	care	would	need	to	be	taken	to	ensure	that	this	was	implemented	appropriately.			
VIII-	5-	2	Comparing	‘in-house’	versus	‘external’	HF	expertise		The	 differences	 between	 in-house	 and	 external	 HF	 expertise	 within	 an	investigation	 organisation	 was	 identified	 as	 a	 key	 finding	 in	 the	 research.	Namely,	 it	 was	 seen	 that	 differences	 existed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 depth	 and	consistency	 of	 human	 factors	 reporting	 in	 the	 accident	 reports.	 Subsequently,	future	 research	may	 seek	 to	 compare	 the	 benefits	 and	 limitations	 of	 in-house	versus	 external	 expertise	 more	 systematically.	 This	 might	 take	 the	 form	 of	longitudinal	 study	 comparing	 different	 organisations.	 While	 this	 might	 be	challenging	 from	 a	 purely	 quantitative	 perspective,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 air	accident	 reporting,	 a	 more	 qualitatively	 focussed	 assessment	 may	 produce	important	 findings.	 	 It	 is	 foreseen	 that	 such	 work	 would	 help	 more	 informed	
	 216	
decisions	 on	 the	 part	 of	 organisations	 as	 to	 how	 they	 should	 engage	 with	 HF	experts	when	conducting	investigations.			As	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 thesis,	 human	 factors	 in	 accident	 investigation	 is	 a	complex	 issue	 that	 has	 led	 to	 considerable	 academic	 research	 and	 industry	development.	With	global	airspace	getting	busier	and	busier,	and	the	uncertain	influence	of	factors	such	as	the	growth	of	automation,	it	can	be	assumed	that	the	role	 of	 human	 factors	 in	 air	 accident	 investigation	 will	 become	 even	 more	important	in	the	future.	As	this	research	has	demonstrated,	it	is	therefore	never	more	important	than	it	is	now	to	ensure	that	managers	and	investigators	receive	the	 quality	 and	 type	 of	 training	 proportionate	 with	 the	 importance	 of	 human	factors	as	a	discipline.				
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INTERVIEW(GUIDE(FOR(INTERVIEWEES(/(CONSENT(FORM((
• About(the(interviewer:((Camille(Burban,(PhD(student(at(Cranfield(University((UK)(Nationality:(French(Background:( Mechatronics( engineering,( MSc( in( Human( Factors( and( Safety( in(Aviation((PhD( topic:( To(what( extent( Air( accident( investigators( should( be( human( factors(specialists?(I( am( looking( into( the( level( of( HF( training( that( accident( investigators( should(receive.(After(identifying(a(lack(of(confidence(and(knowledge(due(to(deficiencies(in( their( initial( training( and( lack( of( recurrent( training,( I( am( now( looking( at(designing(more(adapted( training(by( trying( to(understand(what(are( their(needs(and(what(should(their(role(be(in(Human(Factors(investigation.(((
• About(the(interview:((Length:(approx.(1(hour((Topics(approached:((
− Your(background(and(motivation(
− Recruitment/expectations(
− Role(and(involvement(/(approach(to(the(investigation(/(approach(within(your(organisation(/(task(and(challenges(/(balance(
− The(way(HF(in(considered(nowadays(in(accident(investigations(
− Relation(with(accident(investigators(/(teamwork(/(their(understanding(
− What(you(do(different/(what(makes(you(an(expert(
− How(they(could(improve(their(knowledge(/(confidence(/(most(important(HF(topics(to(cover(and(develop((I(am(interested(in(your(opinion(about(the(way(Human(Factors(is(approached(in(accident(investigations(and(the(way(it(could(be(improved,(looking(specifically(at(accident(investigators’(knowledge(and(attitude.((
It# is#not# the#goal#of# this# interview# to#obtain#any#confidential# information.#
Each# interview#will# stay# anonymous# and#only# be# used# for# the# purpose# of#
this#research.#Please( note( that( this( is( not,( in( any( case,( an( evaluation( and( you( can( decide( to(withdraw(your(interview(from(the(research(one(week(after(it(took(place.((You(can(contact(me(at:(c.m.burban@cranfield.ac.uk(+(44(7(428(521(737((For(analysis(purposes(this(interview(will(be(tape/recorded.(Please(sign(here(if(you(agree(to(take(part(in(the(survey:((Date:(( ( ( ( ( ( Name(and(Signature:(
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